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CHAPTER SEVENTEENTH.

OF ABSTRACT IDEAS.

§. 194. Definition of abstract ideas and kinds of them.

There is a division of our thoughts, to which the name of abstractions or abstract ideas is given, because by certain acts of the mind they are abstracted or separated, and are made subjects of consideration apart from other ideas, with which they are ordinarily found to be associated.--They may be divided into two classes, viz. particular abstract ideas, and general abstract ideas. Of the first class the different kinds of colours may be mentioned as an instance. When any absent object of perception occurs to us, our thoughts will sometimes fix upon the colour and make that the subject of consideration, without particularly noticing other qualities of the object, such as weight, hardness, taste, form, &c. We may distinguish in any body its solidity from its extension, or we may direct our attention to its weight, or its length, or breadth, or thickness, and make any one of these a distinct object in our thoughts, even when it is impossible to separate them in the subject to which they belong. When any quality or attribute of an object, which does not exist by itself but always in a state of combination, is detached by our minds from its customary associates and is considered separately, it becomes a particular abstract idea.-By general abstract ideas we mean those states of mind, which stand for classes or the various genera and species of objects, such as are expressed by the general names, man, bird, sheep, fish, animal, &c. Thus we may consider those qualities in an object which will lead us to class it as an animal, without taking into view those which belong to it as a man or a bird; or in looking at the various classes of animals we may consider them as men or as birds, and neglect and pass by those qualities, which in consequence of being

found in other animals cause them to be classed as different species. These two classes seem to embrace all our abstract ideas whatever, but they are themselves so different from each other and also the intellectual processes by means of which they exist, that they require some separate consideration.

§. 195. Of the formation of particular abstract ideas.

The manner of expressing ourselves on the subject of our abstract notions, to which we have been accustomed, is apt to create and cherish in us a belief in the existence of a separate mental faculty, adapted solely to this particular purpose. We know not that there is any the least ground for such belief in the case of particular abstract ideas to which we shall first attend; nor has the opinion, to which we allude, been altogether well founded in respect to the other class; although, as will be seen, the intellectual process in the two cases is not precisely the same.—The following statement will be sufficient to show, how those of the first class are formed.-Our ideas in the first place are received from the senses, and from the observation of what takes place within us or reflection; and however much they may have been decomposed at first, a large class of them are soon found to exist with a considerable degree of permanency in a state of combination or are complex. It has sufficiently appeared, that these ideas are recalled to the mind in the absence of their appropriate objects by the principles of association, and also that the separate parts of all our complex notions are held together in their state of combination by the same principles. In every process of abstraction, which results in merely considering any single quality or attribute of an object separate from the rest, we have a desire to consider some part of the complex idea more particularly than the others. If any one object to the term desire, it is certain, that our attention is from some cause, whatever it may be, more particularly directed to such part; and attention itself seems to be nothing more than a particular direction

of the mind, accompanied with desire. When the mind is in this high degree directed to any particular part of a complex idea, we find it to be the fact, that the principle of association, which keeps the other parts in their state of union with it, ceases in a corresponding degree to operate; they rapidly fall off and disappear, and the particular quality or attribute, towards which the mind was especially directed, remains the sole subject of consideration. That is to say, it is abstracted or becomes an abstract idea.

This in the formation of particular abstract ideas seems to be the process of the mind, and nothing more; viz. Some feeling of desire or choice in respect to a part of the complex idea, accompanied with the exercise of association, (1) in suggesting to the mind the complex idea, and (2) in ceasing to retain the parts of it, towards which attention is not directed. Such is the activity of the mind, and in so many ways it views the "images of things," that this striking process of detaching, and examining, and replacing, and changing the parts of our complex notions, is almost constantly going on. And after the mind has thus shifted its position, and has been now in this state and now in that, as if playfully to show its wonderful readiness in diminishing itself to a part of its previous complexity, it seems as readily to swell back again, if we may be allowed in such figurative expressions, to its former dimensions, and exists the same as before the process of abstraction commenced.

§. 196. Of generalizations of particular abstract ideas,

When we speak of the generalizing of this class of abstract ideas, it seems to be chiefly meant, that in our experience of things we observe them to be common to many subjects. We find whiteness to be a quality of snow, of chalk, of milk, and of other bodies; and whenever with the simple abstract notion of whiteness we connect in our thoughts the additional circumstance of its not being limited to one body but the property of many, the term

may be said to be generalized. And this seems to be all, that can be properly understood by generalization when applied to the states of mind which we are now considering.

§. 197. Of particular abstractions in poetry, painting,&c.

The process of abstraction, which is gone through in the formation of particular abstract ideas, is greatly subservient to the exertions of a creative imagination, as they appear in painting, poetry, and the other fine arts.-The poet and the painter are supplied with their materials from experience without having received ideas from some source, they never could have practised their art. But if they do not restrict themselves to mere imitation, they must combine and modify the ideas which they have, so as to be able to form new creations of their own. But every exertion of this kind which they make of their powers, presupposes the exercise of abstraction in decomposing and separating actual conceptions and in forming them anew. See in connection with this section the chapter on IMAGIN

ATION.

§. 198. Of general abstract ideas.

We are now to remark upon the second class.General abstract ideas are our notions of the classes, or genera and species of objects.-As they include classes, it is hardly necessary to observe, that we cannot possess them. without first considering two or more objects together. We may form, on the contrary, those of the first class or particular abstract ideas by considering individual objects merely.

Whenever, therefore, we see a number of trees of the same kind, or a number of flowers, or of men, or of horses, or sheep, the mind immediately exists in that state, which, when we think fit to give it a name, we call a general abstract idea.

This general idea, however, does not embrace every particular, which makes a part of the individuals before us; it leaves out of consideration certain peculiarities which

belong to each tree, each flower, man, &c. when separately considered. And this is the reason of ideas of this kind being called abstract; because, although they embrace the whole number of individuals in certain respects, they detach and leave out altogether a variety of particulars in which they disagree.-As soon, therefore, as we perceive a number of objects before us of the same kind, we at once virtually dismiss from our view these circumtances of disagreement, and the mind exists, as above remarked, in a new state, which is essentially a feeling of resemblance. So that those mental states, which when put into words may be called feelings or immediate mental discoveries of the relation of resemblance in a number of objects, constitute what we understand by general abstract ideas, and these, as far as the mind is concerned and leaving out the names, are the true ideas of genera and species. But as a question may arise in the minds of some in regard to this feeling of resemblance, it is proper, in order to meet any such inquiries briefly to remark further.

f. 199. Of relative suggestions or perceptions of relations.

Nothing is more evident than that the objects, which we perceive, are in some way compared, one with another; and that we learn, when such comparisons take place, how they conform to each other or how they differ. We compare objects together in respect to their position, their resemblance, degrees, and in a great variety of respects, as was particularly scen at chapter eighth in the remarks there made on IDEAS OF RELATION. This is conformable to the general experience of men.-The result of thus considering objects together is certain new states of the mind, which may be called ideas of relation or feelings of relation, and which are essentially different from our simple perceptions or conceptions of the objects that sustain the relation. But the inquiry arises, By virtue of what principle is this discovery of relations made? The answer is, that there is in the mind an original tendency or susceptibility, by means of which, whenever we perceive different