ing only in that one is payable from a general tax, and the other by special assessment, or because it attacks two patents, whose validity can be conveniently considered together.239

To support the objection that the bill contains different causes of suit against the same defendant, two things must concur: First, the different grounds of suit must be wholly distinct; and, secondly, each ground must be sufficient as stated to sustain the bill.240 Thus it is said that if the bill merely seeks to recover the value of land, and rents and profits issued out of the same property, there is not such a want of connection as to render it multifarious, even admitting that one might be rightfully recovered and the other not.241 Mere surplusage does not make a bill multifarious; 242 nor is a bill multifarious where it sets up one sufficient ground for equitable relief, and also another on which no relief can be had.243 If one of two distinct subject-matters be clearly without the jurisdiction of a court of equity for redress, it is held that the court will treat the bill as if single, and proceed with the other matter, over which it has

;242

239 Burlington Sav. Bank v. City of Clinton, 106 Fed. 269; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315; United States Mineral Wool Co. v. Manville Covering Co., 101 Fed. 145. But see, as to patents, Hayes v. Dayton, 8 Fed. 702; Barney v. Peck, 16 Fed. 413; Consolidated Electric Light Co. v. Brush Swan Electric Light Co., 20 Fed. 502; Diamond Match Co. v. Ohio Match Co., 80 Fed. 117; Union Switch & Signal Co. v. Philadelphia & Reading R. Co., 68 Fed. 913.

240 Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C. 313; Kennebec & P. R. Co. v. Portland & K. R. Co., 54 Me. 173; Story, Eq. Pl. § 284; Mathews v. Bank of Allendale, 60 S. C. 183, 38 S. E. 437; Harper v. Holman, 84 Fed. 222; District Grand Lodge v. Marx (Ala.) 30 So. 870.

241 Chapman v. Chunn, 5 Ala. 397, citing Kennedy's Heirs and Ex'rs v. Kennedy's Heirs, 2 Ala. 571. See, also, United States v. Pratt Coal & Coke Co., 18 Fed. 708; Pacific R. Co. v. Atlantic & P. R. Co., 20 Fed. 277; Hendon v. Morris, 110 Ala. 106, 20 So. 27; Patton v. Glatz, 56 Fed. 367.

242 Sturgeon v. Burrall, 1 Ill. App. 537; Morris v. Morris, 58 Ala. 443; Ritch v. Eichelberger, 13 Fla. 169.

243 Pleasants v. Glasscock, Smedes & M. Ch. (Miss.) 17; McGriff v. Alford, 111 Ala. 634, 20 So. 497; Bedsole v. Monroe, 40 N. C. 313; Huff v. Thrash, 75 Va. 546; Pyles v. Riverside Furniture Co., 30 W. Va. 123, 2 S. E. 909; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 137, 28 Am. Dec. 417; Dick v. Dick, 1 Hogan, 290.

jurisdiction, as if it constituted the sole object of the bill.244 A bill is not multifarious because it alleges several grounds in support of the same claim,245 and is not multifarious because it joins two good causes of complaint growing out of the same transaction, when all the defendants are interested in the same. claim of right, and when the relief asked for in relation to each is of the same general character. 246 Matters of the same nature between the same parties, although arising out of distinct transactions, may be joined in the same bill.247 To protect a bill from the charge of multifariousness, it is not necessary that the interests of the parties be the same as to all the matters involved in the suit. It will be sufficient if they have a common interest in one or more, which are connected with the rest.248

§ 109. Avoidance of multiplicity as an excuse for multifarious

ness.

A bill does not come within the evil of multifariousness when the joinder therein of two distinct matters prevents a needless multiplicity of suits, and neither inconveniences the defendants nor causes additional expense.249 A bill to establish a resulting

244 Knye v. Moore, 1 Sim. & S. 61; Story, Eq. Pl. § 283; Baines v. Barnes, 64 Ala. 375; Varick v. Smith, 5 Paige (N. Y.) 137, 28 Am. Dec. 417; Jones v. Reid, 12 W. Va. 350, 29 Am. Rep. 455; Snavely v. Hark. rader, 29 Grat. (Va.) 112; Smith v. McLain, 11 W. Va. 654.

245 Barnett v. Woods, 55 N. C. 198; Cauley v. Lawson, 58 N. C. 132. 246 Story, Eq. Pl. § 284; Chapman v. Chunn, 5 Ala. 397; Harper v. Holman, 84 Fed. 222.

247 Newland v. Rogers, 3 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 432; Campbell v. Mackay, 1 Mylne & C. 616.

248 Booth v. Stamper, 10 Ga. 109; Worthy v. Johnson, 8 Ga. 236, 52 Am. Dec. 399; Lenz v. Prescott, 144 Mass. 505, 11 N. E. 923; Brown v. Guarantee Trust & Safe Deposit Co., 128 U. S. 403. See Brinkerhoff v. Brown, 6 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 139; Camp v. Mills, 59 N. C. 274; Cutter v. Iowa Water Co., 96 Fed. 781; Addison v. Walker, 4 Younge & C. Exch. 442; Kelley v. Boettcher, 56 U. S. App. 363, 85 Fed. 64; Prentice v. Duluth Storage & Forwarding Co., 19 U. S. App. 100, 58 Fed. 437; Bolman v. Lohman, 74 Ala. 507; Truss v. Miller, 116 Ala. 494, 22 So. 863. 249 Stafford Nat. Bank v. Sprague, 8 Fed. 377; People v. Morrill, 26 Cal. 336; Grant v. Phoenix Life Ins. Co., 121 U. S. 105; Chase v. Searles, 45 N. H. 511; Smith v. Bank of New England, 69 N. H. 254, 45 Atl. (145)

trust, and for partition, is not multifarious because the partition is decreed incidentally, to complete the measure of relief and avoid multiplicity of suits.250 If the same relief asked against several defendants is based on the same transaction, and, unless they can be joined in one bill, seventy or eighty suits all growing out of the same character of transactions will be brought, the bill will not be held bad for multifariousness.25

A court of equity will, in a single suit, take cognizance of a controversy, determine the rights of all parties, and grant the relief requisite to meet the ends of justice, in order to prevent a multiplicity of suits, where a number of persons have separate and individual claims and rights of action against the same party, but all arise from some common cause, are governed by the same legal rule, and involve similar facts, and the whole matter may be settled in one action, brought by all these persons uniting as co-complainants.252

§ 110. Prayer for relief making bill multifarious.

Where a bill does not state facts rendering it multifarious, the prayer for relief cannot make it so ;253 and if a bill does not pray for multifarious relief, it is not subject to objection for multifariousness, though the case stated would support such prayer. 254 Where a bill filed by two to recover a joint demand

1082; Animarium Co. v. Neiman, 98 Fed. 14; United States v. American Bell Telephone Co., 128 U. S. 315; Demarest v. Holdeman, 157 Ind. 467, 62 N. E. 17.

250 Hayes' Appeal, 123 Pa. 110, 16 Atl. 600. See 3 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. § 1388.

251 Western Land & Emigration Co. v. Guinault, 37 Fed. 523.

252 Pomeroy, Eq. Jur. §§ 243, 245, 255, 269; Libby v. Norris, 142 Mass. 246, 7 N. E. 919; Osborne v. Wisconsin Cent. R. Co., 43 Fed. 824; Macon & B. R. Co. v. Gibson, 5 Ga. 1, 11 S. E. 442; Sang Lung v. Jackson, 85 Fed. 502, 504; Smyth v. Ames, 169 U. S. 466; Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co. v. Clunie, 88 Fed. 160. See supra, § 25 et seq.

253 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 74 Ala. 546; Burchard v. Boyce, 21 Ga. 6; Hammond v. Michigan State Bank, Walk. (Mich.) 214; Boutwell v. Vandiver, 123 Ala. 634, 26 So. 222; De Neufville v. New York & N. Ry. Co., 81 Fed. 10.

254 Dick v. Dick, 1 Hogan. 290; Allred v. Tate, 113 Ga. 441. 39 S. E. 101.

contains likewise a statement of facts that would entitle one of them to a decree for a separate demand against the same defendant, the bill is not liable to a demurrer for multifariousness, unless relief is prayed as to the separate demand.255 A bill praying the enforcement of an award, and, if that is refused, the declaration of a partition, concerning which the award was made, to be unequal or fraudulent, and the adjustment of the shares of the parties entitled, is inultifarious.256 In a suit between proper parties relating to the same subject-matter, several kinds of relief may be prayed, although either kind might have been the subject of a separate suit.257 Where a bill by several complainants to restrain the continuance of a nuisance contained also a prayer for an account, and compensation for the damage which the complainants had respectively sustained by the alleged nuisance, it was held that multifarious relief could not be granted as prayed for, but that the objection might be obviated by striking out that part of the prayer calling for an account of the damages to the complainants, respectively.25

$111. Multifariousness resulting from misjoinder of complainants.

A bill is bad for multifariousness where several complainants by one bill demand several distinct matters against one and the same defendant.259 The objection of misjoinder does not apply where all the parties complainant have an interest, al

255 Carpenter v. Hall, 18 Ala. 439, citing Dick v. Dick, 1 Hogan, 290. 256 Emans v. Emans, 14 N. J. Eq. 114.

257 Durling v. Hammar, 20 N. J. Eq. 220.

258 Murray v. Hay, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 59, 43 Am. Dec. 773. See, also, relative to prayers making bills multifarious, Wells v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 30 Conn. 316; Commercial Mut. Ins. Co. v. McLoon, 14 Allen (Mass.) 351; McCosker v. Brady, 1 Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 329; Canton v. McGraw, 91 Md. 744, 47 Atl. 1030; Earle v. Humphrey, 121 Mich 518, 80 N. W. 370; Cutter v. Iowa Water Co., 96 Fed. 777.

259 Story, Eq. Pl. § 279; Ayers v. Wright, 43 N. C. 229; Yeaton v. Lenox, 8 Pet. (U. S.) 123; Mix v. Hotchkiss, 14 Conn. 32; Reybold v. Herdman, 2 Del. Ch. 34; Whiteside County Sup'rs v. Burchell, 31 Ill. 68; Exeter College v. Rowland, 6 Madd. 94.

though it is not a coextensive interest.260 Thus, where two mortgagees, one of whom has a mortgage on a part only, and the other on the whole, of the property named in the bill, join as complainants, the bill is not multifarious.261 Where each of the complainants has a standing in court, and their causes of action are not antagonistic, and the relief they pray involves in each case the same questions, and requires the same evidence and the same decree, their joinder does not render the bill multifarious.262 A bill brought by several persons claiming under a common title, but in different shares and proportions, is not multifarious;203 but two alternative claims, each belonging to many persons, one of whom has no interest in one claim, and others of whom have no interest in the other claim, cannot be joined in one bill.263a The fact that each of the complainants has sustained the same kind of an injury is not sufficient to authorize them to file a joint bill, where the cause of complaint is separate and distinct.264 A bill by owners of separate mills, deriving water from the same dam, to restrain the obstruction of their right of flowage, is not multifarious;265 nor is a bill by several property owners to restrain a tax.

266

260 Story, Eq. Pl. § 279a; Buckeridge v. Glasse, Craig & P. 126; Fiery v. Emmert, 36 Md. 464; Catlin v. Wheeler, 49 Wis. 507, 5 N. W. 935.

261 Mobile & C. P. R. Co. v. Talman, 15 Ala. 472.

262 Home Ins. Co. of New York v. Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co., 109 Fed. 681; Walker v. Powers, 104 U. S. 245.

203 Shields v. Thomas, 18 How. (U. S.) 253.

263a Stebbins v. Town of St. Anne, 116 U. S. 386.

264 Appeal of Young, 3 Penny. (Pa.) 463; Winslow v. Jenness, 64 Mich. 84, 30 N. W. 905; Douglass v. Boardman, 113 Mich. 618, 71 N. W. 1100. Several owners of different tracts of land, over which a canal company has made its canal, cannot join in a bill against the company, charging that it has taken their land without permission, and done them great damage; that it is insolvent; and pray for an account and an injunction. Marselis v. Morris Canal & Banking Co., 1 N. J. Eq. 31.

See,

265 Cornwell Mfg. Co. v. Swift, 89 Mich. 503, 50 N. W. 1001. also, Whipple v. Guile, 22 R. I. 576, 48 Atl. 935; Rowbotham v. Jones, 47 N. J. Eq. 337, 20 Atl. 731; Snyder v. Cabell, 29 W. Va. 48, 1 S. E. 241; Robinson v. Baugh, 31 Mich. 290; Lonsdale Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 21 R. I. 498, 44 Atl. 929; Proprietors of Mills on Monatiquot River v.