Trustee"; he may draw out as "A. B., Trustee." He might deposit in a fictitious name, or under a firm or corporate style, as convenience or a whim should induce him. The bank is absolved if the signature is that of the person making the deposit, and if it accords precisely with the name, description, or style to the credit of which that person chose to place the money. Hence, if the depositor instituted the account in his name as "Trustee for C. D.," it is possible, and would follow from a rigid application of the strict rule of the law, that a check paid from that account upon his signature simply as "Trustee" might not be regarded as a good payment, if the money did not really come to the use of the trust estate. The proper and only safe rule for the bank to adopt is to require the signature to be identical in terms with the credit on the books.3 § 433. Agent's Checks. A bank may of course pay checks drawn by a duly authorized agent, but merely giving money to an agent (A.) to deposit does not confer any authority upon the agent to withdraw the money (§ 314); and if the bank has notice that the funds are not the property of A., it will be liable to the principal for paying without his order. But if checks are drawn by an agent duly authorized, the bank may pay them and charge the principal, although the latter has notified the bank not to allow an overdraft beyond a certain limit which the said check transcends. A bank must not pay on an agent's check drawn after notice from the principal revoking agent's authority; but if a check has been already drawn, the burden of proof is on the principal to show that the holder to whom the bank paid the check was not a holder for value.2 Where an agent drew a post-dated check, signing it as agent, but without indicating his principal, the latter was held not liable to a transferee before date.3 § 434. Married Woman's Checks. - In the absence of circumstances charging it with knowledge that a woman is 1 See Tryon v. Oxley, 3 G. Greene (Iowa), 289. § 433. Farmers', &c. Bank v. King, 57 Pa. 202. 2 Penn Bank v. Frankish, 91 Pa. 339. 8 Anderton v. Shoup, 17 Ohio St. 125. Bank may woman as treat a feme sole to the coneven after until notified trary, and married, a bank may open an account with her and pay her checks as if she were a feme sole; and if it turns out that she was really married, and the money was her husband's, the latter, who put the confidence in her and enabled her to commit the fraud, must bear the loss. And it has been further held, that, even though a bank may know the woman is dictions. married, it may lawfully receive deposits from her and pay her check.2 notice in some juris The whole matter of the rights of a married woman depends so much upon the statutes of the various States, that reference must be had to them and to the decisions under them in the particular jurisdiction in which the question may arise.3 § 435. Joint and Joint and Several Deposits. If several persons, not being partners, make a deposit to their joint credit, the bank ought, strictly speaking, to have the signatures of all of them appended to a check before paying it.1 But if the deposit be made to their joint and several credit, then the order of any one of them may be honored. Mr. Grant loco citato intimates that, in case of a payment made from a joint account solely, upon the order of less than all the depositors, the amount paid could not be recovered by the bank from the actual signers, on the ground that the proceeding on the part of the bank would, under the circumstances, be simply a gratuitous payment. Where three persons drew a check directing the bank to pay "selves or bearer," and each one of them signed the check in his own single and individual name, and the check was put aside and kept as collateral security, it was held that it was 1 § 434. Dacy v. New York Chemical Manuf. Co., 2 Hall, 550. 2 German Bank v. Himstedt, 42 Ark. 64; 46 id. 537. 3 Wilderman v. Rogers, 7 Eastern Rep. 786. 1 § 435. See Grant on Bankers and Banking, pp. 32, 33; Innes v. Stephenson, 1 M. & Rob. 145; Stone v. Marsh, Ry. & M. 364; Brandon v. Scott, 7 El. & Bl. 234, 237; 26 L. J. Q. B. 163; Wallace v. Kelsall, 7 M & W. 242; Husband v. Davis, 10 C. B. 640; Dixon's Case, 2 Lewin Cr. Cas. 178; Sloman v. Bank of England, 14 Sim. 459; 9 Jur. 243. the joint, and not the joint and several debt of the signers, so that an action would not lie against one of them for the whole amount of the note.2 § 436. Trustees. If the deposit is placed to the credit of divers persons, as trustees, the signature of all is indispensable to the validity of the check. But in one case in England, where the trust fund was small, and there were five trustees, who were scattered widely asunder throughout the kingdom, the Court of Chancery interfered, to save expense, and made an order that payment should be made to them" or any of them."1 Grant, in citing the case,2 seems half inclined to question the propriety of the decision; and declares that, at any rate, it would seem that the fund must have been previously under the control of the court, as happened to be the fact in the particular case. § 437. Assignees. In England, the inclination has been to extend the same principle, by analogy, to assignees of an estate in bankruptcy. Grant considers it as still doubtful whether the signature of one assignee would suffice to discharge the bank. In Can v. Read,2 the Lord Chancellor said that he doubted whether the receipt of one assignee given in return for a payment made to him singly would discharge the debtor; that the discharge could not be absolute unless a receipt were also obtained from the co-assignee. The ruling was based on the principle that assignees in bankruptcy are a sort of trustees. Equity, however, will also exert the same Equity will control over the fund in the hands of the assignees assignee ab- when one of them absconds, which we have seen sconds. that it would exert, on other sufficient cause, over an ordinary trust fund. So, where one of three co-assignees absconded, the two remaining assignees petitioned the Court of Chancery that the bank should be ordered to pay upon checks signed only by them, and the Lord Chancellor made the or relieve if one 2 Other v. Iveson, 24 L. J. Ch. 654; 3 Drew. 177. 1 § 436. Shortbridge's Case, 12 Ves. Jr. 28. 2 Grant on Bankers and Banking, p. 30. 1 § 437. Grant on Bankers and Banking, p. 28. 23 Atk. 695. der as requested.3 So long as our Bankruptcy Act remained in force, the question was not one which could ever arise in this country. For the act expressly directed how the deposits and drafts of the assignees should be made and signed, and no check could be properly paid by the bank unless it had not only been signed according to the law by both assignees, but had also been countersigned by the register in bankruptcy.1 - § 438. Co-executors. As the ordinary rule in regard to executors and administrators is precisely the converse of that concerning trustees, and as the signature of one executor is sufficient to discharge a simple contract debtor, so the signature of one of several who are co-executors or co-administrators de facto, to a check, is sufficient authority to the bank to pay it.1 But the following case would seem to be of a contrary purport. Two co-executors opened their joint account as such with certain bankers. The bankers afterward failed, and their composition paper and discharge was signed by one of the executors on behalf of the estate. Subsequently, in suit against the bankers, it was held that this was not a valid acquittance. The court said: "It were futile to open a joint account, if one of the depositors could withdraw the money. All must, therefore, unite in the receipt or check, in order to discharge the banker; and it follows that he cannot rely on a compromise or release by one as a defence. This is not so much an exception to the rule, that a payment to a coexecutor discharges the debt, as a return to the general rule to which that is an exception." 2 -- § 439. Firm Checks. Ordinarily every firm or partnership has its firm name or style in which the checks drawn by it 8 Ex parte Hunter, 2 Rose, 363; 1 Meriv. 408; stated to be decided on the authority of Ex parte Collins, 2 Cox, 427. ✦ Rule XXVIII., supplementary to the Act to establish a Uniform System of Bankruptcy, approved March 2, 1867. 1 § 438. Ex parte Rigby, 19 Ves. Jr. 463; Can v. Read, 3 Atk. 695; Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 125; Pond v. Underwood, 2 Ld. Raym. 1210; Prosser v. Wagner, 1 C. B. N. s. 289; Gaunt v. Taylor, 2 Hare, 413. 2 De Haven v. Williams, 80 Pa. St. 480. are signed, either by any one of the partners or by any attor ney sufficiently empowered thereto by the partnership. The bank must pay checks not post-dated, and drawn in the partnership name.1 But a bank must not pay partnership funds on a check signed by a partner in his own name instead of the firm name.2 As a bank is bound to know its customers' handwriting, so it is bound to know the handwriting of the various members of the partnership; for the combination of all their handwritings may be said to constitute the handwriting of the firm which is the customer. and to sign it with the firm name, and the bank is bound to recognize and honor the instrument; though, of course, the firm could not prevail in a suit brought to recover damages from the bank for its failure to honor a check signed by a partner whose signature had never been furnished to the bank. In like manner, it is bound to honor checks signed with the firm name by an agent or attorney duly empowered so to sign. Each of them is entitled to draw a check, Bank not obliged to know was a partner. (a) Grant lays down that the bank is not bound to pay a check signed by one who is not known to it to be a member of the copartnership; as, for example, by one who is a pay check of dormant partner.3 But in a judicial decision, recogone it did not nizing the correctness of this rule, it was also added, that if there was any evidence, however slight, going to show that the bank ought to have known the fact of the signer's partnership, then the question was made for the jury, whether or not the bank ought to have known this. If the question were answered in the affirmative, the bank would be held to all the consequences of actual knowledge; if in the negative, then the bank would be acquitted for its nonpayment.4 1 § 439. Forster v. Mackreth, L. R. 2 Ex. 163; Kirk v. Blurton, 9 Mees. & Wels. 284; Emly v. Lye, 15 East, 7; Nicholson v. Ricketts, 29 L. J. Q. B. 55. 2 Coote v. Bank, 3 Cranch C. C. 50. 8 Grant on Bankers and Banking, p. 33. * Cooke v. Seeley, 2 Exch. 749. |