61 purposes, and said that any evidence tending to show what the grass was worth put to any of the uses for which it was valuable was proper.60 In Boom Co. v. Patterson, the question of the value of certain small islands was involved. The Boom Company sought to condemn these islands for their own special use. The court held that the inquiry in such case must relate to what the property is worth from its availability for all valuable uses. It was held that the owner's compensation is to be estimated by reference to the uses which may be made of the property, having regard to the wants of the community now and in the future. The use to which the owner had put the property, or the fact that he had not used it at all, or had permitted it to go to waste, was regarded as immaterial. So in the sale of coal at a place where the particular coal had no market value, as in Grandtower v. Phillips,62 the court permitted the plaintiffs to show the price they would have been required to pay for such coal as that mentioned in the contract, at the nearest available market where it could have been obtained. It was held that the difference between such price and the price stipulated for by their contract, in addition to the increased expense of transportation and hauling, would be the true measure of damage. So in the case of the conversion of clothing which has been worn, ? since there is no market value for such articles, it has been held that the owner might recover the full value of the clothing for use to himself, and not 60 Gulf, etc., Ry. Co. v. Matthews, 3 Tex. Civ. App. 493. 61 98 U. S. 403, LEADING IILLUSTRATIVE Cases. 62 23 Wall. 471. 63 merely what it could be sold for in money. In Green v. Boston & Lowell R. R. Co., plaintiff sought to recover the value of an oil painting, a portrait of plaintiff's father, which of course had no market value. It was held that evidence of its cost and of the fact that the plaintiff had no duplicate of this picture, of the expense of reproducing it, and the question whether or not it was practicable to reproduce it was competent to determine what damage plaintiff might recover for its loss.64 62. No value, or artificial value.-It may be that the article converted or destroyed not only has no market value, but by reason of its being a nuisance and contrary to law to own or use it, it may be held to have no value whatever for which plaintiff can recover damages. In Du Bost v. Beresford,65 plaintiff sued to recover the value of a picture which had been destroyed by defendant. It was claimed that the picture was a libel upon defendant's sister and to exhibit it publicly was a nuisance which anyone had a right to abate by destroying the picture. The court took this view of the matter and refused to allow plaintiff any damage for the value of the picture itself. 66 An interesting case relating to the question of value of property involved, arose in Kountz v. Kirkpatrick. This was an action for non-delivery of oil, sold by Kountz to Kirkpatrick for future delivery. Defendant sought to show that about the time 63 Fairfax v. New York Central & Hudson River R. R., 73 N. Y. 167. 64 128 Mass. 221. 65 2 Camp. 511. when the oil should have been delivered according to the terms of the contract, plaintiff, with other dealers in oil, entered into a combination for the purpose of raising the price of oil, and that they succeeded in placing a high artificial price on oil which was not its real market price; and that for this reason defendant was unable to procure oil with which to fill his contract with plaintiff. The court held that an inflated speculative market price, not the result of natural causes, but of artificial means to stimulate prices by unlawful combinations for the purposes of gain, cannot be a legitimate means of fixing a market; that a mere speculative price fixed by the contrivance of a few interested dealers is not the true test of the market value of the commodity. In this case the court held the defense valid. It did not decide, however, that an artificial market thus established in a commodity by others aside from plaintiff, and with which plaintiff was in no way connected, would prevent plaintiff from recovering from defendant damages for breach of contract on failure to deliver such commodity. It would seem that since the measure of damages is the difference between the contract price and the market value of the article at the time it should have been delivered, this rule would not apply where the market value was artificially established by a combination of dealers with whom plaintiff was in no way connected. 63. Proof of value. The proof of value of property relates generally to the time of its destruction or conversion by defendant, and to its market value at the place where the property was, when the wrong was committed. The value of the property then and there furnishes the measure of plaintiff's damages. Ordinarily this will be the market value, except in such cases as heretofore shown not to fall within the rules relating to market value. In practically every case where damages are demanded, evidence of the damages produced must be presented to the jury by competent witnesses testifying in the case. Courts have frequently refused a recovery to plaintiff on the ground that no evidence of the value of the property involved or of the labor performed, or of the damage sustained had been given, and hence no basis for a judgment was established. The case of Leeds v. Metropolitan Gas Light Co.67 was reversed because evidence of this character was not produced. The court said: "It was not shown what his business was, or the value of his time or any facts as to his occupation from which that value could be estimated. The jury were left to guess or speculate upon this value without any basis for their judgment, so far as loss of time was an element of the damages awarded." The rule in such cases is that where the loss is pecuniary and can be measured, and plaintiff fails to show its extent, or the value of the time or property in controversy, only nominal damages can be recovered. But this rule has not always been strictly followed. The courts have sometimes permitted the jury to exercise their own general knowledge and common experience relating to the matter in controversy, and when it is apparent that they have done this intelligently, have permitted their verdict to stand. Thus in Bradford v. Cunard Steamship Co., which was an action to recover for goods damaged by defendant, the court said: "We cannot say that a jury would not be warranted in finding as a matter of common experience, that damages of such a nature to such goods could not be less than five hundred dollars." In Hossler v. Trump,69 an action for services rendered, the question discussed and on which the case turned was whether the jury should have been permitted to estimate the value of the services from their character and extent, unaided by the opinion of a witness touching such value. It was held that where plaintiff shows services rendered and their nature, the jury is justified in using their own personal knowledge in estimating their value. While the holding in these cases seems to be justified by the particular facts there shown, and by other cases of a similar nature,7° it would be unsafe to extend very far the principle therein announced. In all matters of value upon which juries are to return a verdict, direct evidence of such values in the nature of opinions of witnesses, based upon proper facts, is exceedingly important, if not absolutely necessary. 68 147 Mass. 55. 69 62 O. St. 139. 70 McIntyre's Ex. v. Garlick, 8 C. C. Rep. 416 (Ohio); Baum v. Winston, 3 Met. 127 (Ky.); O'Hanlan v. Great Western Railway, Queen's Bench (1865), 6 B. & S. 484, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. |