the Post-office Department give the dimensions and styles and description of the various receptacles, and these are sometimes admitted. The books contain no particular line of precedents with respect to such proof.

Section 197 of the new Code, which is, as above stated, a substitute for 5472 and 5473 of the old statute, eliminates some of the uncertainties that were in the old statutes, and as the new section now stands, it is easily understood. The following cases were interesting under the old section: United States vs. Reeves, 38 Fed., 404, which determined in line with the academic authorities, the meaning of the words "dangerous weapon," the responsibility of one aiding or advising the offense, the meaning of the words "attempt to rob," and the further decision that the offense is committed where it is shown that the mail or any part thereof is taken fraudulently from the possession of the carrier, against his will, by violence or putting him in fear. In Jeff Harrison vs. United States, 163 U. S., 140, the only point decided was that a violation of 5472 was a felony, and on the prosecution for which the defendant was entitled to ten peremptory challenges under Section 819. United States vs. Hare, 2 Wharton Crim. Cases, 283, 26 Federal Cases, 148; U. S. vs. Wilson, 28 Federal Cases, 699; U. S. vs. Bowman, 5 Pac. Rep. 333.

§ 47a. Reasonable Doubt in Appellate Court.Matthews vs. U. S., 192 Federal, 490, is a fact case under old Section 5472, in which the Court of Appeals affirms a judgment based upon circumstantial evidence and announces the rule that an Appellate Court need not be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendants in order to affirm.

§ 476. Duplicitousness.-An indictment which charges that the defendant attempted to rob the mail clerk and put his life in jeopardy is not duplicitous. Price vs. U. S., 218 Federal, 149.

§ 48. Obstructing the Mail.-Section 201 of the new Code takes the place of Section 3995 of the old, and enlarges the same by adding the words "car, steamboat, or other conveyance or vessel," and changes the punishment, which was, in the old statute, a fine of not more than a hun

dred dollars, to a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both. These changes, however, do not render valueless the many cases arising under the old section.

In Salla vs. United States, 104 Fed., 544, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an indictment charging defendants with conspiring "to unlawfully, wilfully, maliciously, and knowingly" delay and obstruct, etc., the passage of a railway car and train, "which said railway car and train were then and there carrying and transporting the mails of the United States," was insufficient to charge a violation of Section 3995, since it failed to charge that the defendants knew that said car and train were carrying the mails. In other words, the authorities are a unit upon the proposition that the indictment must allege, and the proof must show, that the defendants knew that the vehicle they obstructed carried the United States mail.

By an Act of the Fifty-seventh Congress, second session, page 1176 of the first part of Volume 32, Statute at Large, Congress determined "that every special delivery messenger, when actually engaged in carrying or delivering letters or other mail matter under contract, directly or indirectly, with the Post-office Department, or employed by the Postoffice Department," shall be deemed a carrier or person intrusted with the mail, and having custody thereof, within the meaning of certain Sections of the Revised Statutes, which included old Section 3995.

It has been directly decided that two or more may conspire to commit the offense of obstructing the mail, as shown in Conrad vs. United States, 127 Fed., 798. Other interesting cases bearing upon the old section are the following: United States vs. Kirby, 74 U. S.; 19 Law Ed., 278, and see also note; in re Debs, 158 U. S., 564; Clune vs. United States, 159 U. S., 590; United States vs. Cassidy, 67 Fed., 698; United States vs. Thomas, 55 Fed., 380; United States vs. Sears, 55 Fed., 268; United States vs. Woodward, 44 Fed., 592; United States vs. Kane, 19 Fed., 42; United States vs. Claypool, 14 Fed., 127; United States vs. De Mott, 3 Federal,

478.

An officer in possession of a civil warrant against a mail carrier is not justified in arresting the mail carrier, though. the carrier be not detained longer than necessary for the

execution of the warrant. United States vs. Harvey, 8 Law Rep., 77. In United States vs. Barney, 3 Am. Law Journal, 128, the Court held in substance that the law did not allow any justification of a wilful and voluntary act of obstruction to the passage of the mail, such as the seizure by its lawful owner of a stolen horse found in a mail stage, or the arrest of its driver for debt. On the other hand, in United States vs. Hart, Pet. C. C., 390; S. C. 3 Wheeler's Criminal Case, 304, the Court held that the Act was not to be so construed as to prevent the arrest of the driver of a carriage transporting the mail when he was driving through a crowded city at such a rate as to injure the lives of the inhabitants. So also, it is understood that mere service of process on a mail carrier, without detaining him, is not an obstruction of the mail. United States vs. Harvey, 8 Law Rep., 77.

It seems, however, to be settled that while a mail carrier is not liable to arrest upon civil process-that he is liable to arrest on a charge of any criminal offense, as a violation of the law against the sale of liquor. Penny vs. Walker, 64 Maine, 430; S. C. 18 American Rep., 269.

The safest practice, however, in view of the public interest in the speeding of mails, is for the officer to make the arrest after the carrier has delivered his charge, which is not at all difficult to accomplish.

§ 48a. Presumption as to Mail on Train.—Judge Speer decided the case of U. S. vs. Hall, 206 Federal, 485, and held that every passenger train must be presumed to be a carrier of United States mail and that therefore an allegation of knowledge was unnecessary in an indictment under Section 201. The learned judge cites no authorities in support of his decision. It is not believed that such a presumption will be allowed in the criminal law. The stopping of a train, the chastising of the engineer of a train or the infliction of bodily punishment upon the members of the crew of a train without any thought of delaying the United States mail which might or might not be on such a train, would certainly not be an offense within the jurisdiction of the United States Courts. There must be an allegation that the defendant knew that the carriage thus delayed was conveying United States mail and it is thought that Salla vs. U. S.,

104 Federal, 544, correctly states the rule, that is if there be no allegation that the defendants knew that the car and train were carrying the mails, the indictment is defective.

§ 49. Ferryman Delaying the Mail.-Section 202 differs little from the old statute 3996, and reads as follows:

"Whoever, being a ferryman, shall delay the passage of the mail by wilful negligence or refusal to transport the same across any ferry, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars."

The penalty of the old statute was ten dollars, and required that a delay should be for ten minutes, but the new section evidently means any delay that is wilful.

$ 50. Postmaster or Other Employee Detaining or Destroying Newspapers.-Section 196 of the new Code, which reads as follows:

"Whoever, being a postmaster or other person employed in any department of the postal service, shall improperly detain, delay, embezzle, or destroy any newspaper, or permit any other person to detain, delay, embezzle, or destroy the same, or open, or permit any other person to open, any mail or package of newspapers not directed to the office where he is employed; or whoever shall open, embezzle, or destroy any mail or package of newspapers not being directed to him, and he not being authorized to open or receive the same; or whoever shall take or steal any mail or package of newspapers from any post-office or from any person having custody thereof, shall be fined not more than one hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than one year, or both," replaced Section 5471 of the old statutes, and contains practically nothing new except that the wording is changed somewhat, and the punishment is enlarged.

tain none.

For some reasons there were few prosecutions under 5471, and so far as reported decisions are concerned, the books conEx parte Friday, in 43 Federal, page 920, cited by some annotations, really does not bear upon the section. other than to cite it as an instance of the power of a Court to impose hard labor, even though the term be less than one In State vs. Nichols, 50 Louisiana Ann., 699, the statute is cited.

year.

At page 512 of the First Volume of the Supplement, being an Act of the Forty-ninth Congress, which applies alike

to all of the statutes relating to offenses against the postal service, committed by persons employed therein in connection with the immediate delivery service, whether temporarily or permanently, or whether under oath or not:

"That any person employed to make immediate delivery of letters or other mail matter under the provisions of this Act, or the Act of which the same is amendatory, shall be deemed an employee of the postal service, whether he may have been sworn or not, or temporarily or permanently employed, and as such employee shall be liable to any penalties or punishments provided by law for the improper detention, delay, secretion, rifling, embezzlement, purloining, or destruction of any letter or other article of mail matter, or the contents thereof, entrusted to him for delivery, or placed in his custody."

§ 51. Postmaster or Employee of Service Detaining or Destroying Embezzling Letter, Etc.-Section 195 of the new Code, which reads as follows:

"Whoever, being a postmaster or other person employed in any department of the postal service, shall unlawfully detain, delay, or open any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail intrusted to him or which shall come into his possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail or carried or delivered by any carrier, messenger, agent, or other person employed in any department of the postal service, or forwarded through or delivered from any post office or station thereof established by authority of the Postmaster General; or shall secrete, embezzle, or destroy any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail; or shall steal, abstract, or remove from any such letter, package, bag, or mail, any article or thing contained therein, shall be fined not more than five hundred dollars, or imprisoned not more than five years, or both,"

takes the place of Sections 3890, 3891, and 5467 of the old statutes. The new law, as above quoted, does not contain the inhibition against the holding of office by a postmaster who unlawfully detains letters or mail matter, but largely increases the punishment. The three old sections were a source of considerable confusion, and with the making of the new section, which plainly states, in commensurate words, the elements of the offenses therein included, this will be largely removed.

The system of postal supervision and preservation by and through efficient Inspectors, ofttimes makes it necessary to