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enrolled bill is not properly authenticated, the presumption of regularity is gone, and the court usually looks behind the act to the journals of the legislature to ascertain the facts.1

In Illinois, it has been held that where an act was not authenticated as prescribed by the revised statutes, the court had no legal evidence of the existence of the law before it, and therefore would not take notice of such law, or act thereon.2

b. EVIDENCE TO IMPEACH.-The validity of an enactment depends on whether constitutional provisions governing the mode of enactment have been complied with. Generally speaking, if this has been done, the act is valid; otherwise, it is void.3 The rule generally accepted is that the only competent evidence to

the senate that they had examined the bill and found it correctly enrolled;" and one on Feb. 21st, that a message was received by the senate from the house returning the said bill signed. It was contended that it appeared from this that the bill was not enrolled in the senate until Feb. 21st, at which date the house transmitted the bill to the senate. For the support of this proposition it was asserted that a bill is never signed by the speaker until it is enrolled or engrossed. The court held that the above entries did not necessarily prove the date of the enrollment of the bill, for it might have been enrolled prior to that date, or it might have been signed before it was enrolled; there being, therefore, doubt as to the matter, the act was held valid. Nelson v. Haywood County, 91 Tenn. 596.

1. Rumsey v. New York, etc., R. Co., 130 N. Y. 92; Ewing v. Duncan, 81 Tex. 230; People v. Com'rs of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276; 13 Am. Rep. 581; Leavenworth County v. Higgenboth am,17 Kan.62; Burr v.Ross, 19 Ark. 250. "But if the record of the act itself carry its death's wound in itself, then, it is true, that the parchment-no, nor the great seal, either, to the original act or to the exemplification of it-will not serve, as in the 4 H. 7, 18, where the act was by the king, with the consent of the lords (omitting the commons), and was judged therefore void." Rex v. Arundel, Hob. 110.

In Burr v. Ross, 19 Ark. 250, doubt of passage of the bill appeared on the face of the act itself, and the court, looking to the journal, discovered that the bill had not been passed, and declared the act void.

Where, however, an act duly passed by the legislature was not in any way

authenticated, the court refused either to enforce it or to compel its authentication. State v. Robinson, 81 N. Car. 409.

Where there is a manifest error in the certificate of the secretary of one of the houses of the legislature attached to the bill, the journal of that house will be examined. Ewing v. Duncan, 81 Tex. 230.

In New York, it is provided that the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each branch of the legislature is requisite to every bill appropriating the public moneys or property for local or private purposes, and no bill shall be deemed to have passed by the assent of two-thirds of the members elected to each house unless so certified by the presiding officer of each house. And where the enrolled statute stated that it had been passed by a two-thirds' vote, but the certificate of the presiding officer of the assembly failed to state whether it had so passed, it was held that, the certificate being defective, the enrolled act was not conclusive to overcome the presumption created by the statement of the secretary in the session laws; and that in such case the journal of the house whose presiding officer had made the defective certificate must be resorted to for the purpose of determining the fact. Rumsey v. New York, etc., R. Co., 130 N. Y. 88. But see People v. Com'rs of Highways, 54 N. Y. 276; 13 Am. Rep. 581.

2. Wabash R. Co. v. Hughes, 38 I11. 189; Burritt v. Comr's of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 332. The Arizona court follows the same rule, Graves v. Alsop, 1 Arizona 274.

It was held incompetent to show by parol evidence that an act had passed where the journal only stated that the bill had been reported. Covington v. Ludlow, I Metc. (Ky.) 295.

3. Currie v. Southern Pac. Co., 21

impeach the enrolled bill, is the legislative journal, and that parol evidence of what actually was done by the legislature is incompetent to contradict either the enrolled bill or the journal. The legislative motive in passing the bill may not be shown.2

The decisions may be classified into those where the enrolled bill is deemed conclusive, and those recognizing the doctrine that the bill may be impeached by the legislative journals. The fed

Oregon 566; State v. Rogers, 22 Oregon 348; State v. Buckley, 54 Ala. 602; Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721. 1. See infra, this title, The Enrolled Bill-Prima Facie Validity.

Parol testimony of members of the legislature, of the proceedings in that body, and of the contents of a bill for which a substitute was introduced, is inadmissible. Sackrider v. Saginaw County Supervisors, 79 Mich. 59.

The draftsman of a bill was not permitted to testify to words of an original statute omitted from the amendatory act by inadvertence. Combined Saw, etc., Co. v. Flournoy, 88 Va. 1029.

2. Wichita . Burleigh, 36 Kan. 34; State 7. Smith, 44 Ohio St. 348; Slack 7. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 613; McCulloch v. State, II Ind. 431; Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514; 95 Am. Dec. 710; Sunbury, etc., R. Co. v. Cooper, 33 Pa. St. 278; Harpending v. Haight, 39 Cal. 202; 2 Am. Rep. 432; Miller v. State, 3 Ohio St. 484; Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 168; State . Fagan, 22 La. Ann. 545; People v. Bigler, 5 Cal. 23; Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 266; 89 Am. Dec. 93; Wright . Defrees, 8 Ind. 303; Fletcher 7. Peck, 6 Cranch (U. S.) 131; People v. Petrea, 92 N. Y. 139.

The courts cannot inquire into the motives and purposes of the legislature in order to attribute to it a design contrary to that clearly expressed or fairly implied in a bill enacted. It must be assumed that the legislature acted in good faith and meant what the bill expressed, although it may be possible to show outside of its language in terms that in fact all or the larger part of its benefits will inure to a few individuals. Waterloo, etc., Mfg. Co. v. Shanahan, 128 N. Y. 345.

The fact that a certain bill was inspired by private persons for their own advantage, and was the result of an agreement between such persons and members of the legislature, furnishes no ground for the interference of the courts, they having nothing to do with either the policy or the motives of legislation. Williams v. Nashville, 89

Tenn. 487; Lynn v. Polk, 8 Lea (Tenn.) 293; Ballentine v. Pulaski, 15 Lea (Tenn.) 634.

When the legislature determines that a public improvement will be a benefit to the adjacent property, and that the expense of making the same shall be paid by the owners of such adjacent property, the courts have nothing to do with the correctness or incorrectness of the determination, but must assume the facts to be as the legislature assumes or declares them. People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. (N. Y.) 177; affirmed 41 N. Y. 137.

The courts cannot, even on the complaint of the state, inquire into the motives by which members of the general assembly were governed in the enactment of a statute. McCulloch v. State, 11 Ind. 424; Wright v. Defrees, 8 Ind. 298.

Where the legislature violates sound political principles in the passage of an act, but not the constitution, the act cannot be declared void. People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 489.

3. In Ex parte Wren, 63 Miss. 527, 56 Am. Rep. 825, the court stated that there were three theories upon which the decisions of different states might be arranged, adding to those in the text a third, based on a dictum in People v. Starne, 35 Ill. 136, to the effect that in Illinois "the journals must affirmatively show conformity to every requirement of the constitution in the progress of a bill through its several stages to become a law, or else the presumption will hold that these requirements have been disregarded and the bill will never become a law."

But in Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 33 Fed. Rep. 761, the second view in the text was followed, and it was decided that the failure of the journal to show compliance with constitutional provisions, not required to be recorded therein, did not invalidate the law. the opinion, the court distinguished the Illinois cases on this point as follows: "The earliest case in the Supreme Court of Illinois upon this general subject to

In

which our attention has been called is Spangler v. Jacoby, 4 Ill. 297. The court there said: 'In our opinion, it is clearly competent to show from the journals of either branch of the legislature that a particular act was not passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution, and thus defeat its operation. The constitution requires each house to keep a journal, and declares that certain facts made essential to the passage of a law shall be stated therein. If those facts are not set forth, the conclusion is that they did not transpire. The journal is made up under the immediate direction of the house, and is presumed to contain a full and complete history of its proceedings. If a certain act receive the constitutional assent of the body, it will so appear on the face of the journal, and, when a contest arises as to whether an act was thus passed, the journal may be appealed to to settle it. It is the evidence of the action of the house, and by it the act must stand or fall. It certainly was not the intention of the framers of the constitution that the signatures of the speakers and executive should furnish conclusive evidence of the passage of a law. The presumption, indeed, is that an act thus verified became a law pursuant to the requirements of the constitution; but that presumption may be overthrown. If the journal is lost or destroyed, this presumption will sustain the law, for it will be contended that the proper entry was made in the journal; but when the journal is in existence, and it fails to show that the act was passed in the mode prescribed by the constitution, the presumption is overcome, and the act must fall.' This decision is cited by counsel to support the proposition that the mere silence of the journal as to whether a bill was or not read on three different days-the journal not being lost or destroyed-is itself fatal to the validity of the act. But we are not satisfied that the court intended to express an opinion upon that precise point. Although it did not appear, in that case, that the bill was read the third time before it went to the senate, or that the aves and noes were called, no special comment was made by the court upon the silence of the journal as to the bill not being read the third time. Plainly, its language had reference to the fact that the journal did not show the passage of the bill by ayes and It was with reference to the fact that the language above quoted was

noes.

used. In Turley v. Logan County, 17 Ill. 152, the court said that 'the journals should show the readings, and the passage of the law by a constitutional vote;' but nothing was said as to what would be the result where the journal did not show that each of the required readings was had. The general language above quoted seems to have been unnecessary to the decision, for the court finally sustained the validity of the act there in question, upon the ground that the same legislature, in extra session, caused its journals to be amended so as to show what, according to the minutes of the clerk of the house, was the fact that the bill had been read the required number of times. That we do not misinterpret these decisions is shown in Schuyler County v. People, 25 Ill. 181, where one of the grounds of objection to an act was that the senate journal did not show that the bill was read three times before it was put on its final passage. The court said: 'The constitution does require that every bill shall be read three times in each branch of the general assembly before it shall be passed into a law; but the constitution does not say that these several readings shall be entered on the journals. Some acts performed in the passage of laws are required by the constitution to be entered on the journals, in

order to make them valid, and among these are the entries of the ayes and nays on the final passage of every bill; and we held in the case of Spangler v.

Jacoby, 14 Ill. 297, that, where the journal did not show this, the act never became a law. But, where the constitution is silent as to whether a particular act which is required to be performed shall be entered on the journals, it is then left to the discretion of either house to enter it or not; and the silence of the journal on the subject ought not to be held to afford evidence that the act was not done. In such a case we must presume it was done, unless the journal affirmatively shows that it was not done.' This decision was expressly reaffirmed in Wabash R. Co. v. Hughes, 38 I. 186. Nothing to the contrary was decided in People v. Starne 35 Ill. 141, or in Ryan v. Lynch, 68 Ill. 161, which is relied upon as modifying or overruling Schuyler Co. v. People. The case in 35 Ill. recognizes the doctrine of the Schuyler Co. Case, and goes upon the ground that the ayes and the noes were not called, and spread upon the journals of the house,

eral courts apply the rule of the courts of the state. The two views are set forth in the next ensuing sections.

(1) First View-Conclusiveness of Bill.-The first view is that the enrolled act, signed by the presiding officers of both houses and by the executive, is the sole expositor of its own contents and the conclusive evidence of its existence and valid enactment, and that it is not allowable to look to the journals of the houses or to other extrinsic sources for the history of the act or its provisions, or to attack the manner of its enactment.2

on the passage of the bill. In Ryan v. Lynch it appeared from the journal that the bill was read twice in the senate; but the journal was silent as to a third reading, and did not show any call of the ayes and noes on the final passage of the bill. The decision was that as the proceedings in the senate, certified by the secretary of state, were competent proof of the facts therein stated, the failure of the journal to show a call of the ayes and noes was fatal to the bill. Nothing was said as to the effect to be given to the mere silence of the senate journal as to the third reading of the bill. Indeed, we do not find that any of the numerous decisions of the state court relating to the passage of bills by the legislature have modified or overruled the doctrine announced in Schuyler Co. v. People, 25 Ill. 181. With that doctrine we are entirely satisfied. It is in harmony with the adjudications in many of the states whose constitutions have provisions similar to those in the constitution of Illinois which we have been considering."

In Burritt v. Com'rs of State Contracts, 120 Ill. 332, the court recognized the rule in Schuyler County v. People,. 25 I. 181, that where the journal is silent as to matters not specifically required to be entered in it, the requisite facts will be presumed to exist, but decided that the act under consideration not being authenticated was not even prima facie valid, and therefore the doctrine of presumption could not apply.

1. South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683; Ohio v. Frank, 103 U. S. 697; Post '. Kendall County, 105 U. S. 667.

In South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260, Bradley, J., delivering the opinion of the court, said: "It is declared by the judiciary act as a fundamental principle that the laws of the several states, except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be

regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.' And this court has always held that the laws of the states are to receive their authoritative construction from the state courts, except where the federal constitution and laws are concerned; and the state constitutions, in like manner, are to be construed as the state courts construe them. This has been so often laid down as the proper rule and is in itself so obviously correct that it is unnecessary to refer to the authorities. If, therefore, the law in question had never been passed upon by the state courts, the courts of the United States would nevertheless be bound to give to the constitution of Illinois the same construction which the state courts give to it, and to hold a pretended act of the legislature void, and not a law which the state courts would hold to be so. Otherwise, we should have the strange spectacle of two different tribunals, having co-ordinate jurisdiction in the same state, differing as to the validity and existence of a statute of that state, without any power to arbitrate between them. In speaking, however, of their jurisdiction as being co-ordinate, it is only meant that one has no power to enforce its decision upon the other. As a matter of propriety and right, the decision of the state courts on the question as to what are the laws of the state is binding upon those of the United States."

2. The following authorities tend to support this view:

United States.-Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649. In this case the validity of the Tariff Act of 1890, as officially promulgated,was attacked, on the ground that it appeared from the congressional records of proceedings, reports of committees of each house. reports of committees of conference, and other papers printed by act of Congress having reference to the act (House bill 9416) that a section of

on the ground that the principle in the text was not passed on, but, in deference to the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois interpreting the constitution of that state, the United States courts decided that the journals might be examined to determine the validity of an enrolled act.

California. Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; 89 Am. Dec. 93, overruling Fowler v. Peirce, 2 Cal. 165; People v. Burt, 43 Cal. 560. But after these decisions a new constitution was adopted, and in San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R. Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 722, Sawyer, J., said: "While we think the case of Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, correctly decided under the constitution as it then was, we are of the opinion that the change in the constitution requires a change in the rule. When California adopted from other states the provision now found in its constitution, substantially as found in the constitution of Illinois, it must be deemed to have adopted with the provision the settled construction put upon it by the courts of the state from which it was taken."

the bill, as it finally passed, was not in the bill authenticated by the signatures of the presiding officers of the respective houses of Congress and approved by the President. Harlan, J., who delivered the opinion of the court, after observing that the precise question before the court was the nature of the evidence upon which a court may act when the issue is made as to whether a bill was or was not passed by Congress, and that the question was presented for the first time in that court, continued: "The signing by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and by the President of the Senate, in open session, of an enrolled bill, is an official attestation by the two houses, through their presiding officers, to the President, that a bill, thus attested, has received, in due form, the sanction of the legislative branch of the government, and that it is delivered to him in obedience to the constitutional requirement that all bills which pass Congress shall be presented to him. And when a bill thus attested, receives his approval, and is deposited in the public archives, its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress should be deemed complete and unimpeachable. As the President has no authority to approve a bill not passed by Congress, an enrolled act in the custody of the Secretary of State and having the official attestations of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, of the President of the Senate, and of the President of the United States, carries, on its face, a solemn assurance by the legislative and executive departments of the government, charged, respectively, with the duty of enacting and executing the laws, that it was passed by Congress. The respect due to coequal and independent departments requires the judicial department to act upon that assurance, and to accept, as having passed Congress, all bills authenticated in the manner stated; leaving the court to determine, when the question properly arises, whether the act, so authenticated, is in conformity with the constitution." The court distinguished the case of Gardner v. Barney, 6 Wall. (U. S.) 511, on the ground that in that case the journals were looked to only to ascertain the time when an act of Congress took effect, not to impeach the validity of the act. South Ottawa v. Perkins, 94 U. S. 260; Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S. 683; and Post v. Kendall County, In Edger v. Randolph County, 70 105 U. S. 667, were also distinguished Ind. 331, the rule in the text was up

In Weill v. Kenfield, 54 Cal. 111, the journals were examined, though the question at issue was neither discussed nor decided. In a later case, Oakland Paving Co. v. Hilton, 69 Cal. 489, the court asserted its right to examine the journals as to the proper passage of a constitutional amendment, but expressly distinguished Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253, on the ground that that case concerned only the enactment of statutes.

In People v. Dunn, So Cal. 212, it was decided that if the journals were looked to, a defect in the enactment of a law must affirmatively appear in order to render the latter void; but the court said: "The case does not present the question as to the power of this court to go behind the enrolled bill in order to determine from the journals of the two houses whether the bill was properly passed or not." It would, therefore, appear that Sherman v. Story, 30 Cal. 253; 89 Am. Dec. 93, is still law in this state.

Connecticut.-Eld v. Gorham, 20 Conn. 8.

Indiana.-Evans v. Browne, 30 Ind. 514; 95 Am. Dec. 710; Bender v. State, 53 Ind. 254; Madison v. Burford, 93 Ind. 383; Stout v. Grant County, 107 Ind. 343.

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