law shall not revive the original act. This rule is not applicable to cases where the first act was modified only and not repealed by the second, for by the repeal of the second, the original, so far as modified, is revived.2 STAY LAW-See also STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.-See note 3. 1. See statutes in various states and in England. And see generally State v. Slaughter, 70 Mo. 484; Sullivan v. People, 15 Ill. 233; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252; Tallamon v. Cardenas, 14 La. Ann. 514; Witkouski 7. Witkouski, 16 La. Ann. 232; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 127; Heinssen v. State, 14 Colo. 228; Teter v. Clayton, 71 Ind. 237; Cassell . Lexington, etc., R. Co. (Ky. 1888), 9 S. W. Rep. 502. The same rule applies to amendments of laws which constitute repeals. Tallamon v. Cardenas, 14 La. Ann. 514; Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 132. An act suspending a repealing act is not within the statutory inhibition. Brown v. Barry, 3 Dall. (Ŭ. S.) 365. A constitutional provision that no law shall be revived unless set out in the reviving act, prevents a revivor by mere repeal of the repealing statute. Renter v. Bauer, 3 Kan. 505; Trosper v. Horr, 4 Kan. 59. 2. Bank for Savings v. Field, 3 Wall. (U. S.) 495; Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252; Mount v. Taylor, L. R., 3 ̊C. P. 645. See Mirfin v. Atwood, L. R., 4 Q. B. 340; Glaholm v. Barker, L. R., I Ch. 229. So where a statute merely excepts a particular class of cases from the provisions of a previously existing general law which continues to be in force, the repeal of the excepting statute operates to bring such cases under the general law. Smith v. Hoyt, 14 Wis. 252. See Goodno v. Oshkosh, 31 Wis. 132; State v. Hoeflinger, 31 Wis. 262; Bank for Savings v. Field, 3 Wall. (U.S.) 495. 3. In times of extended and severe financial trouble the legislatures of some of the states have endeavored to give debtors some protection against the oppressive enforcement of laws for the collection of debts by the enactment of laws suspending certain judicial remedies, as by providing that foreclosure suits shall not be commenced for a certain period of time, or that execution shall not issue in certain cases. Laws of this nature are popularly called stay laws. Abbott's L. Dict. In the early days after the Revolution and in the southern states in the years immediately succeeding the Civil war such laws were not uncommon (but they were very generally held to be unconstitutional). See the article STAY OF PROCEEDINGS in this volume, where the question is exhaustively treated. A good example of such laws is found in the Wisconsin statute of 1862, exempting from civil process all persons who had or might volunteer or enroll themselves as members of any military company mustered into the service of the United States or of the state, during their service. The act was held to be unconstitutional. The court, by Cole, J., said: "We have quite recently had occasion to inquire into the extent of the power of the state legislature to change, modify, or alter the laws governing proceedings in courts of justice, both in respect to past and future contracts. The rule extracted from the cases was, that this power was unrestricted so long as a substantial remedy was afforded according to the course of justice as it existed at the time the contract was made. But the legislature must give some remedy, and not destroy the legal force and obligation of a contract, taking away all existing remedies. This would seem to be quite a plain proposition. The objection to the law in question is, that it takes away all existing remedies for enforcing the obligation of contracts, while the debtor is in the military service of the United States or of this state. So long as this military service continues, the creditor is without redress. Should the debtor continue in the service, three, five, ten, or twenty years, he is, under the law, exempted from all civil process. It is very evident that this is a suspension for an indefinite period of all remedies whatever. And such being the character of the law, we cannot see upon what ground its validity can be sustained. It is claimed that the act is amply justified by the perils which threaten our national existence, and the imperious necessity which exists for obtaining a military force adequate to the defense of the country. Giving to these political considerations all the weight which has been claimed for them, they surely do not show that the exemption should be for an indefinite period." STAY OF PROCEEDINGS.--For stay of proceedings pending appeal, see SUPERSEDEAS. Costs, 520. b. For Breach of Faith, 521. c. In Second Action for Same d. For Vexatious Process, 522. f. Upon Discharge in Bank- g. For Irregularity, 526. a. For Non-Payment of Costs, b. Where Material Evidence c. For Discovery and Commis sions to Take Testimony, 529. 3. Application for Stay-In What 4. Remedy for Abuse of Discre tion, 529. III. Stay of Execution (See EXECU- 1. Definition and Kinds, 530. 2. Stay by Order of Court, 530. b. Perpetual Stay, 532. 4. Statutory Stays, 540. a. Construction of Statutes, 540. b. Right of Appeal after Taking Stay, 543. c. Waiver of Right to Stay by Contract, 544. d. Stay Laws-Constitutional- 5. Effect of Stay, 548. Effect upon b. Execution Pending Stay, c. Effect upon Judgment Lien on Real Estate, 549. d. Effect upon Execution Personal Property, 550. on e. Effect upon Execution Partly Performed, 552. f. Effect upon Execution Fully Performed, 554. I. DEFINITION. Stay of proceedings usually imports an order of court made in the cause and as a part of its course suspending further action in it; and is generally conditional or temporary, as, until some other order of court has been complied with, until a party shall give required security, or the like. It is distinguishable from injunction to restrain proceedings at law, which is in the nature of an equitable decree in another court, that the party stayed shall proceed no farther, because his action is deemed contrary to equity; and from prohibition, which is a mandate of a superior court to an inferior one, commanding it to refrain from proceedings because they have been in excess of its jurisdiction.1 II. STAY OF INTERMEDIATE PROCEEDINGS-1. Absolute Stay-a. UPON PAYMENt of Debt and COSTS.-In many cases where the 1. Abbott's L. Dict. The act of stopping or arresting a judicial proceeding by order of the court or judge. Burr. L. Dict. But the stay may be by consent of the parties. Stet processus is an entry on the roll in the nature of a judg ment, of a direction that all further proceedings shall be stayed (that is, that the process may stand), and it is one of the ways by which a suit may be put an end to by an act of the party, as distinguished from the termination of it by judgment, which is amount of the debt is certain, or capable of being rendered certain, and the defendant does not dispute the cause of action or the amount of the debt, proceedings will be stayed upon defendant's motion and upon his paying the amount of the debt and costs. And in some cases, courts have granted absolute stays upon payment of the debt without costs; as where an action was brought without a previous demand, or for the purpose of making costs, without giving the defendant an opportunity to pay.2 Even in actions for unliquidated damages, proceedings may be stayed where the defendant pays all that the plaintiff could recover under any aspect of the case, with all costs; or after verdict, pays the amount of the verdict with costs. But there is some conflict of authority on this point.3 Such a rule or order is not a matter of right, but is within the discretion of the court, and when defendant seeks this relief he must make prompt application for it and render prompt compliance with the conditions imposed.5 b. FOR BREACH OF FAITH.-If the parties make a definite agreement to settle and one of them seeks to proceed, notwithstanding such agreement, the court may stay all further proceedings upon compliance with the terms of the agreement by the other 1. Where the writ is indorsed for a larger sum than is due, by which the defendant is misled and prevented from settling the claim, the court may stay the proceedings on payment of the real debt with the costs of the writ only. Elliston v. Robinson, 2 D. P. C. 241; 2 C. & M. 343. The staying proceedings in an action on a bond for the performance of covenants, and the like, on payment of the penalty and costs, is a very usual exercise of power. Oshiel v. De Graw, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 63, citing 1 Dunlap's Pr. 338. 2. If the defendant, after verdict, tender the amount recovered, with all the costs up to the time, the court will order further proceedings to be stayed. Hatfield v. Baldwin, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 506. In an action brought against a sheriff for money levied under a fieri facias without any previous demand, the court will stay the proceeding on payment of the sum levied, without costs. Jefferies v. Sheppard, 3 B. & Ald. 696; 5 E. C. L. 426. 3. Hatfield v. Baldwin, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 506; Oshiel v. De Graw, 6 Cow. (N. Y.) 63. Contra.-An order cannot be made for staying proceedings on payment of debt and costs for unliquidated damages. Fisher v. Pyne, 1 M. & G. 265; 39 E. C. L. 437; nor in such case after verdict, on payment of amount of verdict and costs. Peat v. Mangnall, 2 B. C. Rep. 325; 6 D. & L. 261. 4. A defendant who moves to stay proceedings on payment of debt and costs, is not entitled to a rule for that purpose as a matter of right, but must submit to such reasonable terms as the court in its discretion may think proper. Jones v. Shepherd, 3 D. P. C. 421. 5. Application to stay proceedings on payment of debt must be made within four days after service of process. Bowdridge v. Slaney, 2 Scott 197; 2 Bing. N. Cas. 142; 29 E. C. L. 285; Hayter 7. Moat, 5 D. P. C. 329. The judge has no power before declaration to order that proceedings be stayed on payment of debt and costs within a certain time, otherwise judgment for plaintiff. Reynolds v. Sherwood, 8 D. P. C. 183. A judge has no authority without the consent of the plaintiff to make an order to stay proceedings in an action upon payment of the debt and costs on a subsequent date. Morton v. Fraser, 2 M. & G. 916; 40 E. C. L.691; Kirby v. Ellison, 2 D. P. C. 219. But the debtor party; but the agreement to settle must be unconditional.2 So, the court may punish the offending party by staying proceedings brought against good faith, though the agreement, in fraud of which the action was brought, was made while the parties were not under the authority of the court;3 and an agreement between the parties to stay further proceedings may be enforced on summary application.4 c. IN SECOND ACTION FOR SAME CAUSE.—In rare cases, the courts have sometimes stayed proceedings in a second action after a recovery for the same cause in a former action; and this has been done although the plaintiff in the former action recovered only nominal damages; and where relief was claimed that had already been claimed in another action, proceedings were stayed except as to relief not claimed in the former action.R Usually, however, the courts refuse to interfere and compel the defendant to plead the former adjudication if he seeks to take advantage of it as a defense.7 d. FOR VEXATIOUS PROCESS.-The court will stay proceedings in an action where the manifest purpose of the plaintiff is to annoy and vex the defendant and not to enforce a just demand; 8 as where one brings simultaneous actions for the same cause, even though one of the actions be in a foreign jurisdiction,9 or where plaintiff repeatedly sues in the same jurisdiction on the same cause of action.10 is not obliged to pay instanter; he is entitled to a reasonable time to get the money. Perkins v. National Ins., etc., Assoc., 26 L. J. Exch. 182. 1. Ponting v. Watson, 1 Jur. N. S. 1139. 2. Webster v. Acton, 11 W. R. 114. 3. Cocker v. Tempest, 7 M. & W. 502; 9 D. P. C. 306. Where the defendant had received a letter not to pay except on written order of plaintiff, the proceedings were stayed on payment of the money into court. Newton v. Matthews, 4 D. P. C. 237. 4. Eden v. Naish, 7 Ch. Div. 781; 47 L. J. Ch. 325. 5. Wait's Pr., vol. 2, p. 619, citing Longridge v. Brewer, 1 Bing. 307; 8 E. C. L. 521. 6. Morton v. Quick, In re Aird, 26 R. W. 441. See also Haigh v. Paris, 16 M. & W. 144; 4 B. & L. 325; 16 L. J. Ex. 37: 7. 2 Wait's Pr., p. 619, citing Harrington v. Johnson, 2 Cowp. 744; Pechell v. Layton, 2 T. R. 512. See RES JUDICATA, vol. 21, p. 127. 8. Jacobs v. Raven, 30 L. T. 366; Edmunds v. Attorney Gen'l, 47 L. J. Ch. 345; 38 L. T., N. S. 213. 9. Cox v. Mitchell, 7 C. B., N. S. 55; 29 L. J. C. P. 33; 97 E. C. L. 55. 10. As equity would decree an injunction after three trials in ejectment, so will the courts in Pennsylvania stay further proceedings by their summary powers for the ends of justice. Cherry v. Robinson, 1 Yeates (Pa.) 521, citing 2 Eq. Cas. Abr. 222; 1 Wms. 672; 2 Bro. Parl. Cas. 217; 1 Stra. 404; Bunb. 115. Although a party has a right, as a general rule, to bring suit upon a prior judgment, still the supreme court has such control over its own process that it ought not to permit it to be perverted or used for an improper purpose. Where a person who has recovered a judgment, brings successive suits thereon, in different courts, without issuing execution, and he admits that such suits were brought for the purpose of coercing payment of his debt by accumulating costs, the court in which the last suit is brought will grant a perpetual stay of proceedings in all the suits in that court except the first. The plaintiff will not be allowed to make use of the costs of the suit by way of penalty, in order to compel a defendant to pay his debt. Keeler v. King, 1 Barb. (N. Y.) 390. e. PENDING OTHER ACTIONS FOR SAME CAUSE.-Where several actions are brought on the same cause of action, the court may stay proceedings on all but one; or will stay proceedings on all until the plaintiff elects to discontinue in all but one.2 And this will be done where the plaintiff of record is not the same person in all the actions, if it appears that the actions are all under the control of one person and for his benefit. If the plaintiff is the defendant in another suit where the same questions are involved, he can not be compelled to elect between the two actions. But the court may stay proceedings in one of two cross-actions and order the counterclaim to be delivered by the party who has not the burden of proof on the issues, if the points at issue are the same in the two actions.5 The mere fact that there is another action involving the same issues pending between the same parties in a foreign country, is not sufficient ground for staying proceedings, unless it appears that one of the parties is seeking to prevent the course of justice. But it seems to be within the sound discretion of the court to stay proceedings when there is another action between the same parties and involving the same issues pending in a court of a sister state or in a court of the United States." In order to authorize any court to stay proceedings on account of a suit pending in another court, the two proceedings must be practically identical.8 1. Jones v. Pritchard, 6 D. & L. 529; 18 L. J. Q. B. 104; Sowter v. Dunston, 1 M. & R. 508; 17 E. C. L. 26); Carne v. Legh, 6 B. & C. 124; 9 D. & R. 126; 13 E. C. L. 118; Burlinue v. Parce, 12 Hun (N. Y.) 149; lanagan . Flanagan, 13 N. Y. St. 432; Cushman v. Leland, 93 N. Y. 6:2; Brown v. May, 17 Abb. N. Cas (N.Y.) 205: Oroville, etc., R. Co. v. Supervisors of Plumas Co., 37 Cal. 354. The court may order suspension of action against a garnishee until attachment proceedings are disposed of. McFadden v. O'Donnell, 18 Cal. 160; Pierson v. McCahill, 21 Cal. 123; McKeon . McDermott, 22 Cal. 667; 83 Am. Dec. 86. In a suit on the assignment of a promissory note, the declaration averred that the plaintiff had sued the maker, that the latter had obtained judgment on account of a want of consideration for the note, and that notice of the suit against the maker had been given to the indorser, etc. A motion was made by the now defendant in the circuit court to stay proceedings until a writ of error, which had been taken to said judgment and which was shown by affidavit to be pending in the su preme court, should be determined. Held, that the motion should be granted. Scott v. Herald, 8 Blackf. (Ind.) 129. The court will not stay proceedings until another action between the parties brought upon the act against usury shall be determined. Shoemaker v. Shirtliffe, 1 Dall. (Pa.) 127. 2. Hammond v. Baker, 3 Sandf. (N. Y.) 704; Liftchild v. Smith, 7 Robt. (N. Y.) 306. 3. Soule v. Corning, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 412; Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 448. 4. Botts v. Cozine, 2 Edw. Ch. (N. Y.) 583; Mariposa Co. v. Garrison, 26 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 448. 5. Thomson v. South Eastern R. Co., 9 Q. B. Div. 320; 51 L. J. Q. B. 322; Adamson v. Tuff, 44 L. T. 420. 6. Republic of Mexico v. De Arangoiz, 5 Duer (N. Y.) 634; Cox v. Mitchell, 7 C. B. N. S. 55; 29 L. J. C. P. 33; 97 E. C. L. 55; McHenry v. Lewis, 22 Ch. Div. 397; 52 L. J. Ch. 325. 7. Bell v. Donohue, 47 N. Y. Super. Ct. 458; Parmalee v. Wheeler, 32 Wis. 429. 8. Campbell, J., in People v. Judges, |