made not every clod or stone a star or sun; or that he suffered men to be tormented by each other's cruelty, or by such diseases as the stone and strangury, convulsions, epilepsies, &c.; or that men at last must die, and their bodies rot and turn to dust. That these things are done, is past dispute; and that God is good is past dispute: and, therefore, that all this is consistent with this goodness, is past dispute; and consequently that his goodness is not to be measured by so low a thing as human or any creature interest. "

If you say, that all this is hurtful to the individuals, but not to the universe, to which it is better that there be a mixture of evil with good, than that every part had a perfection in itself; I answer :

1. It seemeth, then, that the good which you measure God's goodness by, is not the interest of any individual creature, at least, that is in this lower world. For you confess, that the good which would make it happy, is given to it limitedly, and with mixtures of permitted or inflicted evil; and that God could have given them more of that goodness, if he would: God could have freed them from pain and misery; yea, and have given the ignorant more knowledge, and honesty, and grace. So that it is not our interest that is the measure of his goodness: and if so, what is it that you call the universal interest. Surely, the universality of rational creatures hath no being but in the individuals; and if it be not the welfare of the individuals, which is the measure, there is not any interest or welfare of the uniwhich is of the same kind: and for the insensible creatures, they feel neither good nor hurt, and, therefore, by your measure, should be none of the universe, whose measure it is. Therefore, it must be somewhat above the sensible interest of any, or all the individuals, which you call the bonum universitatis: and that can be nothing else but that state and order of the universe, in which it is conformable to the idea of the divine intellect, and to the volition of the divine will, and so is fittest for him to take complacency in, as being the measure and reasons of his own volitions and operations, which he fetcheth not aliunde,

verse,

m It was the erroneous reasoning of the philosophers, to prove the world eternal, that optimum et pulchrum, God and the world, must be inseparable; and so to conclude the being of that, which their fancies think best to be; (as Ammonius argueth with Zachar. Mitilen. ;) whereby they might as well prove (as Zach. telleth Ammon.) that Plato and Aristotle were from eternity, and must never die. It is foolish to reason against sense and experience, or to deny that which is, because we think that it should be otherwise.

or at least which are unknown to such as we. No doubt but it is more for the happiness of the individuals, that every dust, and stone, and fly, and beast, and man were an angel; but it is not so.

2. And surely they that believe the evil of sin, and that God could have kept it out of the world, and saved the individuals from it, will confess that man's interest is not the measure of God's goodness, especially considering what consequents also follow sin, both here and hereafter.

3. And as to this lower part of the universe, how many nations of the earth are drowned in woful ignorance and ungodliness: how few are the wise, and good, and peaceable! When God could have sent them learning, and teachers, and means of reformation, and have blessed all this means to their deliverance. So that the far greater part of this lower world hath not so much good as God could give them; and the infirmities of the best do cause their dolorous complaints.

It is certain that God is infinitely good, and that all his works also are good in their degree; but, withal, it is certain that God in himself is the simple, primitive good, and that created goodness principally consisteth in conformity with his will, which is the standard and measure of it.

Sect. 16. God, as considered in the infinite perfections of his nature and his will, is most amiable, and the object of our highest love.

Sect. 17. But he is not known by us in those perfections, as seen in themselves immediately, but as demonstrated and glorified expressively in his works, in which he shineth to us in his goodness.

Sect. 18. His works, therefore, are made for the apt revealing of himself, as amiable to the intelligent part of his creation." They are the book in which he hath appointed us to read, and the glass in which he hath appointed us, with admiration,

n Cotta telleth Velleius, that Epicurus, by making God careless of the affairs of man, Sustulerit omnem funditus religionem: quid est enim cur Deos ab hominibus colendos dicas, cum Dii non modo hominibus non consulant, sed omnino nihil curant, nihil agant? At est eorum eximia quædam præstansque natura, ut ea debeat ipsa per se ad se colendam elicere sapientem. (This reason is not denied, but the goodness of God's nature proved by his doing good.) Quæ porro pietas ei debetur, à quo nihil acceperis? Aut quid omnino, cujus nullum meritum sit, ei debere potest? Est enim Pietas Justitia adversus Deos: cum quibus quid potest nobis esse juris, cum homine nulla cum Deo sit communitas? sanctitas est scientia colendorum Deorum: qui quamobrem colendi sint non intelligo, nullo nec accepto ab iis, nec sperato bono.-Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. 1, p. 32.

to behold the infinite power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator; and in which we may see that he is not only our chief benefactor, but the ultimate object of our love, and so the end of all our motions.

Sect. 19. This third relation of God to us as our chief Good, efficiently and finally, is the highest, and the most perfective to us, but is not separated from the former two, but they are all marvellously conjunct, and concur in the production of most of the subsequent effects of God's providence.

As the elements are conjunct, but not confounded in mixed bodies, and in themselves are easily to be distinguished, where they are not divided, and their effects sometimes also distinct, but usually mixed, as are the causes: so it is in the case of these three great relations, though God's proprietary extend further than his government, because inanimates and brutes are capable of one, and not of the other; yet, as to the rational creatures, they are, in reality, of the same extent. God is, as to right, the Owner, and Ruler of all the world, and also their real Benefactor, and, quoad debitum, their ultimate end. But as to consent on their parts, none but the godly give up themselves to him in any one of these relations. In order of nature, God is our first Owner, and then our Ruler, and our chief Good and End. His work, in the first relation, is arbitrary disposal of us; his work, in the second, is to govern us; and, in the third, attraction and felicitating. But he so disposeth of us, as never to cross his rules of government; and so governeth us as never to cross his absolute proprietary, and attracteth and felicitateth us in consent with his premiant act of government; and all sweetly and wonderfully conspire the perfection of his works.

Sect. 20. All these relations are often summed up in one name, which principally importeth the last, which is the perfective relation, but truly includeth both the former; and that is, that God is our Father.o

• Epicurus verò ex animis hominum extraxit radicitus religionem, cum Diis immortalibus et opem et gratiam sustulerit. Cum enim et præstantissimam naturam Dei dicat esse, negat idem esse in Deo gratiam: tollit id quod maximè proprium est optimæ præstantissimæque naturæ.-Cic. de Nat. Deor. 1.1, p. 33,34. Quæ enim potest esse sanctitas, si Dii humana non curant.-Id. Utinam istam calliditatem hominibus Dii ne dedissent; qua perpauci bene utuntur; qui tamen ipsi à male utentibus opprimuntur; innumerabiles autem improbè utuntur: ut donum hoc divinum rationis et consilii, ad fraudem hominibus non ad bonitatem, impertitum esse videatur : sed urgetis, hominum esse istam culpam, non Deorum.-Resp. At, si medicus sciat eum ægrotum, qui jussus est vinum sumere, meracius sumpturum statimque periturum, magna

As the rational soul doth ever include the sensitive and vegetative faculties, so doth God's fatherly relation to us include his dominion and government. A father is thus a kind of image of God in this relation: for, 1. He hath a certain proprietary in his children. 2. He is, by nature, their rightful governor. 3. He is their benefactor, for they are beholden to him for their being and well-being. Nature causeth him to love them, and bindeth them again to love him; and the title "Our Father which art in heaven," includeth all these divine relations to us, but especially expresseth the love and graciousness of God

to us.

Object. But I must go against the sense of most of the world, if I take God to be infinitely or perfectly good; for operari sequitur esse, he that is perfectly good will perfectly do good. But do we not see and feel what you said before. The world is but as a wilderness, and the life of man a misery. We come into the world in weakness, and in a case in which we cannot help ourselves, but are a pity and trouble to others. We are their trouble that breed us and bring us up. We are vexed with unsatisfied desires, with troubling passions, with tormenting pains, and languishing weakness, and enemies' malice; with poverty and care; with losses and crosses, and shame and grief; with hard labour and studies; with the injuries and spectacles of a bedlam world, and with fears of death, and death at last. Our enemies are our trouble, our friends are our trouble; our rulers are our trouble; and our inferiors, children, and servants, are our trouble; our possessions are our trouble, and so are our wants. And is all this the effect of perfect goodness? And the poor brutes seem more miserable than we: they labour, and hunger, and die at last to serve our will: we beat them, use them, and abuse them at our pleasure and all the inanimates have no sense of any good; and, which is worst of all, the world is like a dungeon of ignorance, like an hospital of madmen for folly and distractedness, like a band of robbers for injury and violence, like tigers for cruelty, like snarling dogs for contention, and, in a word, like hell for wickedness. What else sets the world together by the ears in wars and bloodshed in all generations? What maketh peace-makers the most sit in culpa. Sic vestra ista providentia reprehendenda, quæ rationem dederit iis, quos sciverit ea perverse et improbe usuros. Nou intelligo quid intersit, utrum nemo fit sapiens, an nemo esse possit. Debebant dii quidem omnes bonos efficere, siquidem hominum generi consulebant: sin id minus, bouis quidem consulere debebant.—Cotta in Cicer. de Nat. Deor. 1. 3. f. 105, 106.

neglected men? What maketh virtue and piety the mark of persecution and of common scorn? How small a part of the world hath knowledge or piety! And you tell us of a hell for most at last. Is this all the fruit of perfect goodness? These thoughts have seriously troubled some.

Answ. He that will ever come to knowledge, must begin at the first, fundamental truths, and in his inquiry proceed to lesser superstructures, and reduce uncertainties and difficulties to those points which are sure and plain, and not cast away the plainest certain truths, because they overtake some difficulties beyond them. The true method of inquiry is, that we first try whether there be a God that is perfectly good or not: if this be once proved beyond all controversy, then all that followeth is certainly reconcilable to it; for truth and truth is not contradictory. Now, that God is perfectly good hath been fully proved before he that giveth to all the world, both heaven, and earth, and all the orbs, all that good, whether natural, gracious, or glorious, which they possess, is certainly himself better than all the world, for he cannot give more goodness than he hath; this is not to be denied by any man of reason, therefore it is proved that God is perfectly good. Besides, his perfections must needs be proportionable; we know that he is eternal, as is unquestionably demonstrated: we see by the wonderful frame of nature, that he is omnipotent and omniscient; and then it must needs be, that his goodness must be commensurate with the rest.

h

Therefore, to come back again upon every consequent which you understand not, and to deny a fundamental principle, which hath been undeniably demonstrated; this is but to resolve that you will not know. By this course you may deny any demonstrated truth in mathematics, when you meet with difficulties among the superstructed consequents.

P If God's making man a free agent be not against his goodness, then the sin which a free agent committeth, is no impeachment of God's goodness. At verum prius, ergo-The reasons why God made man with free will, the ancient writers commonly render to the infidels. Iræneus, Tertullian, Clemens Alexand. Arnobius, Lactantius, Eusebius, Tatianus, Origen, &c.—Vid. Zachar. Mitylen. Disput. p. 364. B.P. Græca Lat. tom. 1. Siquidem anima regalem majestatem ostendit, nullius dominio subjecta, et propriæ potestatis, tanquam imago Dei, communia cum archetypo quædam habens,-Greg. Nyssen. citat. etiam in Cæsarii, Dial. 3. The ancients commonly make the freedom of the will, as well as rationality, to be God's natural image on the soul. See especially the full discourse of Nemesius, de Natur. Hom. cap. 39-41. Lege Peunotti Propugnacul. libert.