posed of a number of individuals appointed annually, liable to be recalled within the year, and subject to a continual rotation; which, with few exceptions, is the fountain neither of honour nor emolument. If we will exercise our judgments, we shall readily see no such resemblance exists, and that all inferences deduced from the comparison must be false.

"Upon every occasion, however foreign such observations may be, we hear a loud cry raised about the danger of intrusting power to congress; we are told it is dangerous to trust power any where; that power is liable to abuse, with a variety of trite maxims of the same kind. General propositions of this nature are easily framed, the truth of which cannot be denied, but they rarely convey any precise idea. To these we might oppose other propositions equally true, and equally indefinite. It might be said that too little power is as dangerous as too much; that it leads to anarchy, and from anarchy to despotism. But the question still recurs, what is too much or too little? Where is the measure or standard to ascertain the happy mean?

"Powers must be granted, or civil society cannot exist: the possibility of abuse is no argument against the thing; this possibility is incident to every species of power, however placed or modified. The United States, for instance, have the power of war and peace. It cannot be disputed that conjunctures might occur, in which that power might be turned against the rights of the citizens; but where can we better place it-in short, where else can we place it at all?

"In our state constitution we might discover power liable to be abused to very dangerous purposes. I shall instance only the council of appointment. In that council the governor claims and exercises the power of nominating to all offices. This power of nomination, in its operation,

amounts to a power of appointment; for it can always be so managed as to bring in persons agreeable to him, and exclude all others. Suppose a governor disposed to make this an instrument of personal influence and aggrandizement-suppose him inclined to exclude from office all independent men, and to fill the different departments of the state with persons devoted to himself-what is to hinder him from doing it? who can say how far the influence arising from such a prerogative might be carried? Perhaps this power, if closely inspected, is a more proper subject of republican jealousy than any power possessed or asked by congress, fluctuating and variable as that body is.

"But as my intention is not to instil any unnecessary jealousies, I shall prosecute these observations no further. They are only urged to show the imperfections of human institutions, and to confirm the principle, that the possibility of a power being abused, is no argument against its exist

ence.

"Upon the whole, let us venture with caution upon constitutional ground. Let us not court nor invite discussions of this kind. Let us not endeavour still more to weaken and degrade the federal government, by heaping fresh marks of contempt on its authority. Perhaps the time is not far remote, when we may be inclined to disapprove what we now seem eager to commend, and may wish we had cherished the union with as much zeal as we now discover apprehension of its encroachments.

"I hope the house will not agree to the amendment. In saying this, I am influenced by no other motive than a sense of duty. I trust my conduct will be considered in this light. I cannot give my consent to put any thing upon our minutes which, it appears to me, we may one day have occasion to wish obliterated from them."

The opposition was again called up, and travelled over the same ground; inveighed against the dangers of an inVOL. III.-13

croachment on the rights of the people; justified fully the conduct of the governor; declared that the decision of the constitutional question was not necessarily involved, and closed with a strong appeal to popular feeling on the dangers to be apprehended from countenancing such an invasion of the freedom of their deliberations.

Hamilton replied; indicated more clearly the fallacy of the arguments which had been used; pointed out the true construction of the language of the constitution; warned the house of the folly and danger of this distrust of the powers of congress, and ridiculed the attempt to draw an analogy between its powers and those of a monarchy. "Are we not," he asked, "to respect federal decisions? are we on the contrary to take every opportunity of holding up their resolutions and requests in a contemptible and insignificant light, and tell the world their calls, their requests are nothing to us; that we are bound by none of their measures? Do not let us add to their embarrassments, for it is but a slender tie that at present holds us. You see, alas! what contempt we are falling into since the peace; you see to what our commerce is exposed on every side; you see us the laughing-stock, the sport of foreign nations. And what may this lead to? I dread, sir, to think. Little will it avail then to say, we could not attend to your wise and earnest requests without inconvenience: little will it avail to say, it would have injured individual interests to have left our farms. These things are trifling when compared to bringing the councils and powers of the union into universal contempt, by saying their call was unimportant, and that it did not come under the indefinite meaning of 'extraordinary. See, gentlemen, before you may feel, what may be your situation hereafter. There is more involved in this measure than presents itself to your view.

"You hear it rung in your ears that, from the resemblance between the king and the congress of these states

it would be dangerous to come into measures proposed by them, and adopted by every state but this. But I say there is no danger; it is impossible; the constitution, the confederation, prevents it. Let us hear the reasoning used;they have the power of declaring war and peace, and request the power of raising and applying money. This, if in a king, permanent, hereditary, and independent of the people, would be danger; but in an annual body chosen from ourselves, and liable on every turn of popular breath to be changed, who are checked by twelve other states, who would not stand by and see the ruin of their associates, as it would involve their own,-where can be the danger? How can a similitude exist between bodies so different-as different as east from west, as north from south? I regret that these things should be compared, for there is no necessity for sounding this alarm. It is enough the danger of republican governments that their very nature tends to their destruction, because of their liability to change."

The question was then taken, and such was the force of the governor's party, that the conciliatory substitute was rejected by a vote of thirty-six to nine.

A few days after the address was adopted, this irritating topic being disposed of, the friends of the impost, however inauspicious the prospect, indulged the hope that the exigencies of the country might induce a compliance with a measure which had been at this time sanctioned by all of the other states, and that notwithstanding the views of the opposition, when the final vote was taken, they would shrink from the responsibility of placing the state in an attitude so hostile to the confederation and leading to consequences so portentous.

A motion was made for a reference of this subject to a committee, according to the usual practice of the house, but the speaker having avowed himself a friend of the

measure, and it being apprehended that the report of a committee favourable to the impost might have weight with the house, an attempt was made to defeat this motion and to refer the subject to a committee of the whole house. This design was defeated, and a committee was appointed to investigate the subject. While under its consideration, Hamilton moved a reference of the laws apparently contravening the treaty: one, relative to debts due to persons within the enemy's lines; the other, the much agitated "Trespass act:" taking as the basis of this motion the letter of the secretary of foreign affairs, and the communications of the British government in relation to its violation. Of this committee he was appointed chairman, and he introduced a bill after a speech indicating the importance of this measure to the state, and her obligation to remove all impediments to the foreign negotiations.

The following is a brief outline of his remarks upon this subject: He first expressed great uneasiness that any opposition should be made to this bill, particularly as this state was individually interested therein. He felt greater regret from a conviction in his own mind on this occasion, that the bill should be objected to, as there was not a single law in existence in this state in direct contravention of the treaty of peace. He urged the committee to pass the bill, from the consideration that the state of New-York was the only state to gain any thing by a strict adherence to the treaty.

There was no other state in the union that had so much to expect from it. The restoration of the western posts was an object of more than one hundred thousand pounds per annum. Great Britain held those posts on the plea that the United States had not fulfilled the treaty, and which we have strong assurances she will relinquish on the fulfilment of our engagements with her. But how far Great Britain might be sincere in her declaration was unknown.