its character from a Federal to a national Government. Among other things, these resolutions affirm, that "it (the Legislature) views the powers of the General Government as resulting from the compact to which the States are parties, as limited by the plain sense and intention of the instrument constituting that compact, as no further valid than they are authorized by the grants enumerated in that compact; and that in case of a deliberate, palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers not granted in said compact, the States who are parties thereto have the right, and are in duty bound to interpose for arresting the progress of the evil, and for maintaining within their respective limits the authorities, rights, and liberties appertaining to them."

In the resolutions passed by the Legislature of Kentucky in 1798, it is declared "that whensoever the General Government assumes and delegates powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force; that each State acceded as a State, and is an integral party, its co-States forming as to itself the other party; that the Government created by this compact was not made the exclusive or final judge of the extent of the powers delegated to it, since that would have made its discretion and not the Constitution the measure of its powers; that, as in all other cases of a compact among parties having no common judge, each party has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of the infractions as the mode and measure of redress."

The resolutions of Virginia were drawn up by Mr. MADISON; those of Kentucky were said to be sketched, but not fully prepared, by Mr. JEFFERSON.

It was believed that the Administration, under the guidance of Northern men, had assumed powers not enumerated in the Constitution, and, in this way, had usurped powers belonging to the States.

THE DOCTRINE OF STATE RIGHTS.

As the doctrine of State rights has been adopted at different times, by both the South and the North, in their relations to the General Government, it seems proper to give some account of its origin and its sectional influences.

LUTHER MARTIN'S LETTER.

LUTHER MARTIN wrote a letter to the Legislature of Maryland on the formation of the Federal Constitution in 1787, and the composition of the Convention, of which the following is an extract:

"There was one party, whose object and wish is to abolish and annihilate all State Governments, and bring forward one General Government over this extensive continent, of a monarchical nature, under certain restrictions and limitations. Those who openly avowed this sentiment were, it is true, but few; yet it is equally true that there was a considerable number who did not openly avow it—who were, by myself and many others of the Convention, considered as being in reality favorers of that sentiment, and, acting upon those principles, covertly endeavoring to carry into effect what they well knew openly and avowedly could not be accomplished.

"The second party was not for the abolition of State Governments, nor for the introduction of a monarchical Government in any form; but they wished to establish such a system as could give their own States undue power and influence in the Government over the other States.

"A third party was what I considered truly Federal and Republican. This party was nearly equal in number with the other two, and was composed of the delegations from Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, and in part Maryland; also of some individuals from other representations."

The first party here mentioned by Mr. MARTIN was supposed to include Mr. HAMILTON, GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, and some others. The second party was supposed to include the delegates from Virginia, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and some other of the larger States.

Colonel HUMPHREYS, in his letter to General WASHINGTON, of the 20th of January, 1787, describes the temper of a number of the States in the following language: "They have a mortal reluctance to divest themselves of the smallest attribute of independent, separate sovereignties." This temper showed itself in the convention in the speeches of the delegates.

Friday, June 29, 1787.-Doctor JOHNSON, of Connecticut,

said, in the Federal Convention: "The controversy must be endless, whilst gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments; those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political society; and those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is, the States do exist as so many political societies; and a government is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that, if the States as such are to exist, they must be armed with some power of self-defence?"

Mr. ELLSWORTH, in the same debate, said: "Under a national Government he should participate in the national security, as remarked by Mr. KING; but that was all. What he wanted was domestic happiness. The national Government could not descend to the local objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects of a general nature. He turned his eyes, therefore, for the preservation of his rights, to the State Governments. From these alone he could derive the greatest happiness he expected in this life. His happiness depends on their existence as much as a new-born infant on its mother for nourishment.'

So anxious was that distinguished statesman to preserve the rights of the States, that he moved in the Federal Convention that the term “national” should be stricken out of the Constitution; and his motion was passed without opposition, and the objectionable term was stricken out.

He and others preferred the term "Federal," because it described more accurately the nature of the Government which they were forming. The term "Federal pertains to a league or compact, and is derived from an agreement or covenant between parties, particularly between nations." Hence the friends of the Constitution, which was a compact or league between the States, were called Federalists.

In a letter to Governor HUNTINGTON, dated New London, September 26, 1787, Mr. ELLSWORTH and Mr. SHERMAN unite in saying:

"Some additional powers are vested in Congress, which was the principal object the States had in view in appointing the Convention; those powers extend only to matters respecting

the common interests of the Union, and are specially defined, so that the particular States retain their sovereignty in other matters."

Dr. JOHNSON, in the State Convention in Hartford, convened January 14, 1788, to ratify the Federal Constitution, said: "The Constitution vests in the general Legislature a power to make laws in matters of national concern; to appoint judges to decide upon those laws; and to appoint officers to carry them into execution. This excludes the idea of an armed force. The power which is to enforce these laws is to be a legal power, vested in the magistrates. [Not military.] The force which is to be employed, is the energy of law; and this force is to be employed only upon individuals who fail in their duty to their country. This is the glory of the Constitution, that it depends upon the mild and equal energy of the magistracy for the execution of the laws." [Not upon military coercion.]

OLIVER ELLSWORTH, Jan. 7, 1788, in the State Convention, Hartford, 1788, said: "We see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No man pretends to the contrary. We all see and feel this necessity. The only question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms? There is no other possible alternative. Where would those, who oppose a coer cion of law, come out? Where will they end? A necessary consequence of their principles is a war of the States, one against the other. I am for coercion by law; that coercion which acts only upon delinquent individuals. The Constitution does not attempt to coerce sovereign bodies-States in their political capacity. No coercion is applicable to such bodies but that of armed force. If we should attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force against a delinquent State, it would involve the good and bad, the innocent and guilty, in the same calamity. But this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual, and punishes him for breaking the laws."

Mr. Law, in the same Convention, said: "Some suppose that the General Government, which extends over the whole, will annihilate the State Governments. But we ought to consider that this General Government rests on the State Governments for its support. It is like a vast and beautiful bridge built upon thirteen strong and stately pillars. Now the rulers,

those who occupy the bridge, cannot be so beside themselves as to knock away the pillars that support the whole fabric."

The Constitution was formed on the idea that all powers granted to the General Government were "specially defined" or "enumerated," and that all powers, not "specially defined" or "not enumerated," are retained by each of the States.

In the formation and adoption of the Constitution, the States were the only agents. The State Legislatures appointed the delegates to the Convention. While there, they voted by States. Each delegation made its report to the Legislature or Governor of the States. The Convention which assembled in the several States to ratify or reject the Constitution, was appointed by the people of the several States. The parties to the "Constitutional Compact" were the States. ROGER SHERMAN says: "And the Government of the United States being Federal, and instituted by a number of sovereign States for the better security of their rights, and the advancement of their interests," &c.—Letter to John Adams.

The motion was made in the Convention to give Congress power to negative all State laws contravening the articles of Union, and thus to abridge the rights of the several States. This motion was rejected by a vote of seven States against three.

Thursday, May 31, 1787.-In the plan of a Constitution proposed by Governor RANDOLPH, and generally adopted by the Convention, provision was made "authorizing the exertion of the force of the other States against a delinquent State." The effect of this would be to abridge the rights of the States.

Mr. MADISON observed, "that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice, and the efficacy of it, when applied to a people collectively. and not individually. A union of the States, containing such an ingredient, seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State would look more like a declaration of war than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped such a system might be framed as would render this resource unnecessary,