vided that the counties should be liable for "stationery" furnished clerks of court. Knox Co. v. Arms, 22 Ill. 175; Commissioners' Court v. Goldthwaite, 35 Ala. 704. Contra Arapahoe Co. v. Koons, 1 Colo. 160.

1. Webster's Dict.; where it is also said that, "It is unfortunate that, in the United States, the stopping-places on railways first received the name of depot-a gross misapplication of the term, since it means simply a storehouse or magazine. In England, the name has always been station or station-house, and there is now a growing tendency to adopt this in the United States, as the only proper word."

Meaning in Particular Cases.-Within the meaning of the New Hampshire statute prohibiting the expulsion of any person from the cars for non-payment of fare except at a passenger station, it has been held that the station must at least be a stopping place where passenger tickets are ordinarily sold. Baldwin v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 64 N. H. 596; 37 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 126. See also RAILROADS, vol. 19, p. 908. In Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Lattimer, 128 Ill. 171, under a similar statute, the court said: "The instructions given for the plaintiff defined the term 'regular stations,' to mean 'the place on the railroad where passenger trains usually stop for the purpose of having passengers get on and off such trains,' while several instructions, asked by

defendant and refused, defined such term to mean 'the town or village in which a railroad company may have its passenger depot building,' and not 'the depot platform of a railroad company.' We think the definition laid down in the given instructions was substantially correct, and in accord with the decisions of this court." The court in this connection cited Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Flagg, 43 Ill. 364; 92 Am. Dec. 133; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Parks, 18 Ill. 465; 68 Am. Dec. 562; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Vanatta, 21 Ill. 188; 74 Am. Dec. 96.

A statute of Connecticut provided that no railroad corporation should abandon any depot or station on its road after the same had been established for twelve months, except by approval of the railroad commissioners. In State v. New Haven, etc., Co., 37 Conn. 153, it appeared that the defendant company, after constructing its road, leased it for twenty years to a New York railroad company. This latter company soon after taking possession built a platform for the accommodation of passengers at a place on the road which was thereafter called "Brooks' Station," and placed upon it an old baggage car which served as a shelter for passengers waiting at the station. No agent was ever placed there and no tickets were sold there, nor was freight way-billed to or from that station, but to and from an

other station in the same town. But tickets were sold at other stations to passengers for that station, trains were stopped to take up passengers, trains carrying the mail also stopped regularly, and freight was deposited there as a place of deposit. It was held that this "Brooks' Station" was a depot or station within the meaning of

the statute.

sideration."

In State v. New Haven, etc., R. Co., 41 Conn. 134, under the same statute, the case just set forth was distinguished. The court, by Park, C. J., said: "In the case of State v. New Haven, etc., Co., 37 Conn. 153, the court considered themselves as going to the verge of the law in holding that the place called Brooks' Station was a station within the meaning of the statute. In that case much reliance was placed upon several important facts, none of which appear in the case under conAfter enumerating the facts just stated, the court went on to say: "These were important facts and distinguished that case from the presThe railroad never treated this place as a station. It never appeared on any of their timetables or lists of stations; and passengers were never ticketed to it, but always to the station beyond. No transactions at this place appeared on the books of the company, but all dealings with it were regarded as having taken place at the station beyond, and so appeared on their books."

ent one.

Under the North Carolina statute designating the place where freight must be tendered in order to make the carrier liable for not transporting it, the words "regular depot or station" mean a certain place situated near to a railroad,

alongside of or

which there has never been any station, or where no tickets have ever been kept or sold, or where there is no agent's office and where no bills of lading or receipts are given, but where the conductors sometimes stop trains and take on freight and passengers, is not a regular depot or station. Kellogg v. Suffolk, etc.. R. Co., 100 N. Car. 158; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 529. See also Kansas City, etc., R. Co. v. Lilly (Miss.), 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 379; Georgia Pac. R. Co. v. Robinson, 68 Miss. 643. As to what is a depot or station under the fencing statutes, see infra, this title, Duty of the Company.

In Denver, etc., R. Co. v. Pickard, 8 Colo. 163; 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 284, one sued for damages for injuries received in an attempt to board a moving train, and claimed that the point at which he attempted to get on was a regular station and that the train was bound to stop for him. He had no ticket. It was held that he could not recover; that the mere fact that the place was put down in a timetable which expressly stated that it was for the government employes only, station. did not make such place a regular Beauchamp v. International, etc., R. Co., 56 Tex. 239; 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 307.

(U. S.) 264, where, in a contract for the transportation of government supplies, the words posts, depots, or

See also U. S. v. Caldwell, 19 Wall.

66

railroad depots or stations, but merely military posts or stations.

stations" were held not to include

Depot. The word depot properly in

ously in an orderly manner the business of transporting freight; and the fact that a mail train stopped regularly at a certain place to deliver mail, and that such place was set down in the circulars and orders of the company as a station, does not necessarily make it a regular station. Land . Wilmington, etc., R. Co., 104 N. Car. 48; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 18. Under the same statute it is held that a place at

sold, etc., and where the offices of the agents are. See also DEPOT, vol. 5, p. 622; Abb. Law Dict.; Maghee v Camden, etc., R. Co., 45 N. Y. 520; 6

Am. Rep. 128.

1. Com. v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 258; 4 Am. Rep. 555; Railroad Com'rs v. Portland, etc., R. Co., 63 Me. 270; 18 Am. Rep. 208; RAILROADS, vol. 19, p. 884. Such statutes are regarded as a legitimate exercise of the police power. State v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722.

The only limitation as to the right of the legislature in this regard is found in the principle that the legislature cannot pass a statute which would be an impairment of the obligations of the charter contract. See FRANCHISES, vol. 8, p. 620 et seq.; RAILROADS, Vol. 19, p. 891.

2. In support of the exercise of the power is State v. Republican Valley R. Co., 17 Neb. 647; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500; 52 Am. Rep. 424; affirmed on rehearing in 18 Neb. 512. The court, by Cobb, C. J., said: "At common law, it was the duty of a common carrier by land to deliver freight personally to the consignee but when railways took the place of conveyances drawn by animals, necessity required the relaxation of this rule so as to allow of the substitution, in place of personal delivery, of a delivery at the warehouse or depot provided by the companies for the storage of goods. Vincent v. Chicago etc., R. Co., 49 Ill. 33. Is it too much to say that this relaxation of the above rule in favor of railway companies as common carriers imposed upon them the duty of providing suitable depots for the purpose of such delivery? This duty is so intimately connected with the business for which railways are built and managed that motives of self-interest almost always secure its observance. But when, for any reason, it is neglected or refused, may it not be enforced the same as any other public duty? In the use of such franchises all citizens have an equal interest and equal rights, and all must, under the same circumstances, be treated alike. It cannot be supposed that it was the legislative intention, when such privileges were given, that they were to be used as private property at the discretion of the recipi

ent; but, to the contrary of this, I think an implied condition attaches to such grants that they are to be held as a quasi public trust for the benefit, at least to a considerable degree, of the entire community. In their very nature and constitution, as I view this question, these companies become, in certain aspects, public agents, and the consequence is, they must, in the exercise of their calling, observe to all men a perfect impartiality."

In People v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 130 Ill. 182; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 355, reversing 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462, a mandamus was granted. The petition for the writ alleged specific facts making out a clear and strong case of public necessity; and also alleged that the accommodation of the public living in or near the town required and had long required the establishment of a station within the town. A demurrer to the petition admitting all the allegations was overruled. The court, by Bailey, J., said: "It is undoubtedly the rule that railway companies, in the absence of statutory provisions limiting and restricting their powers, are vested with a very broad discretion in the matter of locating, constructing and operating their railways, and of locating and maintaining their freight and passenger stations. This discretion, however, is not absolute, but is subject to the condition that it must be exercised in good faith and with a due regard to the necessities and convenience of the public. Railway companies, though private corporations, are engaged in a business in which the public have an interest, and in which such companies are public servants and amenable as such. This doctrine has been repeatedly announced by this and other courts. It cannot be admitted that the discretion vested in the defendant in the matter of establishing and maintaining its freight and passenger stations, extends so far as to justify such manifest and admitted disregard of its duties to the public." See this language approved in Mobile, etc., R. Co. v. People, 132 Ill. 571; 42 Am.

& Eng. R. Cas. 679; 22 Am. St. Rep. 556. See also Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Territory, 3 Wash. 303.

In Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Washington, 142 U. S. 492; 48 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 475, reversing 3 Wash. Ter. 303, it appeared that the charter gave the road a discretion as to the location of its route, and imposed no specific duties as to the establishment of stations. When the road was first constructed, the company stopped its trains at a place known as Y., it being the countyseat and principal town of the county, but built no depot there. When the road was completed four miles further on, it reached the town of North Y., which had been laid out by the railroad company on its own land. The company then established a freight and passenger station at that place and ceased to stop its trains at Y. Mandamus was applied for to compel it to build and maintain a station at Y. fore the suit was determined, Y. rapidly retrograded and the town of North Y. rapidly increased in size at its expense, and became the principal town of the county and was made the county-seat.

Be

It appeared also that there were other stations on the road which furnished sufficient facilities for the country south of North Y., and that a station at Y. would not pay expenses, the earnings of this division of the road being insufficient to pay the running expenses; that the passenger and freight traffic of the people living in the surrounding country, considering them as a community, would be better accommodated at North Y. than at Y. It was held that the mandamus should not issue, since it was not shown that the duty was imposed upon the railroad company by statute, and because the duty did not exist independently of statute. The opinion of the majority of the court, delivered by Gray, J., was It began with the premise that "A writ of mandamus to compel a railroad corporation to do a particular act in constructing its road or buildings or in running its trains, can be issued only when there is a specific legal duty on its part to do that act, and clear proof of a breach of that duty." The court, after adverting to York, etc., R. Co. v. Reg, 1 El. & Bl. 858; 72 E. C. L. 856; Com. Fitchburgh R. Co., 12 Gray (Mass.) 180; State v. Southern Minn. R. Co., 18 Minn. 40, in support of the doctrine that where a railroad charter simply

an elaborate one.

V.

authorizes the corporation, without requiring it, to construct and maintain a railroad to a certain point, the corporation cannot be compelled by mandamus to complete or maintain its road to that point when it would not be remunerative, said: "The difficulties in the way of issuing a mandamus to compel the maintenance of a railroad and the running of trains to a terminus fixed by the charter itself, are much increased when it is sought to compel the corporation to establish or to maintain a station, and to stop its trains at a particular place on the line of its road. The location of stations and warehouses, for receiving and delivering passengers and freight, involves a comprehensive view of the interests of the public, as well as of the corporation and its stockholders, and a consideration of many circumstances concerning the amount of population and business at or near, or within convenient access to one point or another, which are more appropriate to be determined by the directors, or, in case of abuse of their discretion, by the legislature, or by administrative boards intrusted by the legislature with that duty than by the ordinary judicial tribunals. To hold that the directors of this corporation, in determining the number, place and size of its stations and other structures, having regard to the public convenience as well as its own pecuniary interests, can be controlled by the courts by writ of mandamus, would be inconsistent with many decisions of high authority in analogous cases." The court cited People 7. New York, etc., R. Co., 104 N. Y. 58; 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 480; 58 Am. Rep. 485; Com. v. Eastern R. Co., 103 Mass. 254; 4 Am. Rep. 555; South Eastern R. Co. v. Railway Com'rs, Q. B. Div. 586, and disapproved the decision cited above, viz.: State v. Republican Valley R. Co., 17 Neb. 647; 22 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 500; 52 Am. Rep. 424, declaring that decision to be inconsistent with Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S. 667; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 57. Justices Brewer, Field, and Harlan dissented, Brewer, J., saying: "A railroad company has a public duty to perform as well as a private interest to subserve; and I

never before believed that the courts

would permit it to abandon the one to promote the other. Nowhere in its charter is in terms expressed the duty

of carrying passengers and freight. Are the courts impotent to compel the performance of this duty? Is the duty of carrying passengers and freight any more a public duty than that of placing its depots and stopping its trains at those places which would best accommodate the public? If the State of Indiana incorporates a railroad to build a road from New Albany through Indianapolis to South Bend, and that road is built, can it be that the court may compel the road to receive passengers and transport freight, but, in the absence of a specific direction from the legislature, are powerless to compel the road to stop its trains and build a depot at Indianapolis? I do not so belittle the power or duty of the courts." 1. See Bonham v. Columbia, etc., R. Co., 26 S. Car. 353; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 177; People v. Chicago, etc., R. Co. (Ill.), 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 462; South Eastern R. Co. v. Railway Com'rs, 6 Q. B. Div. 586; 29 Moak's Rep. 724; People v. New York, etc., R. Co, 104 N. Y.63; 29 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 484: 58 Am. Rep. 485. In this last case the court, by Danforth, J., said: "No doubt the court may by mandamus act in certain cases affecting corporate matters, but only where the duty concerned is specific and plainly imposed upon the corporaSuch is not the case be

tion.

fore us. The grievance complained of is an obvious one, but the burden of removing it can be imposed upon the defendant only by legislation. The legislature created the corporation upon the theory that its functions should be exercised for the public benefit. It may add other regulations to those now binding it, but the court can interfere only to enforce a duty declared by law. The one presented in this case (that is, to erect a depot) is not of that character. Nor can it by any fair or reasonable construction be implied." The application for mandamus was therefore denied, though it was admitted in the opinion of the court that "a plainer case could hardly be presented of a deliberate and intentional disregard of the pub

lic interest and the accommodation of the public."

A statute of South Carolina provided that the railroad commission of the State might suggest to a railroad company to make enlargements and improvements in its stations and station houses, and if their suggestions were not complied with, they were authorized to take such legal proceedings as they should deem expedient, but provided no fine or forfeiture or mode of redress. It was held that the court could not enforce the suggestions of the commission requiring a larger depot, and that the only remedy lay in an appeal to the legislature. Bonham 7. Columbia, etc.. R. Co., 26 S. Car. 353; 30 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 177.

2. Statutory Regulation. Thus, in Missouri a statute exists requiring that wherever two railroads intersect, passenger waiting-rooms shall be erected and maintained. Such a statute is held to be a proper exercise of police power and not unconstitutional. State v. Wabash, etc., R. Co., 83 Mo. 144 25 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 133. similar statute exists in Texas. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. State, 79 Tex. 264; 45 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 586. See also Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Denver, etc., R. Co., 110 U. S. 667; 16 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 57; State v. St. Paul, etc., R. Co., 40 Minn. 353.

A

Under such statutes neither company is released from its obligation by the default of the other, and a prosecution may be instituted against one without joining the other. State v. Kansas City, etc., R. Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 722. And the fact that the roads had established separate depots in the town before the passage of the act will not excuse their failure to erect depot at the point of intersection, as required by the act. San Antonio, etc., R. Co. v. State, 79 Tex. 264.

a

In other cases statutory provisions exist requiring that a railroad company shall furnish sufficient accommodations at such stations as their trains stop at. Such a statute applies only to such stations as are already established, and does not authorize a court