that, while they infallibly obeyed, they could claim no merit for obedience. This is true, if we do not admit fear, ambition, avarice, benevolence, &c. to be instinctive feelings; and there are very few, who will not deny them the character of instincts in the sense, in which we usually apply that term to animals.

In order that man may be accountable, it seems to be necessary, that good and evil, that right and wrong should be set before him, with a liberty of choosing between them. When this is the case, there are motives influencing him to pursue one course, and opposite considerations operating upon him to pursue another; and his moral rectitude, his merit or demerit will be known by the choice, which he makes under such circumstances. But in pure instincts there is no balancing of motives in this way; and, consequently, no accountability, and no praise and blame.

CHAPTER TWENTY EIGHTH.

THE WILL, CONSCIENCE, &o

f. 344. Of volition and its objects.

VOLITION is the determination of the mind to do or not to do something; or it may be expressed more briefly by saying, that it is the determination or act of choice.-It can be objected to this definition, that to describe volition, as a determination of the mind, or as an act of the mind, is merely to increase the list of terms, and to call the thing in question by another name. There is some ground for this objection; but it will not have so much weight, when it is noticed, that the qualifying terms point out the nature of the act or determination; viz. an act of the mind, in refer

ence to which two things are compared together, and which gives the preference to one over the other. Further, it is to be kept in memory, that the simple acts of the mind do not readily admit of definitions, however convenient and desirable they may in some cases be. Something, it is true, can be said. But in order to have a clear notion of such simple acts, we ought to make them subjects of attentive reflection, as we find them to exist in ourselves. And, therefore, the above definition, although it be a defective one, will not be without its use, if we connect with it a careful observation of what takes place within us. Certainly without such observation, no definition whatever can give a full idea of what is intended to be communicated.

The capability, which the mind has, of putting forth such a determination, of exercising choice, is commonly intended by the phrase, POWER OF FACULTY OF THE WILL, and also by the WILL simply---All acts of the will, that is, all volitions must have objects. A person cannot well exercise the act of willing, without having his mind directed towards something, which is the object of his volition. To will without willing something, would be much the same, as to remenber without remembering something.

§. 345. Nature and kinds of motives.

As volition is found to exist only in certain circumstances, it may, therefore, be considered an effect, and, consequently, must have a cause, which gives rise to it; using the term, cause, in the sense heretofore explained, viz. as implying merely a regular and constant antecedence. The causes of volition are motives; so that a motive may be defined to be any thing, which moves or excites the mind in putting forth volition. Without motives, that is, without some ground or reason of our choice, volition would never be exercised, and, consequently, there would never be voluntary action, since a voluntary action implies, and is preceded by volition.

Motives, in reference to their tendency to cause voli

tion are spoken of, as either weak or strong. That motive, which has a less degree of previous tendency to move the will, or, what is the same thing, appears the less inviting, as it is presented to the view of the mind, is called the weaker motive. On the contrary, that motive, which appears to the mind the most inviting, and, therefore, has the greater tendency to move the will, is the stronger motive. --The strength of a motive is found to vary in two ways, or from two causes.-(1) It will be found to vary, first, not only with the particular object, which is before the mind, but also with the attendant circumstances. Many things, which once appeared eminently desirable, and strongly influenced our volitions, appear less desirable, and have less power over us, in consequence of being accidentally associated with other things. In other instances, the effect is directly the reverse.-(2) Things, that exist in the view of the mind, have their tendency to move the will increased or diminished according to the nature and circumstances of the mind, which views them. Thus, the same thing will appear differently to different individuals, and also to the same individual at different times.

MOTIVES, in reference to their origin, may be divided into two classes, INTERNAL, and EXTERNAL. -By the internal, we mean those, which are connected with our physical organization, such as hunger, thirst, and bodily pains and enjoyments; and also our passions or affections, whether good or evil. Accordingly in all languages, people speak of being impelled, of being excited to action in these ways. By the external, we mean such as can be traced to external causes, and exist in something without us. All external objects, which please or disgust us, operate upon us as motives. It is true, that they influence the will through the medium of the passions; but as the influence exercised may be traced to them, as the ultimate subjects of it, they may properly be termed the motive. As all external objects, which are not utterly indifferent, affect the will more or less, it is useless to attempt an enumeration of the motives from this source. In what way it happens, that certain appetites & passions, or that certain external objects

which appear to us pleasing and desirable, affect the will, and cause volition, cannot be explained. Nor can we give an explanation of any other instance of cause and effect; but of the truth of the fact, that the will is influenced by means of them, there is no room to doubt.

§. 346. Of moral liberty in man.

The volition will always be determined by the strongest motive; in other words, the will always is, as the greatest apparent good, or as what appears most agreeable. To say otherwise would imply the direct contradiction, that the mind chooses, what it does not choose, and likes what it dislikes. Our voluntary actions correspond to our volitions; that is, the action will be as the volition is; and yet men under the circumstances stated, having their volitions in perfect correspondence with the motive, and the action agreeing with the volition, are justly said to act freely, or with liberty. But moral liberty, we apprehend, is not rightly considered a quality or property of man, analogous to his other mental and physical qualities, but a privilege.

If this be a correct notion, LIBERTY, in its full extent, is the privilege of acting according to our wishes, without being subject to any restraint. This definition coincides very nearly with the concise explanation of it by the unlearned, who commonly say, that liberty consists in choosing and doing, as one pleases It will, indeed, be said, that there is an indissoluble relation between the volition and the motive. This is true. But the circumstance, that nothing can have the character of a motive independently of our feelings, and that the efficient or strongest motive is never at variance with them, takes away from this fixed and inflexible relation the attribute of constraint.

Liberty, then, may be predicated of man in two respects, viz. liberty of WILL, and liberty of EXTERNAL ACTION.

As to the will, it may be said, that it always has liberty, is always free, using the terms in accordance with the above definition. When a person, looking upon a number of objects, makes choice of one in preference to another,

he does it agreeably to his wish or inclination, and has the highest possible liberty; we can conceive of no greater. As, therefore, there is an inseparable connection between the volition, and the preference or the strongest desire of the heart, it is safe to assert, that there is no constraint on the volition, and that the will is always free. In support of the fact, that the volition, whatever its relation to the motive, is in the same direction with the preponderance of inclination, an appeal may be made to the common experience of men; and it can hardly be doubted, that on examination every one will find it confirmed by what takes place in himself. If they do not find this to be the case, they will find, that the will is not always conformed to the strongest motive, which will lead to plain contradictions, if the terms are used in the sense here attached to them.

There is also liberty of external actions. But while we say, that there is liberty in this respect, it cannot be denied, that it is subject to contingencies, which do not exist in relation to the freedom of volitions. In other words, the freedom of external actions is sometimes from various causes interrupted. For instance, a person has a desire to go to a certain place; he exercises volition or wills to go to that place; and the means, by which his determination is to be effected, is the motion of his feet. If there be nothing to prevent this motion, then his actions are free, as well as his will; but if he be bound or shackled, then there is a constraint, a deprivation of freedom, in respect to the action. And it is the same in all analogous cases. There may be a freedom in the volition, while there is a constraint and hinderance in the performance; so that necessity can be predicated of external actions, but no necessity analogous to that, which is predicated of actions, can be predicated of the mental resolve. But in all outward actions, where such necessity truly exists, men are not accountable.

Note. The view of libery above given seems to coincide essentially with that of M. Destutt-Tracy. He has the following remarks ;—“Je dis que l' ideé de liberte nait de faculté de vouloir; car, avec Locke, j'entends par liberté la puissance d'executer sa volonté, d'agir conformement a son desir; et je soutiens, qu'il est impossible d' attacher une ideé nette a ce mot, qaund on veus lui donner un autre sens," (Elemens d' Ideologie, part 4 et 5, p. 99. 2d. ed.)