bound by the representations and averments of those parties, but may impeach them and contradict them by parol or oral testimony. It is almost a universal system of jurisprudence, to give a decided preference to written memorials over verbal representa tions, founded on the doubtful or imperfect recollection of witnesses. The French law requires a very large class of contracts to be put in writing, "in consequence," it observes, "of the corruption of manners and subornation of witnesses," and formally prohibits the admission of oral evidence against the contents of a written document. It is a fundamental rule of the common law that oral evidence shall not be given, to add to, subtract from, or alter or vary any description of written contract; "quoties in verbie nulla est ambiguitas, nulla expositio contra verba fienda est." This general rule or principle of law has been established on the grounds that the writing stands higher in the scale of evidence than the oral testimony, and that the stronger evidence onght not, therefore, to be controlled or altered by the weaker.

§ 575. A party who enters into a contract in writing, without any fraud or imposition practiced upon him, is conclusively presumed to understand and assent to its terms and legal effect.'

If a man execute a deed, calling himself therein a certain name, he will not be admitted to take advantage of the fact that it is not his true name.'

Where a party makes an incorrect return of his property liable to taxation he is estopped to deny its correctness."

Where a statute requires a ministerial officer, like a sheriff, to make a return of his doings in making a levy, for instance, upon land, such return is conclusive evidence between the creditor and debtor in the execution, and all persons claiming under them respectively.

It is a sound rule of law that a written contract cannot be altered or varied by parol proof. This excellent rule of law is

1 Rice v. Dwight Co., 2 Cush. 80; Gavagan v. Bryant, 83 Ill. 376; Hunter v. Miller, 6 B. Mon. 612; Bank v. Daniel, 12 Pet. 56.

2 Com. Dig. B. 1.

& Telle v. Green, 28 Ind. 184; Conwell v. President, 8 Ind. 358.

Bott v. Burnell, 11 Mass. 163;

Whittaker v. Sumner, 7 Pick. 551; Butts v. Francis, 4 Conn. 424; Miller v. Moses, 59 Me. 129, Ante, §§ 451, 452; Anthony v. Bartholow, 69 Mo. 186.

Van Syckle v. Dalrymple, 32 N.. J. E. 233; S. C., 826.

intended to guard against fraud and perjuries, and it cannot be too steadily enforced and supported by courts of justice. Expressum facit cessare tacitum-vox emissa volat-litera scripta manet, are law axioms in support of this rule, and law axioms are nothing more than the conclusions of common sense, which have been formed and approved by wisdom of ages. This rule prevails equally in a court of equity and a court of law. Generally speaking, the rules of evidence are the same in both courts, and if words of a contract be intelligible there is no instance where parol proof has been permitted to give them a different sense. You can introduce nothing on parol proof that adds to or deducts from the writing. If, however, through fraud or mistake, it is made to speak a different language from what was intended, the estoppel does not apply. These are the only cases that form an exception to the rule.

576. In what manner a deed or contract is to operate must be ascertained from its own language; on what it is to operate may be gathered from the whole field of parol evidence; whether the parties were under a disability, sui juris, by what right or anthority they conveyed, what the location is, or the quantity of the land conveyed, and what the title of the grantor is, may ordinarily be sought outside the deed, and, as is frequently the case, can be ascertained in no other way. Notwithstanding these matters, the parties to a deed or contract may agree to bind themselves in this respect by stating a particular state of things as a part or basis of the grant or contract. And when this is done with sufficient clearness so as to leave no doubt as to the intention, it falls within the general principle that matters which have been solemnly reduced to writing cannot be denied, and constitutes an estoppel by deed. So far as a deed is intended to pass, or extinguish a right, it is the exclusive evidence of the contract, and the party is concluded by its terms, but the deed is not conclusive evidence of the existence of facts acknowledged in the instrument, such as its date, acknowledgment of payment, consideration,' etc. There are few rules of law that are better established or of greater antiquity than the one which has firmly settled the question, that a man may irrevocably bind himself by

1 Rhine v. Ellen, 36 Cal. 362.

putting his seal to a grant or covenant, and that he will not be allowed to disprove or contradict any declaration or averment contained in the instrument and essential to its purpose. A recital or allegation in a deed or bond, which is certain in its terms and relevant to the matter in hand, is conclusive between the parties to the controversy growing out of the instrument itself or the transaction in which it was executed.' That no man shall be allowed to dispute his own deed, for it is not only conclusive upon the party executing it as to the very point intended to be effected by the instrument, but also as to the facts recited in it, is a well settled principle of law. No one can be permitted, except on the ground of fraud or deceit, to aver or to

prove anything in contradiction to what he has solemnly and deliberately avowed by deed.'

8577. This principle of estoppel is founded on the general doctrine that a man shall not defeat his own act or deny its validity to the prejudice of another. Ordinarily, the name of the covenantor or obligor appears in the body of the deed; but there is a sufficient designation and description of the party to be charged if the name is written at the foot of the instrument.' A man may bind himself by deed either in his own name, or by some acquired or adopted name, title or description. Where therefore, the defendant described himself in a deed by the name of "Davis and Marsh," he was held estopped from showing that his name was Davis only.' So if a man executes a bond in the name of Thomas, he is estopped by the bond from pleading that his name is Joseph. If he is described as James in the body of the deed, and executes it in the name of John, by writing that name against the seal, and is sued in the name of John, and pleads the misnomer, the plaintiff may rely on the estoppel, and the deed is conclusive evidence of the adoption by the defendant of the names both of James and John. So a grantor whose signature has, at his own request, been affixed to the deed by another, is bound thereby, and after delivery of the deed and receipt of the consideration, is estopped to deny the same. At common law, signing is not necessary to the due execution of a deed, but it is made so by the statute of frauds. But if the grantor's name is written in his presence, and by his direction, it is his act, and he will not be permitted to repudiate a deed thus executed. So where a man in his deed recites particular facts, these facts become conclusive evidence against him, and he is not at liberty to deny the truth of his statement. One who makes a feoffment cannot allege that his feoffee was not seized,

v. Whitebread, 11 C. B. 406; Reeves v. Slater, 7 B. & C. 489; Williams v. Bryant, 5 M. & W. 454.

Lovejoy v. Richardson, 68 Me. 386; Ins. Co. v. Brown, 30 N. J. E. 193; Croy v. Busenback, 72 Ind. 48; Weaver v. Carnall, 35 Ark. 198; S. C., 37 Am. R. 22; Clough v. Clough, 73 Me. 487; S. C., 37 Am. R. 22.

or set up any title acquired subsequent to the feoffment.' Estoppel by deed extends to persons claiming under the person estopped in the same manner as an estoppel by record does. No person can avoid his own deed by which an estate has passed on the ground of his own hand in executing it. Thus where a party conveys his property to another in fraud of his creditors, or collusively suffers a judgment to be rendered against him, and his property is sold and conveyed for the purpose of defeating the just claims of his creditors, the grantor in such fraudulent conveyance cannot recover in opposition to his deed; he is estopped by it and by his actions from claiming in hostility to it. Such fraudulent conveyance binds not only the grantor but his heirs and his personal representatives. So a person named as grantor in a deed may be guilty of such a degree of negligence in executing it, and permitting it to be exposed where it may readily be taken by the person named as grantee, as will estop him from setting up title' as against a bona fide purchaser for value, under the deed."

§ 578. Estoppels by deed, as far as they are applicable, or may be applied to deeds conveying real estate, create what in law is termed a title by estoppel, which is defined as follows: A title by estoppel is where equity, and in some cases the law, in order to accomplish the purposes of justice which cannot otherwise be reached, draws certain conclusions from the acts of one party in favor of another, in respect to the ownership of lands which it does not allow the first to controvert or deny. Estoppels differ from evidence in this, that the former are received as conclusive, and preclude all inquiry as to the merits of the title, while evidence is merely the medium of establishing facts which do exist or have existed. As an estoppel against an estoppel sets the

v. Barnett, 31 Miss. 653; Snodgrass v. Andrews, 30 Miss. 472; Crosby v. De Graffenried; 19 Ga. 290; Hurley v. Osler, 44 Iowa, 642; Sims v. Field, 66 Mo. 111; Tuffts v. Du Bignon, 61 Ga. 322; Peterson v. Brown, 17 Nev. 172; S. C., 45 Am. R. 437.

3 Tisher v. Beckwith, 30 Wis. 55; Collins v. Heath, 34 Ga. 443; Jones v. Powles, 3 M. & G. 581; Everts v. Ag. nes, 6 Wis. 453.