libel, slander, seduction and false imprisonment, all of which relate to personal injuries. (2) Such actions as trover, replevin and trespass, relating wholly to property loss by plaintiff, damages for which may be easily measured. In this class of cases interest is allowed as matter of right, from the date of conversion to the time of trial.82 (3) But the courts constitute a third class, of those cases where there is simply an injury to or destruction of property, not beneficial to the wrongdoer. In such cases it is generally held that the jury may in its discretion allow interest or damages for the wrongdoer's delay in making reparation, but that the court may not direct the jury so to allow interest, as it is not a matter of absolute right in plaintiff's behalf, although when allowed it is because plaintiff was entitled to it as compensation.83 73. Interest as a matter of right. When it is conceded that interest is part of plaintiff's compensation to be given as indemnity and not as punitive damages, it follows logically that the jury should be instructed to allow interest. But in Richards v. The Citizen's Natural Gas Co.,84 an action to recover damages for wrongful destruction of plaintiff's goods, the court held that such an instruction was erroneous. It was said that in such cases the question whether any amount should be given plaintiff as damages on account of defendant's delay in paying for the goods destroyed, must be left to the 82 P. S. V. R. Co. v. Ziemer, 124 Pa. St. 560; Duryee v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 477. 83 Richards v. The Citizen's Natural Gas Co., 130 Pa. St. 37. 84 130 Pa. St. 37. jury's discretion. viously held, in City of Allegheny v. Campbell,85 that plaintiff was entitled to interest as a matter of right. The facts here were as follows: The defendant city owned a certain wharf which it licensed plaintiff to use upon the payment of a stipulated amount as wharfage. Afterwards the city gave to a railway company the privilege of laying tracks along the wharf. While engaged in laying its tracks the railway company took out of the wharf certain posts theretofore used in mooring crafts and vessels. The company also deposited a quantity of stones and debris on or near the wharf. Plaintiffs notified the city to replace the posts and to remove these stones, but it neglected to do so. Later the river rose very high and several flats and a float belonging to plaintiff were torn from their moorings at the wharf and were carried away and lost, because of the city's neglect to restore the wharf properly to its former condition. For this loss plaintiff sued the city and recovered. Defendant claimed that the court erred in instructing the jury that if they found for plaintiff they should allow interest. But this was held not to be an error. The court said that without the addition of interest on the value of the property from the time it was destroyed, the remedy of the plaintiff would be inadequate, and that in such cases interest is properly allowed. This court, however, had pre 74. Same subject-Interest as compensation.— The Lawrence Railroad Company v. Cobb 86 was an 85 107 Pa. St. 530; Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, 31 Am. St. Rep. 817, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. 86 35 O. St. 94. action for damages caused by excavating in front of plaintiff's lot, thereby destroying access to the lot. The court instructed the jury that if they found for the plaintiff, interest should be added as part of plaintiff's compensation. In response to defendant's objection to this instruction, the court stated that where reparation was delayed by the wrongdoer, the injured party could not be made whole unless the damages awarded should include compensation in the nature of interest for withholding the reparation which should have been promptly made. Snow v. Nowlin 87 was an action against defendant for misrepresenting the value and location of land conveyed by defendant to plaintiff. The court here held that interest should be allowed as damages for fraudulently representing the value of land sold to the plaintiff to be much greater than its real value. Relating to this subject, in Chapman and another v. The Chicago and Northwestern Ry. Co.,88 the court said: "The damage to the plaintiff was the value of the property destroyed. That value was readily ascertained. It was therefore as if the court had instructed the jury that the damages of the plaintiff would be the value of the property destroyed with interest from the time of the commencement of the action. In trespass, trover or replevin for the same property taken or converted by the defendants such would have been the legal rate of damages, or rather the value with interest from the time of the taking or conversion. Why should not 87 43 Mich. 383. 88 26 Wis. 295, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. the same rule prevail in this action? We are at a loss to assign any good reason for the distinction, if it can be said that it exists; or if it can be said to be in the discretion of the jury to give interest by way of damages in this case, whilst in the others they must give it as matter of strict legal right." 89 These authorities clearly indicate that the tendency of the courts is to abrogate the rule that in actions for injury to or destruction of property it lies within the discretion of the jury to allow or not to allow interest on the damages sustained by plaintiff and withheld by defendant. There should be no distinction in the matter of allowing interest between cases of this kind and actions for conversion, trover or replevin, in all of which interest is allowed as a matter of right. 89 The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company v. The Ansonia Land & Water Power Company, 72 Conn. 703; McInroy et al. v. Dyer, 47 Pa. St. 118. CHAPTER X. LATERAL SUPPORT. 75. Removing lateral support.-Questions relating to lateral support of land, and the recovery of damages for removing such support, are of especial interest in connection with urban property. The rapid development of cities, where heavy buildings requiring deep foundations are erected on land so valuable that it is important to leave no vacant space upon it, has frequently raised the question of the adjacent landowner's right to lateral support, and has developed so much litigation that some of the states have undertaken by legislation more clearly to fix the rights of adjoining owners. In order to reach a conclusion which is in any degree satisfactory relating to damages, where lateral support has been removed, the question of most importance to be first settled pertains to the right and interest which the adjacent owner has to lateral support. If lateral support is a property right passing with the land, it is then held by the same title as the land itself and is subject to similar rules of law and can be taken only by the same means and under the same restrictions as any other portion of the land. Neither a court nor a legislature could give to anyone the right or power to take it from the landowner except for a public purpose, and then only upon condition of paying him its full value. But it has been held |