Many have imagined, that the memory of the uneducated, because it deals so much in minute particulars, is intrinsically stronger, than of others. It is, no doubt, to the multitude a more imposing species of memory, and admirably answers the purpose of those, in whom it appears. But mere contiguity in time and place, which is almost the sole principle that binds together events in the recollection of such persons, is of but small consequence in the estimation of the philosopher. He looks more deeply into the nature of things; their mere outward and incidental circumstances do not particularly arrest his attention; and consequently his knowledge is connected together by less obvious and ready, but more important principles, such as analogy, cause and effect.

§. 271. Of the memory of the aged.

A defect of memory is often noticed in persons, who are advanced in years. Very few retain those powers of recollection, which they possessed in earlier days. "Age, says Ossian, is now on my tongue, and my soul has failed; memory fails on my mind."

The failure of this mental susceptibility in the aged seems to be owing to two causes, viz. the impaired state of the organs of perception, and a defect of attention.

(1) Their organs of external perception are impaired.

We find it difficult, in consequence of the failure of their sense of hearing, to converse with people, advanced in years, and it requires a great effort, both in our part and theirs, to make them understand what we say. The most conclusive arguments, and flashes of wit, and rich strains of musick have in a great measure ceased to excite in them any interest.There is a like failure of the sense of seeing also. They no longer take pleasure in the delightful aspects of creation; and the waving forest, and the gay beams of the sun, although they have not ceased to have charms for others, have none for them.-All the other senses fail of their wonted operation in the same way;

and the natural and necessary consequence is, that the

ideas, which are let in by the senses, make but a very feeble impression, and are almost immediately erased from the mind.

(2) The second cause of the weakness of memory, of which old people complain, is a defect in attention. That mental exercise, to which we give the name of attention, always implies desire, an emotion of interest; and without an emotion of this description, it cannot exist. But the world, (including in the term what is beautiful in nature, and what is important in the duties and callings of life,) has at last ceased to excite the emotions, which it formerly awakened. The aged are like the prisoner, released, in the period of the French revolution, from the Bastille; they find themselves, as it were, in a new creation, which passes before them with great indistinctness, and with which they feel but little sympathy. And why should it be thought unnatural, that they should neglect in some measure that scene of things, which has already learnt to forget and to neglect them? As their organs of external perception have failed them, and there has also been a defect of attention, the memory, as a natural consequence, has become powerless and broken.

It should, however, be remarked here, that, notwithstanding what has been said, aged people often recal, with great readiness and precision, the feelings and the incidents of their youth. As when a man, who has been greatly prospered, but who at last meets with sudden and disastrous reverses of fortune, finds, in this new state of things, his obsequious attendants fleeing away and turning against him, while only a few early friends remain unmoved in evil and good report; so early feelings and early associations appear to cling with a faithful fondness to the shattered intellects of the aged. The old soldier, who had a share in the American Revolution, will sit down by his fireside and describe with great particularity the scenes, where he toiled and bled, and yet be quite unable to give an account of the incidents of the preceding week.

The explanation of this trait in the mental aspects of the aged seems to be this.As a general statement, our

early feelings and our early associations are the strongest. That they should be so is not strange, since we have then entered on a state of things, which, in its essential features, is new, and which, in all its diversities of duty, and pleasure, and danger, attracts, and excites us by continual novelty. Who can forget the plains, where he wandered in early life? Who can erase from his recollection the associates of those days of wonder, activity, and hope? Who can obliterate from his heart his toils, and his sufferings, and his joys, all which assumed a peculiar emphasis and importance, being connected with future prospects, the adversities and the successes of after life?--These things remain, while others vanish. Such feelings, so deeply fixed in the mind, and bound together and made permanent by the strength of a mutual association, are frequently recalled; they recur to the soul in the activity and bustle of life, and in those more favoured moments, when it is given up to silent and solemn meditations. The effect of this frequent recurrence can easily be imagined. The early impressions, which are the subjects of such recurrence, become in time, if one may be allowed the expression, a part of the mind itself; they seem to be woven into its existence. Hence old men,' who have no eye and no hearing for the events, that are passing around them, repeat, with the greatest animation, the stories of scenes, and actions, and friendships of fifty years ago.

§. 272. Memory of persons of a rich imagination.

It is a remark of Dr. Watts, that a fine genius is often found to have but a feeble memory. By a fine genius he probably understood what we commonly mean by a person of a rich imagination; that is, one, who is furnished with a rich store of images, has readiness in the perception of their congruity or incongruity with each other, and of course has great power in the formation of various new combinations.

Such a person finds a luxuriance of wealth in himself. He is continually and happily entertained with the new pictures, which his imagination creates. Hence he does

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not so much entertain himself with outward events; many facts, which are particularly noticed and retained by others, pass by him unregarded; and, therefore, quickly escape from his remembrance. Montaigne (§. 7.) seems to have been a person of this description; acquainted with the general principles of the sciences, possessing an exuberance of intellectual riches, but utterly incapable of remembering dates, times, places, and the numerous mattersof-fact of every day's occurrence.

Weakness of memory in persons of a rich imagination is discovered also in their reading of books. The reason of it seems to be a too great confidence in their own ability. Conscious of their own resources, they are tempted to peruse books in a hasty and careless manner, and without due attention. The result of this careless manner, both in respect to events and the sentiments of authors, is that they are but imperfectly known at first, and are very speedily forgotten. This will not appear strange, in connection with the remarks at §. 175, on the connection existing between memory, and attention. The weakness of memory, therefore, in persons of rich imagination is not constitutional and permanent, but a matter of mere accident; and, for this reason, the more discreditable. When such persons have habitually taken an interest in the common affairs of life, they are found to remember their details, however unpoetical; and in their reading of authors nothing seems to be wanting, but interest and attention, in order to secure them from the reproach, under which they are thought to labour.

§. 273. On the compatibility of strong memory and good judgment.

By JUDGMENTS we in general understand nothing more than the opinions, which we form in view of evidence; in other words, they are the results or conclusions of moral reasoning. By a person of good judgment, we generally mean one, who examines subjects with caution, and whose results, founded on such examination, for the most part, prove correct. That persons may possess, in a very high degree, the susceptibility of memory, and still be incapable.

of correct moral reasoning, or of exhibiting any other indications of a well judging mind, is a fact well known. There have even been idiots, who certainly could present no claims to the character of judging well, that have, nevertheless, been remarkable for memory. Such are, indeed, instances of an extreme kind;-however, there are not wanting many other cases, where strong memories have been found united with feeble judgment. On this fact, it may be remarked, as follows.

The connection between a strong memory and a weak judgment, it may be said without any hesitation, is not necessary, but merely accidental; that is, is not the constitution of nature, but in general the result of circumstances. As it is an accidental state of things, and not any thing essential and permanent in our mental structure, we must look for its appropriate cause in erroneous mental discipline.It may well be supposed, that those, who possess strong memories, are not insensible of their excellence in this respect; and the approbation, which they have received in consequence of it, encourages them to treasure up a dry collection of all facts, which will, in any way, bear repetition. Dates, genealogies, local incidents, traditional anecdotes, are all seized, and retained with peculiar avidity. But too much intent upon the mere dates and names of things, such persons fail to inquire into their true nature; they neglect other and more important forms of mental discipline; and thus justly sustain the reputation of possessing a showy, rather than discriminating and sound knowledge. In instances of this description, the relations, by which the suggested trains of thought are associated, are the more slight and obvious ones, such as of time, place, &c. But there are some exceptions to this unwise course; individuals may be found, who, with an astonishing ability to recal the most unimportant incidents of daily occurrence, as well as the dry details of historical facts, combine the far more enviable ability of discriminating the true differences of things, of combining means for the attainment of ends, and of rightly estimating evidence in its various ap