ance companies have stipulated that the accident must be the result of external and violent means. These words, as construed by the courts, mean merely that some cause of the injury must have existed outside of the body of the insured and must have produced injury. Death from inhalation of gas is an accident resulting from external and violent means for this purpose.76 Accident as the cause of injury. An accident must be the cause of the injury to warrant recovery. In many cases an accident follows illness, or illness follows an accident in such a manner as to show causal connection. Other combinations may be suggested; for example, disease, apparent recovery, then accident which would otherwise be harmless but becomes serious because it brings back the old disease. The policy frequently provides that the injury must result from accident, "independently of all other causes." In the leading English decision on this question" the insured, while at a railway station, was seized with a fit and fell off the platform. Then a train which was passing ran over him. This was held to be an accident, not a mere consequence of the disease which induced the fit. 101. Visible mark of injury. The requirement that there must be a visible mark of injury has accomplished virtually nothing in restricting the insurer's liability. The decisions lead us to the conclusion that "visible" here means merely capable of being determined, not merely by sight, but by any 76 Paul v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 112 N. Y. 472, 20 N. E. 347. 77 Lawrence v. Accidental Ins. Co., 7 Q. B. D. 216 (Eng.). of the human senses. Thus, where the only mark of asphyxiation was the emanation of illuminating gas from the body when artificial respiration was produced, this was held to be both an external and visible mark of injury.78 The mark may be hidden under the surface of the body. It is sufficient if it become visible when the body is dissected. For example, the discoloration of a part of the brain is sufficient, though brought to light only by an autopsy.79 102. Excepted risks.-One common form of accident policy provides as follows: "This insurance does not cover disappearances; nor suicide, sane or insane; nor injuries of which there is no visible mark on the body (the body itself in case of death not being deemed such mark); nor accident, nor death, nor loss of limb or sight, nor disability resulting wholly or partly, directly or indirectly, from any of the following causes, or while engaged or affected: Disease or bodily infirmity, hernia, fits, vertigo, sleep-walking; medical or surgical treatment except amputations necessitated solely by injuries and made within ninety days after accident; intoxication or narcotics; voluntary or involuntary taking of poison or contact with poisonous substances or inhaling of any gas or vapor; sunstroke or freezing; dueling or fighting, war or riot; intentional injuries (inflicted by the insured or any other person); voluntary over-exertion; violating law; violating rules of a corporation; voluntary exposure to unnecessary danger; expedi 78 Menneilley v. Employers' Liability Assur. Assn., 148 N. Y. 596, 31 L. R. A. 686. 79 Union Casualty & Surety Co. v. Mondy, 18 Colo. App. 395, 71 Pac. 677. tions into wild or uncivilized countries; entering or trying to enter or leave a moving conveyance using steam as a motive power (except cable cars), riding in or on any such conveyances not provided for transportation of passengers, walking or being on a railway bridge or roadbed (railway employees excepted)." 103. Same subject-Accident while intoxicated. -Under the express provisions of many accident policies, no recovery is allowed by reason of accidents occurring while the insured is intoxicated. The company need not show that the intoxication caused the accident. Proof of the coexistence of the two is sufficient to prevent recovery. Thus, where the insured, while intoxicated, allowed a friend to shoot through the insured's ear and was killed in the attempt, no recovery was allowed.80 Probably, under this clause, no recovery would be allowed if plastering fell off a ceiling and hit the insured while in bed and asleep soon after an over-indulgence. 104. Same subject-Injury from poison.-Accident companies frequently stipulated against liability for injury resulting from "taking poison." This was generally held to refer only to an intentional and conscious taking of poison, not to the taking of poison by mistake, nor to an unconscious absorption of poison into the system. Therefore, the companies extended the exemption to "poison in any way taken." The courts then held that this referred, for example, to the liquid or powdered state of the poison, not to the intention or consciousness of the so Shader v. Railway Pass. Assur. Co., 66 N. Y. 441, 23 Am. Rep. 65. insured at the time of the poisoning.81 Hence, the companies gained little or nothing by the addition of these words. However, a clause now frequently used relieves the company from liability for the "voluntary or involuntary taking of poison or contact with poisonous substances." This provision and similar ones seem to have accomplished the purpose of the insurers.82 105. Same subject-Inhalation of gas.-Many accident companies have sought to escape hability for death caused by inhalation of gas. The courts have been inclined to construe such exceptions as referring only to intentional inhalations of gas, as, in the dentist's chair, or preliminary to a surgical operation. An Illinois case has come close to outdistancing others in allowing recovery. The policy in question contained a stipulation against liability for "death resulting, wholly or partly, directly or indirectly * from any gas or vapor." The insured was killed by the accidental inhalation of gas while asleep. The insurer was held liable in view of the state of the authorities and the strict construction which, the court held, must be given to such provisions. * * * * 106. Same subject-Intentional injuries.-Many policies provide against liability for "intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person. This exception has been construed by the courts in accordance with its obvious purpose. A comparison between the principles which are applicable in this 81 Metropolitan, etc., Assn. v. Froiland, 161 Ill. 30, 52 Am. St. Rep. 359. 82 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Hudgins, 97 Tex. 124, 64 L. R. A. 349. 83 Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Ayers, 217 Ill. 390, 75 N. E. 506. connection and in criminal law is of interest. If one, with deliberation and premeditation, shoots at X intending to kill him, but, through poor aiming, kills Y instead, he is guilty of murder "in the first degree"; that is, for our purpose, deliberate murder. But Y's estate would probably be allowed to recover accident insurance, even though this clause excepting intentional injuries is inserted in the policy.84 107. Total disability or loss of a member.-We have already considered total losses in fire and marine insurance. The question does not arise in life insurance, but appears in this form in accident insurance: When is one totally disabled? The answer depends to some extent upon the clause in the policy. Certain policies stipulate that total disability arises only when the insured is incapable of engaging in "any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation." The general rule on this question may remind the student of agency of the obligation of the wrongfully discharged agent to seek other and similar employment, though not all kinds of work. In a leading cases the plaintiff was a "billiard-saloon keeper." He admitted that, after the accident, he could still do certain acts necessary in his business, but introduced evidence to prove that he was wholly disabled from doing many of the material acts necessary. Recovery as for a total disability was allowed. The court suggested the following analogy: "Suppose a barber who can use his razor and shears in his right 84 Richards v. Ins. Co., 89 Cal. 170, 23 Am. St. 455. |