assumes that the mind in all individuals is sound, and that the imperfections lie in the organs, which are subject to modification by means of propagation and exercise. According to this view, also, insanity is not a disease of the immaterial principle, but an affection of the organs, which may be cured by medicine. See Phrenological Journal, vol. ii., p. 149.

III. ON THE EFFECTS OF INJURIES OF THE BRAIN ON THE MANIFESTATIONS OF THE MIND.

(BY DR. A. COMBE.)

Or all the arguments advanced for the subversion of Phrenology, no one has been more frequently or more confidently urged, than that which rests on the alleged fact of the brain having, in various instances, been wounded or destroyed in whole or in part, without in any degree impeding the usual operations of mind. When narrowly examined, however, this objection proves at variance with the views of those who maintain it, and completely demonstrative of their ignorance of the principles of the science against which it is directed. "The system of Gall and Spurzheim," it is said, "however ingenious or amusing in theory it may be, is annihilated by the commonest reference to fact. Experience has shown us that a man may live in the full enjoyment of his intellectual faculties, although a part of his brain is destroyed by disease. Portions of the brain, various in situation and size, have been found to have been entirely disorganized, yet no single power of the mind was impaired, even to the very day of the patient's death. It would be difficult to find any one portion of the brain that has not, in some case or another, been deranged in its structure, without injury to the mind. Certainly, of the parts specified by Gall and Sputzheim, every one has, in its turn, been found wanting, without any deficiency in that intellectual faculty which they would represent it either to produce or sustain."* Such are the ipsissima verba of a learned and respectable, though prejudiced, opponent; and, although others might be quoted who go still farther than he does, I am ready to admit that, if the statements here recorded were as clearly substantiated as they were sweepingly made, neither the system of philosophy which we advocate, nor any other which acknowledges the necessity of the intervention of a material instrument for the manifestation of the mind, could possibly survive for a day.

At first sight the foregoing objection appears to be highly plausible and relevant; and, coming as it generally does, directly or indirectly, from the members of the medical profession, who, naturally enough, are supposed to be best qualified to judge, it is received by many with implicit confidence, and thus operates upon them with all the force of truth; and, in fact, to those who are alike ignorant of Anatomy and of Phrenology, and who, therefore, have no means of forming an accurate estimate of its force, it does present a very formidable aspect. As, however, to those who are acquainted with both these sciences, and who are consequently better qualified to judge correctly, the very facts upon which the objections are grounded seem, instead of invalidating the fundamental principles of the new philosophy, to be clearly and unequivocally demonstrative of their truth; it may be useful to state such an abstract of the evidence itself as shall enable even the unprofessional reader to determine how far it authorizes the inferences which have been deduced from it by our opponents. With this intention I shall first make some observations on the testimony offered of the alleged integrity of all the mental faculties in cases of extensive injury of the brain; and then examine anatomically how far the

* Rennel On Skepticism, p. 100.

extent, situation, and nature of the injuries sustained in the cases alluded to authorize us to infer the partial or total destruction of any individual phrenological organ; and, lastly, I shall offer a few remarks on the pos sibility of discovering the functions of the brain from noticing the effects of its injuries-a mode of proceeding lately recommended from high authority.

In proceeding to this inquiry, it must first be observed, that, without a single exception, all the cases alluded to are related by surgical authors for purely professional purposes, without the remotest idea of their being afterward founded on, to prove that entire preservation of the mental faculties may coexist with extensive disorganization of the organ of mind; consequently, in all of them, as will be seen by a reference to Dr. Ferriar's paper, in the 4th volume of the Manchester Memoirs, and to the 48th number of the Edinburgh Review, the state of the mind is mentioned merely incidentally, and in very vague and general terms, as it was, in reality, scarcely attended to. For instance, it is stated in one case that "the senses were retained to the last;" in another, that "there was no loss of sensibility;" in a third, that there was "no alienation of mind;" and, in a fourth, that "the patient remained quite well." The want of precision, indeed, and the utter inadequacy of the statements to establish the important conclusions deduced from them, are so palpably conspicuous, that even the reviewer already alluded to, hostile as he is to the doctrines of Phrenology, expresses a "wish to see cases more minute in all their details, and observed with a view specially to this physiological inquiry, substituted for those we at present possess,"* before he ventures to pronounce an irrevocable decree; and if he hesitates, it would surely be too much to expect us to pronounce, upon testimony rejected by him, a verdict against ourselves.

But, even supposing that these cases had been observed with a view specially to this physiological inquiry; still this testimony, to be of the slightest value in establishing the point contended for, necessarily supposes two conditions or requisites in those by whom they are narrated, which were manifestly not possessed, viz., 1st, A perfect knowledge of the num ber and nature of the primitive faculties of the human mind; and, 2dly, A previous knowledge of their relative degrees of endowment and energy, during health, in the individual cases under consideration.

Now, as to the first of these, it is well known that scarcely any two metaphysicians who make the philosophy of mind their particular study, are agreed either upon the number or nature of the primitive mental powers. Much less, then, can we expect the surgeon, engaged in the hurry of general practice, to be better informed. "Certain crude ideas," says the Edinburgh Reviewer, in his notice of Sir E. Hume's paper on the Functions of the Brain, "are attached to the words Intellectual Faculties; a vague conjecture arises as to the seat and nature of these faculties."+ How, then, I would ask, can any one certify, even after the most scrupu lous attention, that all the powers of the mind are retained, when he is ignorant what these powers are? when he is ignorant, for instance, whether the propensities of Destructiveness, Acquisitiveness, or Secre tiveness exist, and whether the sentiments of Veneration, Hope, or Conscientiousness are primitive emotions. The state of these, and other feelings and propensities, proved by Phrenology to be primitive, is never once alluded to in the history of injuries of the brain; and, consequently, for anything we are told to the contrary, they, along with their respective organs, might have been entirely wanting in every one of the cases which are advanced as instances of the entire possession of the faculties. The opponents never speak of any except intellectual faculties; and in expecting * Edinburgh Review, No. 48, p. 448.

† Ib., p. 439.

lesion of these powers, when, for instance, it is only the cerebellum or posterior lobes of the brain that are diseased, they display at once their own ignorance of the nature and number of the primitive faculties, and their most profound ignorance of the doctrines which they impugn. If any injury occurs in that portion of the brain lying under the most prominent part of the parietal borre, which the phrenologist states to be the organ of Cautiousness, and if we be in doubt as to the accuracy of the function assigned to it, and wish to have our observations confirmed or refuted by the phenomena attending such a case, one would naturally suppose that, as the organs are all double, we would begin by observing whether the corresponding portion of brain on the opposite side partook in the disorganization or not; and that we would then proceed to investigate the state of that particular faculty, of which these parts constitute the organs, and thus ascertain whether the feeling of Cautiousness ever remained undiminished, where, from the extent of the disease, it ought, according to the natural laws of the animal economy, to have been either impaired or entirely awanting.

This mode of proceeding, plain and simple as it appears, is not that pursued by the opponents of Phrenology. The opponent does not care, and does not inquire, whether it is one side only, or both sides, which are diseased he makes no inquiry about the presence or absence of the manifestations of the sentiment of Cautiousness; he proceeds at once to the state of the intellectual powers, with which, as Phrenology most distinctly teaches, that part of the brain has no direct connexion; and finding none of the faculties which he calls Attention, Perception, Memory, or Imagination, at all impaired, he, with great confidence, concludes that the part in question cannot be the organ of Cautiousness; and so satisfied is he with his own reasoning, that he thinks himself entitled to ridicule those who do not see its cogency as clearly as he does himself. On any other subject this mode of reasoning would be looked upon as proceeding from a very blameable and lamentable degree of ignorance; but such was once the state of the public mind, that, when directed against Phrenology, it was hailed almost universally as highly philosophical and satisfactory. Even supposing, however, that the number of primitive faculties was known, still no dependence can be placed upon cases not observed with a view specially to this physiological inquiry;" for daily experience proves that, whenever a patient is able to return a rational answer to any simple question about his health, the surgeon and attendants, whose attention is not directed to the point, invariably speak of him as in full possession of all his faculties, although he is as unable to think or reason on any serious subject with his accustomed energy and facility, as a gouty or rheumatic patient is to walk with his accustomed vigour. In one sense, no doubt, the former may be said to be in possession of all his faculties, just as the latter, merely because he can drag himself across a room, may be said to possess the power of mascular motion; but then the power of exercising the faculties may be, and is, as much diminished in the one case, as that of using the muscles in the other. Even take a convalescent from any acute disease, in which there has been no particular affection of the brain, and introduce a subject which requires a train of thinking and concentration of mind to which, in health, he is fully equal-so far from retaining his powers undiminished, he will soon be reminded of his enfeebled state, by painful confusion in the head and other disagreeable symptoms. But confine his attention to anything which requires no effort on his part, and you benefit rather than harm him by such exercise, for it is then suited to the diminished vigour of his mind. Now, this is precisely the kind of discourse which the judicious surgeon permits to his patient, and from it alone he forms his own opinion of the state of the

mind; and, therefore, a person in such a state is uniformly said "to retain his faculties," &c. In like manner, the convalescent, gouty, or rheumatic patient, if gently exercised by strolling about his room, reaps benefit and strength; but suppose you force him to an effort beyond what his muscular energy is calculated to support, the same bad effect is produced as in the case of the mind; and as well might this person be said to retain his power of voluntary motion undiminished, as the other all his force of intellect unimpaired.

That the evidence as to the state of the mind, after wounds or alteration of the cerebral mass, is really so vague and unsatisfactory, may easily be shown from Dr. Ferriar's paper, and from the Edinburgh Review, the text books of the opponents. Besides the objection of extreme latitude in such expressions, as "no loss of sensibility," "no loss of voluntary motion," &c., &c., when used to indicate the condition of all the mental faculties, it may be remarked, that Dr. Ferriar speaks of one man as retaining all his faculties entire, who, it appears, had laboured under hypochondriasis for ten years; a disease the very existence of which implies a morbid activity of some of the mental feelings, and which, consequently, ranks in the list of insanities; and of a girl who, with evident symptoms of oppressed brain, is also said to have retained her faculties: and that the reviewer speaks of a lady who, "the day before her death, was capable of being roused from her stupor, and was then in possession of all her But the idiot from birth, when roused from his natural stupor by the exaltation of a fever, appears sometimes to gain a considerable share of intellectual power, only to be lost upon recovery. Will he, too, then, be said to be in full possession of every faculty, because thus shown to be susceptible of excitation from stimuli? The inference in the one case is certainly as logical as it is in the other.

senses."

But, even allowing also that, from a previous acquaintance with the number and functions of all the mental powers, we were qualified to judge of their presence or absence, it seems still to be a self-evident proposition, that, before we can affirm that a man possesses them all unimpaired under disease, we must have had some previous knowledge of the relative degrees of endowment and energy in which he possessed them when in health. The differences of intellectual vigour, of temper, and of moral dispositions, between man and man, are exceedingly great. The scale extends from the lowest pitch of idiocy up to the highest endowment of genius; and the history of diseases informs us that a man, whose faculties have suffered a great diminution of energy, may still be able to return a rational answer to a question, although his mind is unable to fathom the depths it penetrated before. If, then, our first acquaintance with a patient suffering from an injury of the brain is formed by the side of his sick-bed after the accident has occurred, what means do we possess of knowing how far his mental powers in general, or any one in particular, have been injured or impaired? Even under the most favourable circumstances the difficulty is by no means easily surmountable; and, when we consider that injuries of the head are by far more frequent in hospital than in private practice, and that, in the former, the surgeon has seldom seen the patient before, it will be obvious, that, even supposing the testimony as to the actual state of the faculties to be as specific and precise as it is general and vague, still, in a great majority of instances, the surgeon is unfavourably situated for speaking of the comparative force of any of them, seeing that this does not form the direct or usual object of his inquiries, and that, although it did, he must necessarily be ignorant of the degree in which they were manifested before the injury was sustained. Having now shown that the observers quoted by the opponent were evidently neither acquainted with the number and functions of the mental

faculties, nor in possession of any means of judging of the actual existence or comparative diminution of any individual faculty, in cases of disease or wounds of the cerebral mass, I proceed to point out an anatomical requisite, which, although as essential as the other two, seems not to have been possessed in any perceptible degree by any of those to whom the cases occurred, or by whom they are quoted. I allude to knowledge of of the situation, form, and direction of fibre of the several organs of which the phrenologists state the brain to be a congeries. Without this knowledge, any observations must manifestly be imperfect: how, for instance, is a man to ascertain that the organ of Cautiousness has been wounded or destroyed, if he knows neither its local situation nor the direction in which its constituent fibres run? And yet this is precisely the state of the mind of those upon whose authority the objection we are now refuting is so strenuously urged: nine-tenths of the cases occurred long before the organs were discovered, and the remaining tenth were, I believe, observed in ignorance of the discovery, so that all come under one class. If any one, indeed, could prove that he has found both the organs of Cautiousness destroyed, while the corresponding feeling was manifested as powerfully as before, then he would prove the operation of that sentiment to have been erroneously ascribed to that particular part of the brain. But, unless he knows accurately the situation of that organ toward the surface, and the direction of its fibres toward the interior, whether they are horizontal, vertical, or oblique, and unless he ascertains the condition of the organs of both sides, How can he venture to affirm that they were destroyed either in whole or in part? We are told, it is true, by Mr. Rennel, and other opponents, that every individual part specified by Gall and Spurzheim has in its turn been destroyed, without injury to the faculty of which they call it the organ; but if we examine the foundations upon which such assertions rest, the same want of precision, the same inconclusive vagueness, will be found to prevail, as in the evidence of the state of the mind. Not a single case in point can be produced; and it is evident that Mr. Rennel, as well as the other opponents, supposes the organs to be confined to the surface of the brain, instead of extending to its very base, to the medulla oblongata. They also, by what rules of logic I know not, appear to think injury of one organ sufficient to destroy the function of both, although they may see the reverse exemplified in individuals who hear or see well with one ear or one eye after that of the opposite side has been destroyed.

The brain has been considered by many physiologists, and particularly by those of them who are hostile to Phrenology, to be a single organ, every part of which concurs in executing a single function, viz., that of manifesting the mind; but so far from supporting their own conclusions, the cases referred to, if true, are directly subversive of them, and leave no choice, except between the phrenological doctrine of a plurality of cerebral organs, and the notion that the brain, the most delicate, the best protected, and apparently the most important organ of the body, is, after all, a mere useless encumbrance, or at most a mere mass fitted into a case, and placed at the top of the neck, more for the sake of ornament, or of preserving equilibrium, than for any more rational purpose: a conclusion which, however logically deducible from their own premises, they would, I am satisfied, be fully more averse to admit than the truth of Phrenology itself. The phrenological doctrine is, indeed, the only one by which these facts, so far as they are true, are at all explicable; for the moment we can prove, not only that the brain consists of two halves or hemispheres, but that each half is a congeries of parts performing distinct functions, all difficulty disappears, and the phenomena become consistent with the ordinary laws of nature.

We then see how one side or one part may be