by the legislatures of every state." Here no provision is made for or against a convention, and therefore it may be said not to be inconsistent with this article; but as the proceedings of a convention would not be binding on congress, should the latter think themselves under the necessity of rejecting the report of the former, would not the states, after having thus incurred a considerable expense, be dissatisfied on the occasion? Would not the members of the convention, which it must be supposed would be men of the first abilities and influence in the several states, be hurt, and opposed in this instance to congress? And would not parties in the legislatures and among the people, be the consequence? If so, may not an apprehension of these evils have a tendency to influence some members of congress to give up their opinions respecting the repeal, rather than be involved in contentions; and if such are the prospects of a convention, will not congress consider it as being contrary to the spirit of the confederation? Indeed we are doubtful whether a measure of this kind would not be viewed as manifesting a want of confidence in congress, and on this ground meet their disapprobation.

Fourthly-If an alteration, either temporary or perpetual, of the commercial powers of congress is to be considered by a convention, shall the latter be authorized to revise the confederation generally, or only for express purposes? The great object of the revolution was the establishment of good government, and each of the states in forming their own as well as the federal constitution, have adopted republican principles. Notwithstanding this, plans have been artfully laid and vigorously pursued, which, had they been successful, we think would have inevitably changed our republican governments into baleful aristocracies. These plans are frustrated, but the same spirit remains in their abettors, and the institution of the

Cincinnati, honourable and beneficent as the views may have been of the officers who composed it, we fear, if not totally abolished, will have the same tendency. What the effect then may be of calling a convention to revise the confederation generally, we leave with your excellency and the honourable legislature to determine.

We are apprehensive, and it is our duty to declare it, that such a measure would produce throughout the union, an exertion of the friends of an aristocracy to send members who would promote a change of government; and we can form some judgment of the plan which such members would report to congress. But should the members be altogether republican, such have been the declamations of designing men against the confederation generally, against the rotation of members, which, perhaps, is the best check to corruption, and against the mode of altering the confederation by the unanimous consent of the legislatures, which effectually prevents innovations in the articles by intrigue or surprise, that we think there is great danger of a report which would invest congress with powers that the honourable legislature have not the most distant intention to delegate. Perhaps it may be said, this can produce no ill effect, because congress may correct the report, however exceptionable; or, if passed by them, any of the states may refuse to ratify it. True it is that congress and the states have such power, but would not such a report affect the tranquillity and weaken the gov ernment of the union? We have already considered the operation of the report as it would respect congress; and if animosities and parties would naturally arise from their rejecting it, how much would these be increased if the report, approved by congress and some of the states, should be rejected by other states! Would there not be danger of a party spirit being thus more generally diffused and warmly supported? Far distant we know it to be

from the honourable legislature of Massachusetts to give up a single principle of republicanism, but when a general revision shall have proceeded from their motion, and a report, which to them may be highly offensive, shall have been confirmed by seven states in cóngress, and ratified by several legislatures, will not these be ready to charge Massachusetts with inconsistency in being the first to oppose a measure which the state will be said to have originated? Massachusetts has great weight, and is considered as one of the most republican states in the union, and when it is known that the legislature have proposed a general revision, there can be no doubt that they will be represented as being convinced of the necessity of increasing generally the powers of congress, and the opinion of the state will be urged with such art as to convince numbers that the articles of the confederation are altogether exceptionable; thus, while measures are taken to guard against the evils arising from the want, in one or two particulars, of power in congress, we are in great danger of incurring the other extreme. "More power in congress," has been the cry from all quarters, but especially of those whose views, not being confined to a government that will best promote the happiness of the people, are extended to one that will afford lucrative employments civil and military. Such a government is an aristocracy, which would require a standing army and a numerous train of pensioners and placemen to prop and support its exalted administration. To recommend one's self to such an administration would be to secure an establishment for life, and at the same time to provide for his posterity. These are pleasing prospects which republican governments do not afford, and it is not to be wondered at, that many persons of elevated views and idle habits in these states, are desirous of the change. We are for increasing the power of congress as far as it will promote the happiness of the people, but at the same

time are clearly of opinion that every measure should be avoided which would strengthen the hands of the enemies to free government, and that an administration of the present confederation, with all its inconveniences, is preferable to the risk of general dissensions and animosities, which may approach to anarchy, and prepare the way to a ruinous system of government.

Having thus from a sense of duty we owe to the United States, as well as to our constituents, communicated to your excellency our sentiments on this important subject, we request you to lay them before the honourable legislature at their next session, and to inform them that their measures for a general revision of the confederation, if confirmed, shall be immediately communicated to congress. That no time will be lost by the suspension, since the requisition to the important matters before congress would have prevented them from an early attention to the propositions of Massachusetts, and that if these had been approved by congress, many of the legislatures being now adjourned, could not take the same into consideration.

E. GERRY,

S. HOLTEN,

R. KING."

The views here expressed show conclusively that congress had not advanced beyond the opinions entertained in eighty-three, when Hamilton abandoned his resolutions for the establishment of a National government, "for want of support."

Bowdoin gave a brief, conclusive, pregnant, contemptuous reply "The only observation I shall make on the subject is, that if in the Union there is the operation of such discordant principles, as make it hazardous to intrust Congress with powers necessary to its well being, the Union cannot long subsist." The delegates, in answer, VOL. III.-10

insisted that the wiser course was "to make the powers temporary," to be adopted "when approved by experience; that, if a convention is necessary, its members should be limited in their authority, and confined to the revision of such parts of the confederation as are supposed defective, and not intrusted with a general revision of the articles, and a right to report a plan of federal government essentially different from the Republican form now administered."

The consequence of this opposition was the passage of a resolution, declaring that no further proceedings be had for revising the confederation.