objects together, we are instantly, without the intervention of any other mental process, sensible of their relation in certain respects.

We may here give an illustration of the exercise of this original susceptibility similar to those already given. When a number of objects are together, belonging to the same species, as two or more sheep, or horses, or men, or trees, or flowers, the mind immediately exists in that state, which constitutes the feeling of resemblance.--Here beside the mere perception of the objects we experience a feeling of relation, since that resemblance in the objects before us of which we are conscious is one of the many kinds of relation, of the perception of which the mind has been asserted to be originally susceptible. It is by means of this original susceptibility of relations, as it exhibits itself in particular in the perception of the relation of resemblance, that all of that class which we term general abstract ideas are formed. None we imagine can be formed without it.

All this we know is to be decided, not by the opinions and assertions of an individual, but by the general experience. In any doctrines, which are laid down in regard to the mind, every person has a right to give his testimony; and whenever that testimony is a correct representation of the intellectual processes, it is valuable whatever may be its tendency. But it is confidently thought, that nothing more is wanted, than an appeal to what men generally find themselves conscious of, to confirm the above views. --For a particular defence of the doctrine, that we have an original susceptibility of perceiving or feeling the relations of objects, the reader is referred to what is said on the subject in Brown's Philosophy of the Mind, who has entered into the investigation of it at greater length, than can be permitted here.

§. 200. Of the classifications of objects.

In the classification of objects and in giving general names, the process after what has been said cannot be thought to be either long or difficult.--The first step is

the perception of two or more objects, which constitutes one state of mind. The second is the feeling of resemblance, which is the general idea. Guided by the feeling of resemblance, we are enabled to say, what objects come within the limits of a particular class, and what do not. The name, which is given to the general idea, is what in treatises of Logick is called the general name or genera and species. See in connection with this §. 117-119.

§. 201. Of general abstract ideas in connection with numbers, &c.

The ability which the mind possesses of forming general abstract ideas is of much practical importance; but whether it be the characteristical attribute of a rational nature or not, as some have supposed, it is not necessary now to inquire. Its subserviency in the forming of classifications has already been seen. And it is further to be remarked, that without that mental susceptibility, by which we form general notions, we should not be able to number, even in the smallest degree. Before we can consider objects as forming a multitude, or are able to number them, it seems necessary to be able to apply to them a common name. This we cannot do, until we have reduced them to a genus; and the formation of a genus implies a mental susceptibility of feeling the relation of resemblance. Consequently, we should be unable without such mental susceptibility to number.How great then is the practical importance of that intellectual property, by which general abstractions are formed!-Without the ability to number, we should be at a loss in all investigations where this ability is required; without the power to classify, all our speculations must be limited to particulars, and we should be capable of no general reasoning.

§. 202. Of the speculations of philosophers and others.

There is a characteristical difference between the speculations of philosophers and those of the common mass of

people, worthy of some notice. The difference between the two is not so much, that philosophers are accustomed to carry on processes of reasoning to a greater extent, as this; that they are more in the habit of employing general abstract ideas and general terms, and that, consequently, the conclusions which they form are more comprehensive. Nor are their general reasonings, although the conclusions at which they arrive seem in their particular applications to indicate wonderful fertility of invention, so difficult in the performance, as is apt to be supposed. They have so often and so long looked at general ideas and general propositions, have been so accustomed, as one may say, to contemplate the general nature of things, divested of all superfluous and all specifick circumstances, that they have formed a habit; and the operation is performed without difficulty. It requires in such persons no greater intellectual effort, than would be necessary in skilfully managing the details of ordinary business.

The speculations of the great bulk of mankind differ from those of philosophers in being, both in the subjects of them and in their results, particular. They discover an inability to enlarge their view to universal propositions, which embrace a great number of individuals. They may possess the power of mere argument, of comparing propositions together which concern particulars, and deducing inferences from them to a great degree; but when they attempt to contemplate general propositions, their minds are perplexed, and the conclusions which are drawn from them appear obscure, however clearly the previous process of reasoning may have been expressed.

§. 203. Of different opinions formerly prevailing.

The subject of general abstract ideas, of which we have given a summary view, excited very considerable interest during the scholastick ages; and different opinions have prevailed concerning them, not only at that period, but more or less down to the present time. The disputes so widely prevailed, and so much interest was taken, that

it seems to be necessary to give a short sketch of them. In this discussion there have been three parties, viz. the Realists, the Nominalists, and the Conceptualists.

§. 204. Of the opinions of the Realists.

Those, who go under this name, held, that general abstract ideas have a real and permanent existence, independent of the mind. Of a man, of a rose, of a circle, and of every species of things, they maintained, that there is one original form or archetype, which existed from eternity, before any individuals of the species were created. This original model or archetype is the pattern, according to which the individuals of all species are in the most important respects formed. The archetype, which is understood to embrace only the outlines or generick features of things, becomes an object of perception to the human inlect, whenever by due abstraction we discern it to be one in all the individuals of the species.--Such was the doctrine of the Realists, which in its most essential respects was very widely received from the time of Plato and Aristotle down to the commencement of the 12th century. But since that period, excepting a few ineffectual attempts which have been made from time to time to revive it, it has fallen into as general disrepute, on the ground of its being too hypothetical and not sufficiently sustained by facts.

§. 205. Of the opinions of the Nominalists.

About the commencement of the 12th century, Roscelinus, the instructer of Abelard, whose name occupies so conspicuous a place in the history of scholastick learning, proposed a new hypothesis. He maintained, not only that there are no original forms or archetypes, such as had been asserted to exist by the Realists, but that there are no universal abstract ideas of any kind. On the contrary, it seems to have been his opinion, as well as the sentiment of those who have subsequently approved of this doctrine, that nothing can be called general or universal but names, and that even to them universality can be ascribed only vix

tually, and not in the strict and literal sense of the term.That is, the names are in the first instance given to individuals, but when any individuals are specified, the nature of the mind is such, that we naturally and immediately think of other individuals of the same kind. So that the names are in fact particular, although owing to the principle which we now term association, the practical ef fect is the same as if it were otherwise, and hence the epithets "general" and "universal" are applied to them. This opinion in respect to general ideas and names, or some doctrine essentially of this description has found many advocates from Roscelinus and the enthusiastick Abelard down to Dugald Stewart.

§. 206. Of the opinions of the Conceptualists.

Those, who hold to the actual existence of general abstract ideas, which are not permanent archetypes independent of the mind, but only states of the mind, have generally been called Conceptualists. We have already given what we suppose to be the true mental process in the formation of such ideas. Whether we can have such ideas is best decided by each one's personal experience; and it can hardly be doubted, notwithstanding the refined arguments of Mr. Stewart and others, in what way such a question will be generally answered.

As far as the Realists are concerned the mere statement of their doctrine is sufficient at the present day to ensure its immediate rejection. The question lies then between the Nominalists, and those who have commonly been called Conceptualists; and if there be insuperable objections to the doctrine of the former, that of the latter enhances its claims on our adoption.

Some of the objections to the sentiments of Roscelinus and those who have thought with him are forcibly summed up in the following passage from Brown's Philosophy of the Mind.

"Of that rigid Nominalism, which involves truly no mixture of Conceptualism or of the belief of those feelings of