ON ARMING FOR WAR WITH ENGLAND.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, DECEMBER 31, 1811.

[THE patience of the Nation having been utterly exhausted by a long series of most flagrant outrages on our Rights and Independence by Great Britain, in the harassing of our Commerce, Searching of our Vessels, Impressment of our Sea men, &c., President MADISON transmitted to Congress, on its assembling, November 4, 1811, a Message recommending decisive measures for the vindication of our Na-, tional honor, and the redress of our wrongs. The subject immediately became the engrossing one, and many Members spoke in earnest deprecation of War mea sures-among them JOHN RANDOLPH, of Virginia, with great energy and eloquence The Committee on Foreign Relations having reported a series of Resolutions echoing the sentiments of the Message, and proposing the immediate increase of the Arnry, they were debated at length and adopted. A Bill was thereupon framed in and passed by the Senate, proposing to raise thirteen additional regiments for the public service. This Bill having reached the House, and being under consideration in Committee of the Whole, Mr. CLAY (who had entered the House a new Member, aged 34, at the opening of that Session, and been immediately chosen Speaker by a vote of 75 to 44,) rose and addressed the Committee as follows:]

WHEN the subject of raising an additional military force was discussed some days past, it was the pleasure of the House not to deliberate on it in Committee of the Whole. I should not complain of this course of proceeding, nor indeed of any other which they might think fit to take on any other occasion; but the effect was to preclude me from participating in debate; from taking upon myself that share of responsibility for measures which it has become necessary to adopt at the present moment; a responsibility from which I shall never shrink at any period or on any subject. I owe it to myself, to my constituents, and to my country to express, on this occasion, my views of the great interests involved in the bill under consideration.

The first question which presents itself, in relation to this bill, ist as to the quantum of force which it proposes to raise. Is it too large or too small-too strong or too weak? The contemplated army is, to my mind, too great for peace; and I am fearful, far as it is above the wishes of some of those with whom I generally have the honor to

act, that it is too small for the purposes of war. The bill provides for the raising of twenty-five thousand troops; the bill recently passed was intended to complete the enlistment for six thousand more. The whole would amount to thirty-one thousand. Deducting for sickness, to which raw troops are peculiarly exposed, and for other deficiencies, a reasonable number of these troops, and to give the most favorable result, we shall not raise by both bills more than twenty or twenty-five thousand effective men. Could a country boundless in extent, with a numerous line of forts and garrisons, liable to invasions and predatory incursions at every point, be defended, and at the same time a war carried on, by a less number of regulars than twenty-five thousand? If the legislative councils err in such a case, they ought to err on the side of safety and vigor. The question is-will you embark in a war which shall be feeble and protracted to a great length of time, or will you make a vigorous stroke and put an end to this territorial war at once? Canada is the avowed object. Suppose you conquer Upper Canada, you must leave men behind to hold it, when you march to Quebec. Your rear must be protected; it would be a new mode of warfare to leave it unprotected! Gentlemen will be deceived, if they calculate upon the treason of the Canadian people. Well, sir, you lay siege to Quebec, garrisoned, I am informed, by seven or eight thousand British forces; you must have at least double that number to take possession of the place. Suppose Quebec reduced; high as is my sense of the valor of my countrymen, I do not believe that militia or volunteers could be obtained to retain it for as long a period as would be necessary. But in respect to the question of economy, I conceive that it would be more expedient to raise a large force at With an army of twenty-five thousand men, the territorial war would probably terminate in one year; while it would last, waged with eight or ten thousand troops, three or four years. I said the territorial war; for it is probable that for years after the enemy shall be driven from the provinces, hostilities may be prosecuted on the ocean. So much for the quantum of the proposed force Were I to amplify, as well I might; were I to draw too extensively on the patience of the Committee, they might feel disposed to protest my draft.

once.

I advance to the consideration of the nature of the troops. Our republican jealousies; our love of liberty; the danger of standing

armies, are themes which have been successfully touched, in discussing the subject before the Committee, at least so far as our feelings are concerned, however little weight they may have produced on our judgment. I do not stand on this floor as the advocate of standing armies in time of peace; but when war becomes essential, I am the advocate of raising able and vigorous armies to ensure its success. The danger of armies in peace arises from their idleness and dissipation; their corrupted habits, which mould them to the will of ambitious chieftains. We have been the subject of abuse for years by tourists through this country, whether on horseback or on foot, in prose or in poetry; but although we may not have exhibited as many great instances of discoveries and improvements in science, as the long established nations of Europe, the mass of our people possess more general political information than any people on earth; such information is universally diffused among us. This circumstance is one security against the ambition of military leaders. Another barrier is derived from the extent of the country, and the millions of people spread over its face. Paris was taken, and all France consequently subjugated. London might be subdued, and England would fall before the conqueror. But the population and strength of this country are concentrated in no one place. Philadelphia may be invaded; New York or Boston may fall; every seaport may be taken; but the country will remain free. The whole of our Territory on this side of the Alleghany may be invaded; still liberty will not be subdued. We have or will soon have eighteen state governments, capable and possessing the right to apply their immense pecuniary and physical military resources to oppose any daring usurper who may attempt to prostrate our liberties. The national government; one or more of the state sovereignties, may be annihilated; the country will yet be safe. We possess another security against the dangers of armies in the great body of militia. I hope to God that ere long we shall see every man proudly shoulder a musket to defend his liberties. Massachusetts at this time presents the noble spectacle of fifty or sixty thousand of her citizens with arms in their hands, ready to point their bayonets to the breast of any tyrant who may attempt to crush their freedom. And with all these securities, do gentlemen seriously apprehend danger from a pitiful army of 25 or 30,000 men? I trust not.

I must beg leave to differ with those gentlemen who have thought

it improper to debate upon war in the face of day. It is impossible to conceal the measures of preparation for war. Have gentlemen ever known of a war between France and Russia, for example, without receiving accounts of its being meditated for weeks and months before it actually took place? You may pass your laws in secret, but you cannot secretly execute them. Men must be raised; can they be enlisted in the dark? I feel no difficulty on this point.

Gentlemen have inquired, what will be gained by the contemplated war? I ask, in turn, what will you not lose by your mongrel state of peace with Great Britain? Do you expect to gain any thing in a pecuniary view? No, sir. Look at your treasury reports. We now receive only six millions of revenue annually; and this amount must be diminished in the same proportion as the rigorous execution of the orders in council shall increase. Before these orders existed, we received sixteen millions. We lose, then, to the amount of ten millions of revenue per annum by our present peace. A war would probably produce the repeal of the orders in council; and our revenue would be restored; our commerce would flourish; our wealth and prosperity would advance. But certain gentlemen tell us to repeal the non-importation, and then we shall have commerce and revenue. Admit that we could be guilty of so gross an act of perfidy, after we have voluntarily pledged our faith to that power which should revoke its hostile edicts, to enforce against its enemy this non-importation; admit this; repeal your laws; and what will be the consequence? We shall present the strange phenomenon of an import without an export trade. We should become bankrupt, if we should thus carry on a trade. Where would our produce find vent? Under the British orders, we cannot send it to the markets of continental Europe. Will Great Britain take our exports? She has no market for them; her people can find use for only a small portion of them. By a continuance of this peace, then, we shall lose our commerce, our character, and a nation's best attribute, our honor. A war will give us commerce and character; and we shall enjoy the proud consciousness of having discharged our highest duty to our country.

But England, it seems, is fighting the battles of mankind; and we are asked, shall we weaken her magnanimous efforts? For argument's sake, let us concede the fact, that the French Emperor is aim

ing at universal empire; can Great Britain challenge our sympathies, when, instead of putting forth her arms to protect the world, she has converted the war into a means of self-aggrandizement; when, under pretence of defending them, she has destroyed the commerce and trampled on the rights of every nation; when she has attempted to annihilate every vestige of the public maritime code of which she professes to be the champion? Shall we bear the cuffs and scoffs of British arrogance, because we may entertain chimerical fears of French subjugation? Shall we swallow the potion of British poison, lest we may be presented with the imperial dose? Are we called upon to bow to the mandates of royal insolence, as a preparation to contend against Gallic usurpation? Who ever learned in the school of base submission, the lessons of noble freedom, and courage, and independence? Look at Spain. Did she secure her independence by submitting, in the first instance, to the dictates of imperial usurpations? No, sir. If she had resisted the first intrusion into her councils, her monarch would not at this time be a miserable victim in the dungeons of Marseilles. We cannot secure our independence of one power, by a dastardly submission to the will of another. But look. at our own history. Our ancestors of the Revolution resisted the first encroachments of British tyranny. They foresaw that by submitting to pay an illegal tax, contemptible as that was in itself, their liberties would ultimately be subverted. Consider the progress of the present disputes with England. For what were we contending the other day? For the indirect colonial carrying trade. That has vanished. For what are we now deliberating? For the direct export and import trade; the trade in our own cotton, and tobacco, and fish. Give this up, and to-morrow we must take up arms for our right to pass from New York to New Orleans; from the upper country on James River to Richmond. Sir, when did submission to one wrong induce an adversary to cease his encroachments on the party submitting? But we are told that we ought only to go to war when our territory is invaded How much better than invasion is the blocking of our very ports and harbors; insulting our towns; plundering our merchants, and scouring our coasts? If our fields are surrounded, are they in a better condition than if invaded? When the murderer is at our doors, shall we meanly skulk to our cells? Or shall we boldly oppose him at his entrance?

I could wish the past were buried in oblivion. But we cannot