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have jurisdiction of the offense and of the person and have complied with statutory requirements governing their procedure. Mullan vs. U. S., 212, U. S., 516.

§ 42f. Appeal and Writ of Error. The new judicial code of March 3, 1911, provides at Section 128, page 143, Hopkins Judicial Code, that the Circuit Court of Appeals shall exercise appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal or writ of error the final decisions in the District Courts.

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Section 238 provides for the taking by appeal or writ of error direct to the United States Supreme Court from the District Court, in any case in which the jurisdiction of the Court is in issue, in which case the question of jurisdiction alone shall be certified to the Supreme Court from the Court below for decision; from the final sentence and decrees in prize cases; in any case that involves the construction or application of the Constitution of the United States; in any case in which the Constitutionality of any law of the United States, or the validity or construction of any treaty made under its authority, is drawn in question; and in any case in which the Constitution or law of a State is claimed to be in contravention of the Constitution of the United States.

Section 240 of the same act provides that in any case, civil or criminal, in which the judgment or decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is made final by the provisions of that Act, it shall be competent for the Supreme Court to require, by certiorari or otherwise, upon the petition of any party thereto, any such case to be certified to the Supreme Court for its review and determination, with the same power and authority in the case as if it had been carried by appeal or writ of error to the Supreme Court.

All criminal cases are cases at law and therefore are reviewable only by writ of error and not by appeal. All equity cases are reviewable only by appeal. The disbarment of an attorney is an action in law and the proceedings of the lower Court are reviewed upon writ of error instead of upon appeal, Thatcher vs. U. S., 212 Federal, 805.

A writ of error may be prosecuted in forma pauperis as provided by the Act of June 25, 1910. Latham vs. U. S., 210 Federal, 159.

This Act provides for appellate rights by a pauper either by writ of error or appeal if the person shall certify under oath his poverty and inability to pay the costs or to give security therefor, and provided the trial court shall not certify, in writing, that in its opinion, such appeal or writ of error is not taken in good faith. Act of June 25, 1910, p. 401, Thornton on Federal Acts.

§ 42g. Bill of Particulars.-When an indictment sets forth the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense with such certainty that it cannot be pronounced ill upon motion to quash or demurrer, and yet is acknowledged in such language that the accused is liable to be surprised by the production of evidence for which he is unprepared, he should, in advance of the trial, apply for a bill of the particular. Rinker vs. U. S., 151 Federal, 759; Loring vs. U. S., 91 Federal, 881. A bill of particulars cannot make an indictment valid which fails to state an essential element of the offense, when objection is made at the proper time and in the proper manner. May vs. U. S., 199 Federal, 61. Morris vs. U. S., 161 Federal, 672. Connors vs. U. S., 158, U. S. 408.

§ 42h. Corporations-Indictment of. Regardless of the original position of the Courts of this and the mother country, and regardless of the differences that exist in the early decisions of the Courts of this country, it is now well setted that corporations may be indicted, as well for misfeasance as for non-feasance. 10 Cyc. 1226. The original theory was that a corporation was not indictable for acts of misfeasance because it had no power, under its charter, to commit such acts, but that when those who professed to act in this behalf committed acts of misfeasance they were acting ultra vires and their acts were personal acts and not the acts of the corporation. This rule was strictly analogous to the ancient doctrine that evil intent or motive cannot be imputed to a corporation and that a corporation cannot be made liable to a civil action for a trespass or other malicious injury unless committed by deed. 10 Cyc. 1226.

These theories and ideas have been completely overturned and this is thoroughly settled, both in England and in the United States, that a corporation may be prosecuted, both for misfeasance and non-feasance. Ellis vs. U. S.,

206 U. S.; U. S. vs. Kelso, 86 Federal, 304; U. S. vs. Corporation I, 125 Federal, 94.

In Kaufman vs. U. S., 212 Federal, 613, the conviction of an individual for aiding and abetting a corporation in the commission of a criminal offense was affirmed. In the Kaufman case Circuit Judge Rogers says: "It is undoubtedly the case that decisions and dicta can be found denying that a corporation can be indicted. Lord Holt is reported as having said that 'A corporation is not indictable, but the particular members of it are.' But it is a well-established principle of modern jurisprudence that an indictment will lie against a corporation, although there are some crimes, as treason or felony or breach of the peace, in respect of which it is agreed that an indictment could not be maintained against it, and it has been held that where a statute prescribes fine and imprisonment, it is not applicable to a corporation, because a corporation cannot be imprisoned. U. S. vs. Braun, 158 Federal, 456. But in Cohen vs. U. S., 157 Federal, 651, this Court decided that a bankrupt corporation was capable of committing offense of knowingly or fraudulently concealing its property from its trustee, definable and made punishable by the bankruptcy act, and that persons who conspire to cause a corporation to commit such an act are indictable for the conspiracy and that it is immaterial that a corporation is not or cannot be indicted as one of the conspirators.

The indictment should be against the corporation in its corporate name. 10 Cyc. 1231; 3rd Chitty Criminal Law, 587.

In the Ellis case, cited supra, there were a number of corporations indicted for violation of the Federal eighthour Act, and so far as the record discloses in the Supreme Court of the United States, there was no question raised whatsoever as to the propriety of the proceedings.

Upon the filing of an information or an indictment against a corporation, the moving officer should cause a summons to be prepared for service upon the corporation which should direct the defendant to appear before the Court on a given date to answer the charge contained in the accusing document, and such summons should contain a general statement of the nature of the charge, and advise the defendant that it might secure a more complete statement of such offense by

referring to the information or indictment on file with the clerk. U. S. vs. Kelso, 86 Federal, 304; U. S. vs. Nixon, Supreme Court of the United States, Oct. Term, 1914.

In the case of Hanley vs. U. S., 186 Federal, 711, the defendant, who was general manager for a corporation, was convicted for aiding and abetting other employees of the corporation, but the case does not seem to raise the question being here considered as to the liability of the corporation.

In the preparation of summons or citation for a corporation to answer a criminal charge, I would suggest the following of the statute of the particular state in which the prosecution is pending that covers the service of Court summons for a corporation. U. S. vs. Kelso.

Bishop, in Bishop's first volume, New Criminal Law, page 255, Section 417, treats of the capacity of a corporation for crime and maintains that a corporation cannot, in its corporate capacity, commit a crime by an act in the fullest sense ultra vires, but within the sphere of its corporate capacity, and to an undefined extent, whenever it assumes to act as a corporation it has the same capabilities of criminal intent and of act, in other words, of crime, as an individual man sustaining to the thing the like relation.

Of course it will be borne in mind, which question can seldom arise in a criminal prosecution, however, that a corporation is a citizen only of the state in which it is incorporated. Baldwin vs. Pacific, 199 Federal, 291; Lemon vs. Imperial, etc., 199 Federal, 927; Woerheider vs. Jones, etc., 199 Federal, 535. Revett vs. Clise, 207 Federal, 673.

§ 42i. Error-Not Assigned.-In criminal cases Courts are not inclined to be as exacting with reference to the specific character of the objection made, as in civil cases. They will, in the exercise of a sound discretion, sometimes notice error in the trial of a criminal case, although the question was not properly raised at the trial by objection and exception. Crawford vs. U. S., 212 U. S., 183; Wiborg vs. U. S. 163; U. S. 632; Weems vs. U. S.; 217 U. S. 349; Savage vs. U. S.; 213 Federal 31.

Of course this is a most unsafe practice and a most unsafe way in which to try a criminal case. The courts are not called upon to consider objections to the instructions of the Court or objections to the introduction of testimony unless

exceptions were properly reserved and are properly presented for consideration of the Appellate Court. Savage vs. U. S., 213 Federal, 32; Hickory vs. U. S., 151 U. S., 303; Stewart vs. Wyoming Cattle Co., 128 U. S., 383; Lewis vs. U. S., 146, U. S. 370.

§ 42j. Continuance. It is well settled that the action of the trial Court upon an application for a continuance is a matter of discretion not subject to review, unless such discretion has been abused. Hardy vs. U. S. 186; U. S. 224; Latham vs. U. S., 210 Federal, 159; Isaacs vs. U. S., 159, U. S. 487; Goldsbuy vs. U. S., 160 U. S. 70; Metropolitan Street Railway vs. Davis, 112 Federal, 634; Pacey vs. McKinney, 125 Federal, 679; Dexter vs. Kellas, 113 Federal 48.

In Youtsey vs. U. S., 97 Federal 940, it was held that an application for continuance which contains also a showing, supported by affidavits of the mental weakness of the defendant occasioned by epilepsy, requires the Court to try the issue by appropriate proceedings.

$42k. Extradition.-Under the Constitution of the United States one who commits an offense in one State and flees to another, is liable to be extradited and the State in which the refugee is sought must respond when application is made to its chief executive. In the Federal procedure, however, extradition is accomplished by a much simpler process and there is no appeal to the Executive of the State. Defendants are removed from one state to another or from one district to another, rather, as the case may be. The statute authorizing this procedure is old Section 1014, the latter part of which reads as follows, "And where any offender or witness is committed in any district other than that where the offence is to be tried, it shall be the duty of the judge of the district where such offender or witness is imprisoned, seasonably to issue, and of the marshal to execute, a warrant for his removal to the district where the trial is to be had."

The procedure is simply that the prosecuting officer for the district where the defendant is apprehended, presents a written statement of such apprehension, including a synopsis of the defendant's preliminary hearing before a United States Commissioner, to the Court and moves that the Court

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