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themselves, rendered all apprehension for their safety groundless. He then returned to the considerations in favor of a select and durable Senate. "A government," he remarked, "changeable in its policy, must soon lose its sense of national character, and forfeit the respect of foreigners. Senators will not be solicitous for the reputation of public measures, in which they take but a temporary part; and will feel lightly the burden of public disapprobation, in proportion to the number of those who partake of the censure." "This," he observed in his closing remarks, "This is the first fair opportunity that has been offered of deliberately correcting the errors in Government. Instability has been a prominent, and very defective feature in most Republican systems. It is the first to be seen, and the last to be lamented by a philosophical inquirer. It has operated most banefully in our infant republics. It is necessary that we apply an immediate remedy, and eradicate the poisonous principle from our Government. If this be not done, we shall feel, and posterity will be convulsed by the malady.” *

After a defence of the proposed amendment by Lansing and Smith, who insisted, that the States would be gradually extinguished, unless the dependence of the Senate on the State Legislatures should be thus secured; and, that the Senate would otherwise, become a perpetual body, under the influence of a perpetual faction, Hamil

*It is stated, that he occupied two days on the Senate. "Tears were in the eyes of the audience." Colonel Huger of S. C., said, "I did not conceive it possible for man to speak so." And Chancellor Kent remarks-"His two speeches on the organization, powers, and stability of the Senate, were regarded at the time, by the best judges, as the noblest specimens which the debates in that, or any other assembly, ever afforded, of the talents and wisdom of the statesman." How much is to be regretted the bald and inaccurate reports of them, from which this outline is drawn.

ton resumed his argument, which was much extended. The leading observations will only be given. "There are two objects," he said, "in forming systems of government-safety for the people, and energy in the administration. When these are united, the certain tendency of the system will be to the public welfare. If the latter be neglected, the security of the people will as certainly be sacrificed, as by disregarding the former. Good constitutions are formed upon a comparison of the liberty of the individual with the strength of government. If the tone of either be too high, the other will be weakened too much. It is the happiest possible mode of conciliating these objects, to institute one branch peculiarly endowed with sensibility, another with knowledge and firmness. Through the opposition and mutual control of these bodies, the government will reach, in its regular operations, the perfect balance between liberty and power. I admit that the aggregate of individuals constitutes the Government. Yet every State is not the Government. Every petty district is not the Government. In our State Legislatures, a compromise is frequently necessary between the interests of counties. The same thing must happen in the General Government between States. In this, the few must yield to the many-the particular must be sacrificed to the general interest. It is proper, that the influence of the States should prevail to a certain extent. But shall the individual States be the judges how far? Shall an unlimited power be left to them to determine in their own favor? Gentlemen go to an extreme. Instead of a wise Government, they would form a fanciful Utopia. Men will pursue their interests. It is as easy to change human nature, as to oppose the strong current of the selfish passions. A wise legislator will gently divert the channel, and direct it, if possible, to the public good."

CHAPTER LIV.

AFTER the conclusion of the debate, on the structure of the Legislative body, the article, declaring its powers, was considered. It was asserted, that, connecting the preamble with the clause which gave the power of raising revenue, and with that which empowered the making of all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution, the powers vested in the Government by the Constitution, Congress "might pass any law it thought proper." An amendment was proposed, prohibiting an excise being imposed on articles, the growth or manufacture of the United States: forbidding the laying direct taxes, until the proceeds from the impost and excise were insufficient; and then, only, after a requisition for the amount upon the States. Smith declared, that the General Government should rest in some degree, not only for its foundation, but operation, on the State Governments; and their respective powers be clearly defined. Unless some specific revenue is reserved to them, their governments, with their Independence, will be totally annihilated. "A consolidation of the States," Livingston observed, "ought to be avoided, but the extent of the country will not admit of a representation upon principles, in any great degree, democratic. We shall become a manufacturing peopleImports will diminish-New sources of revenue be required-Distilled liquors will be a first object of excise,

very productive and favorable to morals." Hamilton took a large view of this part of the Constitution. "After all our doubts—our suspicions and speculations on the subject of government, we must return," he observed, "at last to this important truth-that, when we have formed a Constitution upon free principles, when we have given a proper balance to its different branches, and fixed the Representation upon pure and equal principles, we may with safety confide to it all the powers necessary to answer, in the most ample manner, the purposes of government." He then examined, at length, the structure of the Federal Government, to show how far these purposes had been accomplished. He next considered the objects of the respective governments, in order, to exhibit the necessity of conferring on that of the Union, a command of the revenue; and pointed out the inconveniences of attempting to give to each, exclusive sources of revenue; alleging, that the concurrent system proposed, would, in fact, be most advantageous to the States." The existence of the State Governments, he remarked, "must form a leading principle in the most perfect Constitution we could form. It never can be the interest or desire of the National Legislature to destroy them. It can derive no advantage from such an event, but would lose an indispensable support, a necessary aid in executing the laws, and conveying the influence of government to the doors of the people. The Union is dependent on the will of the States for its Chief Magistrate, and for its Senate-a blow aimed at the members must give a fatal wound to the head-The destruction of the States would be, a political suicide. Can the National Government be guilty of such madness? What inducements, what temptations can they have? Will they attach new honors to their station? Will they increase the National strength? Will they multiply the National

resources? Will they render themselves more respectable in the view of foreign nations, or of their fellow-citizens, by robbing the States of their Constitutional privileges? Should such a political frenzy seize the General Government, the attempt would be impracticable.

"There are certain social principles in human nature from which we may draw the most solid conclusions as to the conduct of individuals, and of governments. We love our families, more than our neighbors. We love our neighbors, more than our countrymen in general. The human affections, like the solar heat, lose their intensity as they depart from the centre, and become languid in proportion to the expansion of the circle on which they act. Hence, the attachment of individuals will be first, and for ever secured by the State Governments. The States can never lose their powers, until the whole people of America are robbed of their liberties. These must go together. They must support each other or meet one common fate. It is said, where the laws of the Union are supreme, those of the States must be subordinate, because there cannot be two supremes. This is curious sophistry. That two supreme powers cannot act together, is false. They are inconsistent only, when they are aimed at each other, or at one indivisible object. The laws of the United States are supreme, as to their proper, Constitutional objects. Those of the States are supreme, in the same way. These supreme laws can act on different objects without clashing, or they may operate, on different parts of the same common object, with perfect harmony. The meaning of the maxim, that there cannot be two supremes, is simply this -two powers cannot be supreme over each other." He closed with this remark: "I wish the committee to remember, that the Constitution under examination is framed upon truly republican principles; and that, as it is ex

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