court some party who is a necessary party to the proceedings, and who has been omitted to be introduced at a stage of the cause in which an amendment for such purpose might have been made. A supplemental bill for the purpose of adding new matter or for bringing new parties before the court can also be filed after, as well as before, the decree." The bill, if after a decree, may be either in aid of a decree, that it may be carried fully into execution, or that proper directions may be given upon some matter omitted in the original bill, or not put in issue by it, or by the defense made to it, or to bring forward parties before the court; or it may be used to impeach the decree, which is the peculiar case of a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review. But where a supplemental bill is brought in aid of a decree, it is merely to carry out and to give fuller effect to that decree, and not to obtain relief of a different kind or principle; the latter being the province of a supplemental bill in the nature of a bill of review, which cannot be filed without leave of court.10 In most jurisdictions, 8 Story, Eq. Pl. §§ 334, 336; 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 60; Welford, Eq. Pl. 191; Jones v. Jones, 3 Atk. 110. See supra, § 383. 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 62; Woodward v. Woodward, 1 Dickens, 33; Boeve v. Skipwith, 1 Eq. Cas. Abr. 80; Secor v. Singleton, 41 Fed. 725. See Ashuelot R. Co. v. Cheshire R. Co., 59 N. H. 409. The fact that complainant desires to drop out of the case some of the parties defendant to the original bill does not of itself give him the right to proceed by supplemental bill. Mosgrove v. Kountze, 14 Fed. 315. 10 Story, Eq. Pl. § 338; Mitford, Eq. Pl. 62; Hodson v. Ball, 1 Phillips, 177. "Leave is never given to file a supplemental bill, in order to admit new evidence, after an interlocutory decree, where the party might, by due diligence, have introduced it originally into the cause, or had full and ample means of knowledge of it within his reach. It matters not that he, or his solicitor or counsel, did not understand the true value or importance of it, if they knew the facts, or had ample means of knowledge, and, a fortiori, if, by the very nature and character of the matters put in issue, they were bound to search, and to make full and perfect inquiries. The authorities are very numerous and pointed to this effect." Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267; Young v. Keighly, 16 Ves. 348; Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 26; Whitelock v. Baker, 13 Ves. 511; Barrington v. O'Brien, 2 Ball & B. 140; Blake v. Foster, 2 Ball & B. 457; Wiser v. Blachly, 2 liberal statutes providing for amendments at any stage of the cause exist, and therefore supplemental bills are no longer needed for that purpose in such jurisdictions, for, where the same end can be obtained by amendment, the court will not permit a supplemental bill to be filed. Matter which existed at the time the original bill was filed should be brought in by amendment, if the cause is in a stage at which an amendment is allowable.12 A supplemental bill will not be permitted to be filed whenever the same end may be obtained by an amend Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 488; Livingston v. Hubbs, 3 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 124; Dexter v. Arnold, 5 Mason, 303, Fed. Cas. No. 3,856; Wood v. Mann, 2 Sumn. 316, Fed. Cas. No. 17,953. "The evidence entitling the party to ask leave of the court to file a supplemental bill should not only be true, but should be material, in an emphatic sense; that is, it should be such new matter as must, if unanswered, in point of fact, either clearly entitle the party to a reversal of the decree, or raise a case of so much nicety and difficulty as to be a fit subject of judgment in the cause. In other words, it should furnish a just and solid foundation upon which the court may properly repose its judgment. It is not sufficient that it is such as might be argued, with more or less effect, by way of a presumption against or in favor of former testimony; but it should go further, and demonstrate that, consistently with it, the decree ought not to stand." Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267; Ord v. Noel, 6 Madd. 127; Norris v. Le Neve, 3 Atk. 26. 11 See Hope v. Brinckerhoff, 4 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 660; Nevada Nickel Syndicate v. National Nickel Co., 86 Fed. 486; Copen v. Flesher, 1 Bond, 440, Fed. Cas. No. 3,211. See 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 60-63. 12 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 60; Burke v. Smith, 15 Ill. 158; Bowie v. Minter, 2 Ala. 406; Swatzel v. Arnold, 1 Woolw. 383, Fed. Cas. No. 13,682; Henry v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 45 Fed. 299; Stafford v. Howlett, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 200; Murray v. King, 40 N. C. 223; Fulton Bank v. New York & Sharon Canal Co., 4 Paige (N. Y.) 127; Commercial Assurance Co. v. New Jersey Rubber Co., 61 N. J. Eq. 446, 49 Atl. 155; Barriclo v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 154. In the early decisions, the rule requiring matter arising after suit brought to be introduced by supplemental bill was adhered to with great strictness. In later practice it was relaxed as applied to accountings, so as to permit ac countings to cover periods pendente lite, and down to the time of the decree, and has also been applied to suits for the foreclosure of mort gages. Kelly v. Galbraith, 87 Ill. App. 68, 186 Ill. 593, 58 N. E. 431; Barfield v. Kelly, 4 Russ. 355. See 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 63; Swan v. Swan, 8 Price, 518. ment.13 The subsequent event which will authorize the filing of a supplemental bill must not only be relevant, but material, and of such a nature that the relief sought in respect thereof cannot be obtained under the original bill.14 New matter merely corroborative or contradictory of evidence on the points. in issue is insufficient.15 A supplemental bill may also be brought, not only to insist upon the relief already prayed for in the original bill, but upon other relief different from that which was prayed for by the original bill, where facts which have since occurred may require it.16 To entitle the complainant to file a supplemental bill, and thereby to obtain the benefit of the former proceedings, it must be in respect to the same title in the same person as stated in the original bill.17 Thus, if a person should file an original bill as heir at law of the mortgagor to redeem, and it should turn out, upon an issue and hearing of the cause, that he is not the heir at law, and he afterwards purchases the title of the true heir at law, he cannot file a supplemental bill to have the benefit of the former proceedings, for he claims by a different title from that asserted in the original bill. His true course would be to file an original bill.18 A supplemental bill is in effect but an 13 Story, Eq. Pl. § 333; 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 60. A supplemental bill is unnecessary where an infant complainant becomes of age pending suit, if such fact does not change his interest in the suit. Campbell v. Bowne, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 34. 142 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 64; Story, Eq. Pl. § 337; Milner v. Harewood, 17 Ves. 144; Adams v. Dowding, 2 Madd. 53; Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267; Veazie v. Williams, 3 Story, 54, Fed. Cas. No. 16,906. 15 Jenkins v. Eldredge, 3 Story, 299, Fed. Cas. No. 7,267; Barriclo v. Trenton Mut. Life & Fire Ins. Co., 13 N. J. Eq. 154. 16 Story, Eq. Pl. § 336, quoted with approval in Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 205, 25 N. E. 756; Pinkus v. Peters, 5 Beav. 253; Malcolm v. Scott, 3 Hare, 39. 17 Story, Eq. Pl. § 339, cited with approval in Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 205, 25 N. E. 756; Tonkin v. Lethbridge, Coop. 43; Rylands v. Latouche, 2 Bligh, 586; Pilkington v. Wignall, 2 Madd. 240; Oldham v. Eboral, 1 Coop. t. Brough. 27. 18 Story, Eq. Pl. § 339; Pilkington v. Wignall, 2 Madd. 240. amendment by which new matter which has transpired since the filing of the original bill is brought into the case, and forms a part of and is tried with the original case. 19 The original and supplemental bills make, in effect, but one pleading, and should be consistent.20 A supplemental bill which is in irreconcilable conflict with the original bill will be dismissed at the hearing, though filed by leave of court.21 § 826. Supplemental bill to perfect inchoate right. Matters which have occurred since the original bill was filed. and which are material to perfect the complainant's case, may also be introduced by supplemental bill. Thus, where a complainant has an inchoate right at the time of filing his original bill, but which merely requires a formal act to complete it, which is not performed till afterwards, such formal act may be brought before the court by supplemental bill,—as in the instance of an executor or administrator filing a bill before probate or administration taken out. In such case, the fact of the probate or administration having been granted may be introduced by amendment; but if the record is not in a state to 19 Mix v. Beach, 46 Ill. 314. 20 Straughan v. Hallwood, 30 W. Va. 274, 4 S. E. 394, 8 Am. St. Rep. 29; Gillett v. Hall, 13 Conn. 426; Leonard v. Cook (N. J. Eq.) 21 Atl. 47; Potier v. Barclay, 15 Ala. 439; Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 151; Story, Eq. Pl. § 332. "It is a mistake to say the new bill is an original bill as to the new complainants, and an amended and supplemental bill as to the old complainants. An amended and supplemental bill which merely introduces supplemental matter and new parties to sustain the relief sought incorporates itself with the previous bill, and the whole becomes one bill for all the ordinary purposes of litigation. Wilkinson v. Fowkes, 9 Hare, 198, 594; Bradley v. Dibbrell, 3 Heisk. (Tenn.) 522. Whether the new and old complainants are properly joined turns, not upon the original or supplemental character of the particular pleadings, but upon their connection with the subject-matter of litigation, and with each other. French v. Hay, 22 Wall. (U. S.) 246; Catton v. Carlisle, 5 Madd. 427; Hurd v. Everett, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 124; Wilson v. Beadle, 2 Head (Tenn.) 512." Smith v. St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., 3 Tenn. Ch. 151. 21 Straughan v. Hallwood, 30 W. Va. 274, 4 S. E. 394, 8 Am. St. Rep. 29. admit of amendment, it may be introduced as well by supplemental bill. So, where an original bill was filed by a judg ment creditor to reach the property of the defendant, after the return of an execution unsatisfied, it was held that a supplemental bill might be filed to reach subsequently acquired property to satisfy the same debt. But in a similar case, where, after a creditors' bill had been filed, the complainant obtained a second judgment, and issued an execution thereon, and, without waiting for a return thereof, filed a supplemental bill, it was decided that such bill could not be sustained.22 § 827. Original bill showing no ground for relief. Where an original bill shows no grounds for relief, it cannot be aided by a supplemental bill setting up matters that have arisen since the filing of the original bill.23 If the original bill is wholly defective, and there is no ground for proceeding upon it, it cannot be sustained by filing a supplemental bill founded upon matters which have subsequently taken place; but if the original bill is sufficient for one kind of relief, and facts afterwards occur which entitle the complainant to other and more extensive relief, he may have such relief by setting forth the new matter in a supplemental bill.24 A supplemental bill, 22 2 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 61. See, also, supra, §§ 17, 385. 23 Fahs v. Roberts, 54 Ill. 195, citing Story, Eq. Pl. § 339; Hughes v. Carne, 135 Ill. 519, 26 N. E. 517; Putney v. Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385; New York Security & Trust Co. v. Lincoln St. Ry. Co., 74 Fed. 67; Winn v. Albert, 2 Md. Ch. 42; Brown v. Bank of Mississippi, 31 Miss. 454; Edgar v. Clevenger, 3 N. J. Eq. 258; Candler v. Pettit, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 168, 19 Am. Dec. 399; Neubert v. Massman, 37 Fla. 91, 19 So. 625; Birmingham v. Lesan, 77 Me. 494, 1 Atl. 151; Straughan v. Hallwood, 30 W. Va. 274, 4 S. E. 394; Candler v. Pettit, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 168. This rule has no application when the amended and supplemental bill may be treated as an original bill, as when it seeks relief not sought in the prior bill, or introduces a new cause of action. Hughes v. Carne, 135 Ill. 519, 26 N. E. 517. 24 Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 190, 25 N. E. 756, citing Candler v. Pettit, 1 Paige (N. Y.) 168; Bank of Kentucky v. Schuylkill Bank, 1 Pars. Eq. Cas. (Pa.) 180; Ramey v. Green, 18 Ala. 771. On a supplemental bill, no relief can be had upon a cause of action which did not exist when |