with his opinion thereon, and that this cause be continued for such other orders or decrees as may be needful upon the coming in of said master's report.

§ 723. Form of decree in suit for an accounting.

[Title of court and cause.]

This cause coming on again to be heard upon the bill of complaint, the answer thereto, and the replication of the complainant to such answer, and upon the proofs taken and heard in said cause, and upon the report of L. L., Esq., master in chancery, to whom said cause was referred to state the account between the parties in said firm of D., B. & Co. at the date of its dissolution, July 29, A. D. 1885, and to ascertain the value of the interest of said A. B. at said date in said firm assets, and in the goodwill of said business, and report all evidence taken or used before him to the court, with his opinion; and upon the evidence so taken, used, and reported by him, and upon the exceptions taken by the complainant to the said master's report, as well as by the said defendants, and after hearing arguments on behalf of the respective parties, the said complainant being represented by his solicitors, Messrs. O., S. & Q., and the said defendants by Messrs. X., H. & Z., and the said cause having been duly submitted, and the court being now sufficiently advised of and concerning the matters in controversy herein:

It is by the court ordered that the exceptions of the complainant to the master's report in this cause be and the same are and each of them is hereby overruled; and that the exceptions of the defendants to said report be and the same are and each of them is hereby sustained; and with the exception of the sum of five thousand dollars ($5,000) found and reported by the master as the value of the interest of the complainant in the goodwill of said D., B. & Co., which is hereby disallowed, the report of the said master is hereby approved and confirmed.

And the court doth find that the complainant and the defendants C. D., B. D., and E. F. entered into a copartnership agreement on the 16th day of October, 1884, to carry on a wholesale business as dealers in gents' furnishing goods, at Chicago, Illinois, under the firm name of D., B. & Co., and that said firm was dissolved by mutual consent on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1885, and that the said C. D. agreed to purchase the interest of the said complainant in the business, goodwill and assets of said firm, and the said A. B. agreed to transfer the same to him. That the amount to be paid to the said A. B. for his said interest was, by the agreement of the parties, submitted to T. U., as arbitrator, who made his award in writing, which was duly complied with by both parties, and the amount of said award was paid by the said C. D. to the said A. B., who thereupon executed and delivered a bill of sale of his interest in the assets, business, and goodwill

of the said firm to the said C. D. That the sum so paid by the said C. D. for the transfer of the interest of the said A. B. was greater than the value of his interest in the assets, business, and good will of said D., B. & Co., and, the said award having been set aside, the said C. D. is now entitled to recover from said A. B. such balance as may appear to be due to him. That the goodwill of the business of D. B. & Co., on the 29th day of July, A. D. 1885, was valueless. That there is now due and owing by the complainant to the defendant C. D. the sum of three thousand four hundred and three dollars and twenty-nine cents ($3,403.29), and that he is entitled to a decree therefor. That the said complainant is entitled to no relief whatever as against the defendants B. D. and E. F., and that as to them the bill should be dismissed:

Now, therefore, on motion of X., H. & Z., solicitors for said defendants, it is by the court ordered, adjudged, and decreed that, as against the defendants B. D. and E. F., the bill of complaint herein be dismissed for want of equity.

And it is by the court further ordered, adjudged, and decreed that the defendant C. D. do have and recover of and from the said complainant A. B. the sum of three thousand four hundred and three dollars and twenty-nine cents ($3,403.29), being the sum found due to the said C. D. from said complainant as aforesaid, together with the costs of this suit, to be taxed by the clerk of this court, and that, in default of payment thereof, execution issue therefor.

And thereupon the said complainant, by his solicitor, prays an appeal to the appellate court for the first district, which is granted on condition that said complainant doth, within thirty days from date, execute and file a good and sufficient appeal bond in the penal sum of five thousand dollars, with surety to be approved by the clerk of this court.

And it is further ordered that said complainant have until February 1, 1889, in which to prepare and file a certificate of evidence herein.

§ 724. Form of final decree.

[Title of court and cause.]

This cause coming on to be heard upon the bill of complaint herein, and the demurrer of the defendant thereto, and the court being advised in the premises, and having fully considered the same, doth order that the said demurrer of said defendant be overruled, and the said defendant, electing to stand by said demurrer, and refusing to file further plea or answer, made default.

It is therefore ordered that the said bill of complaint be taken as confessed, and thereupon the said cause coming on to be heard upon said bill taken as confessed, and the court being fully advised in the premises, doth find that the equities are with the complainant, that the allegations in said bill contained are true, and that the complainant is entitled to the relief prayed for in its bill of complaint.

The court doth therefore declare that, according to the true construction of the will of Walter L. Newberry, deceased, referred to in said bill of complaint, the limitations contained in said will and the codicil thereto, in and by which the trustees under said will were only authorized to make leases of the real estate of said decedent for terms not exceeding twenty (20) years, were confined to the period of the administration of the trust confided to the said trustees, and continued only prior and up to the final division and distribution of the estate of said decedent; and that, upon the organization of the complainant under the act of the legislature of the state of Illinois entitled, "An act to encourage and promote the establishment of free public libraries in cities, villages, and towns in this state," approved June 17, 1891, in force July 1, 1891, and the conveyance to the said complainant by Eliphalet W. Blatchford, surviving trustee under the will of Walter L. Newberry, deceased, of so much of the estate of said decedent as was applied and set apart for the founding of a free public library, the provisions of the will of said decedent and the codicil thereto, limiting the power of the trustees under the said will to make leases of the real estate of said decedent to terms of twenty (20) years and under, did not become a part of the organic and fundamental law of the said corporation; and the said complainant took the said real estate so conveyed to it free from the said limitations on the power of the said trustees to make leases therof.

The court doth further declare that the provisions of the will of Walter L. Newberry, deceased, limiting the investments which the trustees thereof, during the administration of said trust, were authorized to make, did not, upon the conveyance to the said complainant by Eliphalet W. Blatchford, surviving trustee under the will of Walter L. Newberry, deceased, of that part of the estate of said decedent, as was applied and set apart by the said trustee for the purpose of founding a free public library, become a part of the organic and fundamental law of the said complainant.

The court doth therefore order, adjudge, and decree that the said complainant holds the estate and property conveyed and transferred to it by Eliphalet W. Blatchford, surviving trustee under the will of Walter L. Newberry, deceased, and the proceeds thereof, free from the restrictions and limitations contained in said will and codicil relative to leases and investments, and that said complainant has the same powers over said estate and the proceeds thereof that it would have if the restriction in said will and codicil in regard to leases and investments did not exist.

The court doth further order that the complainant pay the costs of this suit, to be taxed by the clerk.91

91 The above form is taken from Attorney General v. Newberry Library, 150 Ill. 229, 37 N. E. 236.

$ 725. Drawing decree.

Under the English practice, after the hearing was had, the chancellor pronounced his decree, and the registrar took minutes of it, and they were usually read over by him to the parties or their solicitors, and copies of such minutes were generally applied for and furnished to the parties. If not satisfactory, by reason of their uncertainty, or if anything had been omitted, and the registrar refused to correct them, application might be made to the court to correct them. After the minutes were settled, the decree was then drawn up by the registrar, and delivered to the party who demanded it. The decree having been returned, and an office copy taken by the adverse party, the next step to be taken was to have it passed and entered, till which was done, the decree was only inchoate.92 In the United States, the decree is usually prepared by the solicitor for the party in whose favor or on whose application the decree is to be entered. He usually submits the same to the adverse party, and if there is no objection to the form thereof, it is presented to the court for its approval and entry. If there is objection, the draft of the proposed decree is presented to the court, and the form of the decree determined by it after hearing both parties.93 It is held in Illinois that it has never been regarded as the duty of the clerk to draw decrees in chancery, but only to record them when drawn by counsel, and approved by the chancellor.94

$726. Entry and enrollment.

In most jurisdictions the decree is inchoate until it is ap proved by the chancellor, or filed for record, or shall be recorded, which answers to the passing and entering it of the English

92 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 249; Porter v. Vaughan, 22 Vt. 269. 93 Stevens v. Coffeen, 39 Ill. 148; Schneider v. Seibert, 50 Ill. 285; Shute v. Morley Sewing Machine Co., 64 Fed. 368.

94 Schneider v. Seibert, 50 Ill. 285. For practice in the New York court of chancery, see 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 340 et seq.; Rogers v. Rogers, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 473; Whitney v. Belden, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 140; Doe v. Green, 2 Paige (N. Y.) 352.

practice. The mere oral announcement by the chancellor of his decision, and of the grounds upon which it is based, or reducing them to writing, is no more than the minutes in the English practice. Until the final decree has been filed or recorded, the chancellor may alter, amend, change, or even disregard all he has said in his minutes. Before a final decree has been filed for record, or is recorded, the chancellor, on his own motion, may order a rehearing.95 The recording of the decree corre

95 Hughs v. Washington, 65 Ill. 245; Whitney v. Belden, 4 Paige (N. Y.) 140; 1 Barbour, Ch. Pr. 341. "In the court of chancery of England, the chancellor, it seems, after the hearing, pronounces the substance of his decree orally, minutes of which are taken down by the register, who afterwards draws them out into the form of a decretal order; and if, in doing so, any mistake should occur, the execution of the order may be stayed awhile, until it can be corrected by motion in court. As thus drawn up, this judgment of the court is always called its 'decretal order.' But it has the force only of an interlocutory order, and is not a perfect, complete, and final decree before enrollment, for till then the chancellor may rehear, alter, or revise it. The proper officer draws up the form of the decree for enrollment from the decretal order, reciting all the pleadings, etc., after which a fair copy is made upon parchment, and signed by the chancellor. It is then, and not until then, an enrolled and final decree. The interval of time suffered to elapse between the making of the decretal order and the enrollment is seldom less than a month,-often more,-and in some cases exceeds a whole year. But in this interval the decretal order is so far considered as a final decree that it may be enforced by attachment. Gilbert, Forum Rom. 162; 1 Harrison, Ch. Pr. 77, 620; 2 Harrison, Ch. Pr. 174; 2 Maddock, Ch. Pr. 464; 2 Fowler, Exch. Pr. 164. The court of appeals have declared that 'the decree of the chancellor is subject to his control only upon a bill of review, or a bill in the nature of a bill of review. A bill of review lies after the decree is signed and enrolled. A bill in the nature of a bill of review lies after the decree is made, but before enrollment. A decree must be considered as enrolled after it is signed by the chancellor and filed by the register.' Hollingsworth v. McDonald, 2 Har. & J. (Md.) 237; Beames, Order Ch. 1; Digges' Lessee v. Beale, 1 Har. & McH. (Md.) 71. But the chancellor rarely, if ever, pronounces his decree orally, as in England, or, if he does do so in any case, no minutes of it are taken down. He is considered as having pronounced no judgment, nor as having made any decision in the cause, until a decree is drawn up in writing, in full and proper form, and signed by him. That decretal order, which in England always precedes the enrolled or final decree, is never made here, and is unknown to our practice, but in England the