13. A person is not liable to indictment
under the 23d section of the Internal
Revenue Act of July 13th, 1866, (14
U. S. Stat. at Large, 153,) for carry-
ing on the business of a distiller
without having paid a special tax,
where he has complied with the pro-
visions of the 24th section of the Act,
as to giving a notice and a bond, &c.,
and a special tax has been assessed
against him by the assessor and re-
turned to the collector, but ten days
have not elapsed since the receipt by
the collector of the assessment list.
United States v. Shea,
1. Where a cargo of iron, carried by a
vessel under a contract of affreight-
ment, was sunk, and its owner, after
notice to the owner of the vessel,
raised and saved the iron: Held, in
a suit to recover damages for the
non-delivery of the iron, that it was
proper to allow, as such damages, the
The
expense of raising the iron.
Sunswick,
280
2. The rule of damages for the loss of
cargo by a collision, is not the market
value of the cargo at the port of des-
tination, or any general increased
market value thereof that took place
between the time of the shipment
and the time of the collision.
Ocean Queen,
the Act of March 3d, 1863, (12 U. S.
Stat. at Large, 731,) is in the custody
and under the control of the Provost-
Marshal from the time he reports to
him for duty, at the designated ren-
dezvous, in pursuance of notice to
that effect, after the draft has taken
place. In re Irons,
166
After the Board of Enrolment has,
under that Act, made and published
a decision declaring a person exempt
from draft, on an election to that ef
fect made in regard to him by his
widowed mother, it has no power to
revise or reverse that decision. id.
ment. If not so made, they will be
deemed to have been waived. id.
6. Where imported goods were entered
for warehouse, under the Act of
March 28th, 1854, (10 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 270,) but, before they were re-
moved to the warehouse, the importer
applied to the Collector for a permit
to land the goods for consumption,
and the Collector, under instructions
from the Treasury Department,
charged him for half a month's stor-
age of the goods, although they had
remained all the time on board of
the vessel in which they were im-
ported, and the importer paid the
amount under protest, and then sued
the Collector to recover it back:
Held, that the charge was an illegal
one, but that the payment of it was
voluntary, as the importer might
have allowed the goods to go to the
warehouse and have withdrawn them
from there; and that, therefore, the
amount paid could not be recovered
back. Irvin v. Schell,
7. Under the 5th section of the Act of
March 3d, 1857, (11 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 195,) the entry of goods with-
in ten days after which notice of dis-
satisfaction with the decision of the
Collector must be given to him by
the importer or his agent, in order to
authorize a subsequent suit to re-
cover back an excess of duties paid
under protest, is, in the case of goods
entered for warehousing, the entry
for withdrawal of such goods and not
the entry for warehousing. Iselin v.
Barney,
185
Large, 671,) both draft and tare are
allowable on sugar imported in bags,
and subject to duty by weight. Na-
pier v. Barney,
Draft and tare, explained.
Under the 3d section of the Act of
August 5th, 1861, (12 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 293,) in regard to discrimina-
ting duties, the ten per cent. ad val
orem duty imposed by that section is
imposed only as an additional duty
to duties imposed by that Act, and
cannot be imposed on goods which
are not charged with a duty by that
Act. Echeverria v. Barney,
Under the tariff Act of July 30th,
1846, (9 U. S. Stat at Large, 44.) as
amended by the tariff Act of March
3d, 1857, (11 Id. 192,) coral, cut into
the form of a cameo and not set, and
known as a coral cameo, in com-
merce, is liable to a duty of 24 per
cent. ad valorem, under schedule C
of the former Act, as amended by
the latter Act, as "coral, cut or man-
ufactured," and is not liable to a
duty of only 8 per cent. ad valorem,
as "cameos, not set." Bailey v. Schell,
14. The specific description in the Act
of 1846 must prevail over the com-
mercial designation known at the
time of the passage of that Act. id.
15. Gunny cloth, known in commerce
by that name, and being a manufac-
ture of jute, is, under the tariff Act
of July 14th, 1862, (12 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 554,) liable to duty, under the
5th subdivision of the 10th section,
as a manufacture of jute, and is not
liable to duty under the 11th section,
as cotton bagging, or as a manufac-
ture not otherwise provided for,
"suitable for the uses to which cot-
ton bagging is applied," although
used for rebaling cotton. Troost v.
Barney,
16. Where, in the 19th section of the
tariff Act of March 2d, 1861, (12 U.
S. Stat. at Large, 188,) a duty of 10
per cent. ad valorem was imposed on
"Peruvian bark," and, in the 23d
section of the same Act, the same
18. Under the 14th section of the tariff
Act of July 14th, 1862, (12 U. S. Stat.
at Large, 557,) rice, the growth of a
country beyond the Cape of Good
Hope, imported into England in an
uncleaned state, and there cleaned,
⚫ and thence imported into the United
States, is liable to a duty of 10 per
cent. ad valorem, in addition to the
duty imposed by the 8th section of
the same Act, on cleaned rice, when
imported into the United States di-
rectly from the place of its growth.
Williams v. Barney,
June 30th, 1864, did not have a re-
troactive effect. Its intention was to
equalize the operation of the joint
resolution of April 29th, 1864, as be-
tween two classes of persons--those
whose goods, owing to a failure to
enforce the resolution until a late
hour on the 30th of April, had gone
into consumption upon payment of
the former rates of duty, and those
who, on later hours of the same day,
had been compelled to pay the extra
duty of 50 per cent. upon similar en-
tries; but it made no provision for
those who, although their goods
arrived on the 29th or 30th of April,
did not on those days enter them for
consumption.
id.
Under the Act of June 30th, 1864,
all teas in warehouse on the 1st of
July, 1864, were subject to a duty of
25 cents per pound, when afterwards
withdrawn for consumption. id.
7. The provision of the 16th section of
the Judiciary Act of September 24th,
1789, (1 U. S. Stat. at Large, 82,)
that suits in Equity shall not be sus-
tained in either of the Courts of the
United States, in any case where
plain, adequate and complete remedy
may be had at law, is merely declar-
atory, and does not exclude the
Courts of the United States from any
part of the field of equitable reme-
dies. Bunce v. Gallagher,
1. Where a certificate of a division of
opinion on the question of the juris-
diction of this Court to entertain a
bill in equity, sent from this Court to
the Supreme Court, is dismissed by 8.
that Court because of an equal divi-
sion of opinion in that Court, and the
mandate to this Court directs it to
proceed in the cause in conformity
to law and the rules and proceedings
in such cases provided, it becomes
the duty of this Court to enter a de-
cree dismissing the bill. Coleman v.
Hudson River Bridge Co.,
56
2. From such decree, an appeal may be
taken and the case be reviewed in
the Supreme Court, the same as if
the decree were pronounced by the
judgment of this Court.
id.
3. A provisional injunction granted on
the filing of the bill falls with the
dismissal of the bill.
id.
4. The provisions of the Acts of Sep-
tember 24th, 1789, (1 U. S. Stat. at
Large, 85, § 23,) and March 3d, 1803,
(2 Id., 244, § 2,) do not operate to
continue such injunction.
id.
5. A bill of peace, founded on the idea
that all persons charged with a tax
under the 99th section of the Internal
Revenue Act of June 30th, 1864,
(13 U. S. Stat. at Large, 273,) have
such a unity of interest in contesting
the tax, that they may join as plain-
tiffs in a bill to restrain the assess-
ment and collection of such tax, and
that a determinate number of such
persons may appear in the name of
themselves and for the rest, will not
lie. Cutting v. Gilbert,
259
6. To authorize such a joinder of plain-
tiffs, their interest must be not only
A suit in Equity to annul a forged
deed of land and have it cancelled,
and the record of it declared void,
brought by the legal owner of the
land, who is the grantor named in
the forged deed, while he is out of
possession of the land, is not taken
out of equitable jurisdiction by the
fact that the deed is void.
id.
9. It is not necessary, before bringing
such suit, that the legal owner should
establish his title, and obtain posses-
sion of the land, by ejectment at
law.
id.
10. The question whether the deed is
forged or not, involves no question as
to the title of the land.
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