cery the facts which warrant it. According to the ancient practice in the English court of chancery, the decree recited at length the entire pleadings in the case, and the substance of the evidence contained in the depositions. That practice was subsequently slightly modified, but its decrees still contained full recitals. The practice obtained neither in England nor America to set out the depositions in full, but simply to recite the substance of the evidence.70 As the practice in chanhas always required the evidence to be in writing, or, if oral, to be reduced to writing, and preserved in the record, it is apparent that the old practice of embodying it in the decree was not material, as it could at all times be referred to for the purpose of seeing upon what the evidence was based, and whether it was sustained by the evidence, and hence the practice in some jurisdictions dispensed with embodying it in the decree.71 The practice, as modified, does not dispense with the absolute necessity of preserving the evidence in the record.72 Where oral evidence is allowed upon the hearing, provisions are found, in most jurisdictions, authorizing the preservation thereof, either by way of certificate of evidence or bill of exceptions. 73 When the decree is based upon the 69 2 Harrison, Ch. Pr. 108; Broad v. Broad, 2 Ch. Cas. 161; Burdoine v. Shelton, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41; Adamski v. Wieczorek, 93 Ill. App. 357; Ricketts v. Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Ass'n, 67 Ill. App. 71; Chapman v. Kane, 97 Ill. App. 567. 70 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 247; Trenchard v. Warner, 18 Ill. 142; 2 Harrison, Ch. Pr. 108. See Brend v. Brend, 1 Vern. 213; Bonham v. Newcomb, 1 Vern. 215; Burdoine v. Shelton, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41; Broad v. Broad, 2 Ch. Cas. 161. 71 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 247. Ill. 119; Eaton v. Sanders, 43 Ill. 435; 39 N. E. 615. See, also, Grob v. Cushman, 45 72 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 247. It is not essential that the facts on which the decree is based should be embodied in the record if they are contained in the master's report, or in depositions taken as the law requires, or in exhibits, or are made part of the record by certificate of evidence. If not thus preserved, they must appear upon the face of the decree. Bonnell v. Lewis, 3 Ill. App. 283. 73 Flaherty v. McCormick, 123 Ill. 525; Bressler v. McCune, 56 Ill. 475. The bill, answer, replication, and all exhibits and depositions tak verdict of an issue out of chancery, the evidence need not be preserved in the record. If, in such case, the court should enter up a decree contrary to the verdict, such decree must be sustained by evidence contained in the record.74 It is the safer and better practice to incorporate findings of fact in the decree.75 A mere general finding of the decree that the allegations of the bill of complaint are true is insufficient.78 719. Ordering part. A decree should show upon its face what the court has decided or ordered." The ordering or mandatory part of the decree contains the specific directions of the court upon the matter before it. These directions must depend upon the nature of the particular case which is the subject of the decree. Where the decree is merely interlocutory, and directs an issue, or an inquiry to be made, or account to be taken before a master, it usually contains a reservation of the further matters to be decided, and generally, also, of the costs of the suit till after the event of the issue or reference shall be known. The ordering part of the decree commences as follows: "It is therefore ordered, adjudged, and decreed, and this court, in virtue of the power therein vested, doth order, adjudge, and decree,” en in a case, and every paper filed in a cause as a part thereof, including stipulations filed therein, become a part of the record, without being preserved by a certificate of evidence. Dilworth v. Curts, 139 Ill. 508, 29 N. E. 861; Stevison v. Earnest, 80 Ill. 513; Bressler v. McCune, 56 Ill. 481; Ricketts v. Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Ass'n, 67 Ill. App. 71. 74 Bonnell v. Lewis, 3 Ill. App. 283. 75 Bonnell v. Lewis, 3 Ill. App. 283. 78 Adamski v. Wieczorek, 93 Ill. App. 357; Glos v. Beckman, 183 Ill. 158, 55 N. E. 636. Facts shown by the record cannot be overcome by the recital of only a part of them in the order made. Ricketts v. Chicago Permanent Building & Loan Ass'n, 67 Ill. App. 71. 77 Honore v. Colmesnil, 1 J. J. Marsh. (Ky.) 506; Jones v. Minogue, 29 Ark. 637; Alexander v. Wolley, 4 Ill. App. 225; Mobile & C. P. R. Co. v. Talman, 15 Ala. 472; Welch v. Louis, 31 Ill. 446. See, also, Car penter v. Easton & A. R. Co., 28 N. J. Eq. 390; Citizens' Sav. Bank of St. Louis v. Stewart, 90 Iowa, 467, 57 N. W. 957. etc.78 The reservation of further directions is not confined to the first decree, but will be repeated in every decree in which it may be necessary to direct a reference to a master.79 After such a reservation, the court will not interfere upon the matter reserved in a summary way, but the cause must be set down for hearing.80 A decree should ascertain the precise amount due, and not leave it to computation.81 Thus, a decree directing the sale of real estate to discharge the vendor's lien, which does not state the amount due at the date of the decree, but leaves it to be ascertained by computation of the master, is erroneous. The amount should first be ascertained, and the decree recite it.82 A decree may be sustained by some other instrument in the record.83 Reference may be had to the pleadings on which the decree is based, to ascertain what the court means to order in such decree.8 84 Courts of equity possess the power to examine witnesses viva voce for the purpose of proving written instruments, and the chancellor may state in the decree what the evidence is. 78 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 338. 791 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 338; Seton, Decrees, 36. 80 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 339; Cooke v. Gwyn, 3 Atk. 689. 81 Smith v. Trimble, 27 Ill. 152; Frye v. Bank of Illinois, 10 Ill. 332; Anderson v. Reed, 11 Iowa, 177; Clark v. Bell, 4 Dana (Ky.) 15; Spoor v. Tilson, 97 Va. 279, 33 S. E. 609. 82 Codwise v. Taylor, 4 Sneed (Tenn.) 346. A decree for redemption on the payment of a stated sum, with interest at 6 per cent. from a certain date, is technically, but not materially, erroneous, because it fails to state the amount of the interest. Morrison v. Smith, 130 Ill. 304, 23 N. E. 241. See, also, Phillips v. Edsall, 127 Ill. 535, 20 N. E. 801. 83 Jones v. Belt, 2 Gill (Md.) 106. See Thain v. Rudisill, 126 Ind. 272, 26 N. E. 46. 84 Redhead v. Baker, 86 Iowa, 251, 53 N. W. 114. See Fowler v. Doyle, 16 Iowa, 535; Black, Judgm. §§ 118, 123; Freeman, Judgm. § 45. The maxim, "Id certum est quod certum reddi potest," will sustain a decree which refers to record data for determining what is otherwise uncertain on the face of the decree. Shepard v. Kelly, 2 Fla. 634; State v. White, 40 Fla. 297, 24 So. 160. Such written instruments need not be set out in the record and decree in haec verba.85 § 720. Declaratory part. Where the suit seeks a declaration of the rights of the parties, the ordering part of the decree should be prefaced by such a declaration. This, however, is not absolutely necessary, and the omission of it will not invalidate the decree. Sometimes the court directs an insertion in the decree of the reasons for making the declaration, and of the grounds upon which it proceeds in making it. This, however, is not frequently done, though its utility has often been recognized.86 It is said that such declaration ought not to be introduced where a decree is taken by the complainant upon the defendant's making default at the hearing.87 Where a decree is made by consent, it should be so stated in the decree.88 § 721. Necessity of signing decree. In some jurisdictions it is held that the chancellor must sign the decree. In other jurisdictions it is held that a decree need not be signed by the court.90 85 Levert v. Redwood, 9 Port. (Ala.) 79. See, also, Linsey v. Me Gannon, 9 W. Va. 154. 86 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 339; Jenour v. Jenour, 10 Ves. 568; Gordon v. Gordon, 3 Swanst. 478; Maynard v. Moseley, 3 Swanst. 653; Bax v. Whitbread, 16 Ves. 24; Onions v. Tyrer, 1 P. Wms. 343. For form of a decree containing a declaration of the rights of the parties, see post, § 724. 87 Jennings v. Simpson, 1 Keen, 404. 88 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 339; Seton, Decrees, 375. 89 Sloan v. Cooper, 54 Ga. 486; Burch v. Scott, 1 Bland (Md.) 112. 90 Fouts v. Mann, 15 Neb. 172, 18 N. W. 64; Traer v. Whitman, 56 Iowa, 443, 9 N. W. 339; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Tex. 184; O'Hare v. Leonard, 19 Iowa, 515. See, also, relative to signing decrees, Fraker v. Brazelton, 12 Lea (Tenn.) 278. In Illinois, when the form of the decree has been settled and allowed by the court, the judge indorses thereon the word "enter," and affixes his name or initials, and the decree is then entered by the clerk. It is held that the signature of the judge is not essential to the validity of the decree. Habberton v. Habberton, 58 Ill. App. 99. See Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245; Stevens v. Coffeen, 39 Ill. 148. 722. Form of interlocutory decrce in suit for accounting. [Title of court and cause.] This cause coming on to be heard upon the bill of complaint of said complainant, the answers of said defendants, and replications, and upon the evidence, and it appearing that the bill of complaint is true so far as it sets up the relations of said parties up to the time of the dissolution of said firm of D., B. & Co.; that the charge in the bill of complaint that the said firm was dissolved because of coercion is untrue; that said bill is true so far as it sets forth the submission to T. U., and his award, but untrue so far as it alleges that the defendants exercised undue influence upon said T. U. by conversations with him in the absence of said A. B., pending said award. And it appearing that said T. U. was misled, as to the condition of said business, by the agreed statement of liabilities and assets submitted to him, the same showing that said business had sustained a loss up to June 1, A. D. 1885, of $7,401.36, when in fact the liability of the said firm had been overstated in the said agreed statement; that the principal mistake, so far as ascertained in said agreed statement, was in the amounts payable, which were represented to said T. U. to be much larger than they in fact were. And it appearing to the court that said T. U. made his award believing said erroneous statement to be correct, and that said T. U. was misled thereby, and in consequence thereof said award is not the decision of said T. U., and that said A. B., when he agreed to said erroneous statement of the affairs of said firm, was ignorant of the said mistake, and continued ignorant thereof until after said award was made; that said A. B. is not a bookkeeper; that the books of the said firm were kept by or under the charge of said C. D., and that said erroneous statement is in the handwriting of said C. D. And counsel having been heard for all the parties: The court, being fully advised in the premises, doth order, adjudge, and decree that said award of the said T. U. be and the same hereby is set aside and held for naught, and that said cause be and it hereby is referred to L. L., Esq., a master in chancery of this court, with directions to said master to state the account between the parties in said firm of D., B. & Company at the date of its dissolution. July 29, A. D. 1885, and to ascertain the value of the interest of said A. B. at said date in said firm assets, and in the goodwill of said business, using all the evidence taken on the hearing of said cause, and such other competent evidence as may be offered by the parties, and that all the books and papers of said firm, including all books and papers containing entries affecting said firm in the possession or control of either of the parties to this suit, be produced before the said master at his office in Chicago, in said county, and be open to examination there by either of the parties to this suit, or his counsel, and that said master report all evidence taken or used before him to this court, |