Kellom v. Easley.

rejection of the claim of Smith; and it may also be added that we are inclined to the opinion that Smith's claim was improperly rejected.

Let a decree be drawn up in conformity with this opinion, reversing and setting aside the former decree.

DUNDY, J., concurred.

Decree accordingly.

INDEX.

ADMIRALTY.

1. A State statute,—such as chapter 6 of the Practice Act of Califor-
nia, declaring vessels subject to liens for materials or supplies
furnished towards their construction, repair, or equipment, and
directing that demands secured by such liens shall have prefer-
ence in order of payment over other demands,-is valid and
operative, even in its application to a domestic vessel supplied
in her home port, so far as to entitle the holder of a demand
within the statute to payment out of surplus proceeds remaining
in the registry, after the satisfaction of maritime liens, in prefer-
ence to a mortgagee of the vessel. The Harrison, 74.

2. The successive decisions of the supreme court abrogating the
practice of enforcing such liens by proceedings in rem,—reviewed
and explained. Ib.

ALIEN.

An alien cannot, under the laws of the United States governing the
registry of vessels, be deemed master of a vessel, even for the
purpose of defeating his claim to a lien for wages. The Du-
buque, 20.

AMNESTY.

WAR, 2.

EXTRADITION; NATURALIZATION.

APPEAL.

PRACTICE, 2-5.

ARREST.

OFFICER.

ASSIGNMENT.

BANKRUPTCY, 1, 3; PUBLIC LANDS.

ATTACHMENT.
PRACTICE, 1.

BANKING.

1. A national bank, organized and located in one State, may bring
an action in the circuit court sitting within another State,
against a citizen of the latter State. Manufacturers' National
Bank v. Baack, 232.

2. For the purpose of sustaining such a power to sue, it may be pre-
sumed that the individual members of the national bank are
citizens of the State wherein the bank is located, within the
meaning of Art. III. § 2 of the Constitution, and section 4 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789. Ib.

3. A circuit court has jurisdiction, upon a proper bill filed by a
stockholder of a national bank, to enjoin the officers of the
bank from misapplying its funds to the prejudice of the stock-
holder's interest therein, by acts which are not warranted by the
charter, or amount to a breach of trust. Shoemaker v. National
Mechanics' Bank, 416.

4. A loan made by a national bank in excess of the restriction im-
posed by section 29 of the National Banks Act of June 3, 1864,
13 Stat. at L. 99—which provides that the total liabilities to
any banking association, of any borrower, shall not at any time
exceed one-tenth of the capital stock,—is not void upon that
account. The loan may be enforced; though (by section 53),
the bank is exposed to forfeiture of its franchise, and the offi-
cers participating are declared personally liable. Ib.; Stewart
v. National Union Bank of Maryland, 424.

5. A national bank has power to lend money upon the note or other
personal obligation of the borrower secured by a pledge of stock
of a corporation as collateral security. Shoemaker v. National
Mechanics' Bank, 416.

6. Section 8 of the National Banks Act of June 3, 1864, 13 Stat. at
L. 101,-which authorizes such banks to exercise under that act
all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the
business of banking, by discounting and negotiating promissory
notes, &c., by receiving deposits, by buying and selling ex-
change, &c., by loaning money on personal security, and by issu-
ing, &c., circulating notes,-contains five distinct grants of
power; and neither grant is a limitation upon any other. Ib.
7. An averment that the officers of a bank have loaned its funds to
a specified person
66 upon the collateral security of railroad
stock," does not show a violation of section 8; for the phrase
"collateral security" imports a security additional to the per-
sonal obligation of the borrower; and, by the fourth of the

BANKING-Continued.

powers conferred by section 8, the bank may loan upon personal
security not embraced in the first power. Ib.

BANKRUPTCY.

1. For the purpose of sustaining an action to set aside a transfer of
property by a bankrupt as fraudulent against creditors, an as-
signee in bankruptcy is deemed to represent the creditors; and
may impeach the transfer, notwithstanding it may be held valid
and binding against the bankrupt himself. Allen v. Massey, 60.
2. A clause in an insurance policy declaring that the policy shall be
void if assigned without the consent of the company, does not
apply to a transfer made under the bankrupt law, by a register
in bankruptcy, to an assignee appointed for the insured. Stark-
weather v. Cleveland Ins. Co., 67.

3. An assignee in bankruptcy does not acquire the beneficial interest
in the assets, but is merely clothed with the title and control as
agent for the bankrupt and his creditors, and for the purpose
of converting them into money and applying them to the dis-
charge of the debts. The statutory transfer to such assignee is
not within the purpose or operation of a condition in a con-
tract restricting alienation of the beneficial interest. Ib.

4. The constitutional grant of power to Congress, to establish uni-
form laws on the subject of bankruptcy, is not limited to pass-
ing enactments similar in scope and operation to those in foree
in England when the Constitution was adopted. It gives Con-
gress plenary power over the subject of bankruptcy; under one
limitation only, that the laws passed upon that subject shall be
uniform throughout the United States. Silverman's Case, 243.
5. The reasons why this power should be vested in the national gov-
ment, explained.

lb.

6. In the district court, sitting as a court of bankruptcy, pleadings
must be special. Hence, a mere general denial of the intent
with which an act relied upon as an act of bankruptcy is alleged
to have been done, is not a good defense to the charge; but
the respondent must also allege and prove with what intent he
did such act. Ib.

7. When the unlawful intent is the necessary consequence of the act
charged, as in the case of a payment of one creditor by an in-
solvent debtor, a mere denial of such intent is no answer to the
petition, and judgment may be given against the respondent as
upon a failure to answer. Ib.

8. Inasmuch as every man is presumed to intend the necessary con-
sequences of his acts, a debtor who has paid one creditor to the
exclusion of others, cannot be heard to say that he did not in-