tion he had relative to said article or its publication was when he read the said article in said paper after its publication and distribution.

This respondent further says that he is informed and believes that no disrespect was intended by said article to said court, or to any judge thereof, and that a fair construction thereof will not warrant an inference to that effect.

This respondent is advised and believes that the publication of said article was not designed and had no tendency to impede, embarrass, or obstruct the administration of justice in said court. And this respondent does and will insist that he had and still has the right, through his said paper, by himself or his agents, to examine the proceedings of any and every department of the government of this state, and that he is not responsible for the truth of such publications, nor for the motives with which they were or are made, by the summary process of an attachment for contempt, save when such publications impede, embarrass, or obstruct the administration of justice.

This respondent further says that such has been the established law of this state for over thirty years past, and that said court has no judicial power to change the same.

This respondent takes this occasion to renew his repeated expres sions of confidence in the ability and integrity of said court, and of the individual members of the same, and as evidence of the same gives the following article, which was published in said paper, issued on the 26th of September, 1872; that is to say: [Here insert the article.]

This respondent further says that, at the time of the publication of said article first mentioned, there was an intense excitement in the community, and particularly in the city of Chicago, on account of the frequent murders, and the escape of the perpetrators thereof; and this respondent is informed and believes that the design of said article was to impress upon the community the importance of electing members of the next general assembly of this state who would remedy the defects in the criminal law of the state, by which criminals are able to escape punishment, and not to reflect upon the ability or integrity of said court, or any member thereof, nor to impede, embarrass, or ob struct the administration of justice.

Wherefore, this respondent prays that the said rule, as against him, may be discharged. Charles L. Wilson.

Charles L. Wilson, being duly sworn, says he is one of the respondents named in the foregoing answer, and that the matters stated in said answer are true. Charles L. Wilson.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 29th day of October, 1872. Henry W. Farrar, Notary Public.72

[Seal.]

$ 553. Interrogatories and reference.

After the respondent appears upon a rule to show cause, or is brought up on attachment, he may submit his contempt to the court upon his own answer in the form of an affidavit, or he may demand of the prosecutor to file interrogatories for him to answer. The usual course when the alleged misconduct is denied is for the court to allow the prosecutor to file interrogatories intended to elicit a full statement of all the facts and circumstances of the alleged contempt. These may be filed in court, and the respondent's answers thereto taken and reported to the court, who may procced in a summary manner to decide the question of the guilt of the accused; or a master or commissioner may be appointed, before whom the interrogatories may be filed, and who will take down and report to the court the respondent's answers thereto, with such other testimony as either the respondent or the prosecutor may desire to have taken.73 But the proofs before the master, and not merely his opinion upon the proofs, must be reported to the court.74 § 554. Trial of contempts-Right to trial by jury.

As a general rule, punishment for contempt is by summary proceeding.75 It is held that a court, in enforcing obedience to its orders by proceedings for contempt, is not executing the criminal laws nor invading the constitutional right of trial by jury. It was therefore held that an act providing for pun

76

72 The foregoing form was taken from People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195199.

73 Herring v. Tylee, 1 Johns. Cas. (N. Y.) 32; People v. Brown, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 41; People v. Ball, 5 Cow. (N. Y.) 415; Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. Sr. 141, Fed. Cas. No. 6,617; State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450.

74 Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 372; Rapalje, Contempt, § 124.

75 Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31; Gandy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N. W. 143; State v. Doty, 32 N. J. Law, 403; State v. Matthews, 37 N. H. 450; State v. Mitchell, 3 S. D. 223, 52 N. W. 1052; In re Debs, 158 U. S. 596.

76 In re Debs, 158 U. S. 593; In re Perkins, 100 Fed. 950; Savin, Petitioner, 131 U. S. 267; Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth Coun

ishment for contempt of court was unconstitutional, in so far as it attempted to provide for jury trial for contempt of a court which had been created by the constitution, for the reason that the power to punish for contempt was inherent in the courts.”

The proceeding for contempt properly ends in a judgment of acquittal and discharge or conviction and sentence.78 To authorize punishment as for a contempt, there must be a judg ment adjudicating that the person proceeded against is guilty of a contempt. Unless the record shows a judgment of conviction of contempt, a person committed therefor may avail himself of the remedy of habeas corpus.79 In some jurisdictions it is held that the judgment should recite the offense of which the contemnor stands convicted.so By other authorities it is held that facts constituting the contempt need not be set forth.81 It is held that the judgment or order of committal to jail for contempt must be specific and certain. It must determine the penalties imposed, and be such as the defendant may readily understand, and be capable of performing. It is therefore held that an order that he stand committed to jail until the further order of the court, where such imprisonment is inflicted as punishment for disobeying the order of the court, and not to enforce the performance of some act, is void,82 but

ty, 134 U. S. 31; Cartwright's Case, 114 Mass. 230; Carter v. Com., 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780; Wells v. Com., 21 Grat. (Va.) 503. See Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa, 208.

77 Carter v. Com., 96 Va. 791, 32 S. E. 780. See Arnold v. Com., 80 Ky. 300, 44 Am. Rep. 480.

78 Edrington v. Pridham, 65 Tex. 612.

79 Ex parte O'Brien, 127 Mo. 477, 30 S. W. 158; People v. Baker, 89 N. Y. 460; Ex parte Adams, 25 Miss. 883; Rapalje, Contempt, §§ 128, 129; Andrews v. Knox County Sup'rs, 70 Ill. 65.

80 In re Deaton, 105 N. C. 59, 11 S. E. 244; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 326, 98 Am. Dec. 404; People v. Turner, 1 Cal. 152.

81 State v. Miller, 23 W. Va. 801; Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 63; Easton v. State, 39 Ala. 551; Ex parte Henshaw, 73 Cal. 486, 15 Pac. 110; Ex parte Smith, 40 Tex. Cr. App. 179, 49 S. W. 396.

82 People v. Pirfenbrink, 96 Ill. 68; Rex v. James, 5 Barn. & Ald. 894;

upon this point the authorities are not uniform,83 and it has been held that, where the contempt consists of a violation of the order of the court, and is a contempt not committed in its presence, and the statute does not prescribe the form of the order of commitment, the defendant may be imprisoned until he be discharged by order of the court, or until the further order of the court.84

§ 556. Form of order adjudging contemnor guilty.

[Title of court and cause.]

Upon the return of the rule issued in this cause to show cause why the defendant, J. C. B., should not be attached for contempt of court for failure to pay arrears of alimony heretofore due under the decree entered in this cause, and the court having jurisdiction in said cause, and having heard and read the affidavits on behalf of the complainant and of the defendant, and all parties being present in open court by

In re Hammel, 9 R. I. 248; State v. Keeper of Jail of Camden County, 5 N. J. Law J. 184; Yates v. People, 6 Johns. (N. Y.) 337; In re Leach, 51 Vt. 630; State v. Galloway, 5 Cold. (Tenn.) 326.

83 Rapalje, Contempt, § 129.

84 Fischer v. Hayes, 6 Fed. 63; In re Allen, 13 Blatchf. 271, Fed. Cas. No. 208; In re Yates, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 317; Green v. Elgie, 8 Jur. 187. The judgment should order the imprisonment for a definite period, or until the performance of a specified act. People v. Pirfenbrink, 96 Ill. 68; Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196; Taylor v. Newblock, 5 Okl. 647, 49 Pac. 1114. Where the order of commitment is not punitive, but coercive, that is, where the contemnor refuses to do something which the court has ordered to be done by him for the benefit of another party in the cause, the commitment may be either until the contemnor performs, or for a definite time, or until he performs. Clark v. Parker, 70 Ill. App. 233; Phillips v. Welch, 11 Nev. 187; Stimpson v. Putnam, 41 Vt. 238; Billingsley v. People, 86 Ill. App. 233; Gurney v. Tufts, 37 Me. 135; In re Clarke, 125 Cal. 388, 58 Pac. 22. It is also held that the order should provide, after the specification of the confinement, the clause, "or he be discharged according to law," or words of like import. Billingsley v. People, 86 Ill. App. 233; McDonald v. People, 86 Ill. App. 558. Where a fine is imposed, the order should designate the person to whom the fine should be paid. Smith v. Tenney, 62 Ill. App. 571; McDonald v. People, 86 Ill. App. 558; Albany City Bank v. Schermerhorn, 9 Paige (N. Y.) 372. Where a party is committed by an order in equity for the nonpayment of alimony, a fine, and costs, the amounts must be specified in the commitment. Jernee v. Jernee, 54 N. J. Eq. 657, 35 Atl. 458.

counsel, and the court having heard arguments of said counsel, doth find that there is now due and unpaid from the defendant to the com. plainant the sum of six hundred and twelve dollars ($612) for arrears of alimony under said decree, no part of which has been paid; and the court further finds that no sufficient cause is shown by the said defendant why the same should not be paid, or that he has been or is unable to pay the same, but that he willfully fails and refuses to obey the orders and decree of this court for the payment of said alimony; and the court doth find and adjudge the said J. C. B. to be guilty of a contempt of this court, and doth order that said J. C. B. be committed to the common jail of Cook county, Illinois, there to remain charged with said contempt of this court until he pay the said sum of six hundred and twelve dollars ($612) into this court, or until released by due process of law, and that a warrant for that purpose issue forthwith, directed to the sheriff of Cook county, Illinois.85

In the Circuit Court of the United States of America for the Northern District of California-In Open Court.

In the Matter of Contempt of David S. Terry.

Whereas, on this third day of September, 1888, in open court, and in the presence of the judges thereof, to-wit, Hon. Stephen J. Field, circuit justice, presiding, Hon. Lorenzo Sawyer, circuit judge, and Hon. George M. Sabin, district judge, during the session of said court, and while said court was engaged in its regular business, hearing and determining causes pending before it, one Sarah Althea Terry was guilty of misbehavior in the presence and hearing of said court;

And whereas, said court thereupon duly and lawfully ordered the United States marshal, J. C. Franks, who was then present, to remove the said Sarah Althea Terry from the court room;

And whereas, the said United States marshal then and there attempted to enforce said order, and then and there was resisted by one David S. Terry, an attorney of this court, who, while the said marshal was attempting to execute said order in the presence of the court, assaulted the said United States marshal, and then and there beat him, the said marshal, and then and there wrongfully and unlawfully assaulted said marshal with a deadly weapon, with intent to obstruct the administration of justice, and to resist such United States marshal and the execution of the said order;

And whereas, the said David S. Terry was guilty of a contempt of this court, by misbehavior in its presence, and by a forcible resistance in the presence of the court to a lawful order thereof, in the manner aforesaid:

Now, therefore, be it ordered and adjudged by this court that the

85 This form was taken from Barclay v. Barclay, 83 Ill. App. 366, affirmed 184 Ill. 471, 56 N. E. 821.