Imagens da página
PDF
ePub

freak of fancy, or other folly, could produce it without a predominant Destructiveness. This great defect of taste, therefore, may be ascribed to an excessive manifestation of this faculty, unrelieved by Benevolence or other higher feelings. Moore also, in his earlier verses, was guilty of sins against taste, from excessive manifestations of the amative propensity; but this error he has corrected in his later productions.

Faults in taste, however, arise, not only from unbecoming manifestations of the lower propensities, but also from an inordinate expression of the sentiments and intellectual faculties. In Peter Bell and Christabell, and in the productions of the Lake school of poetry in general, much bad taste springs from mawkish and infantine manifestations of Benevolence, Philoprogenitiveness, and Adhesiveness. Even Ideality itself may be abused. It is undoubtedly the fountain of beauty, but, in excess, it degenerates into bombast, rant, and exaggeration; or that species of composition which a contemporary critic has appropriately designated by the epithet of "drunken sublimity." Wordsworth affords examples of errors in taste arising from an abuse of Causality; he introduces abstruse and unintelligible metaphysical disquisitions into his poetry, and mystifies it, instead of rendering it profound. Homer also sometimes offends a correct taste by overloading his descriptions with similes, under the influence of Comparison.

In like manner, the expression of any sentiment or propensity in an undue degree in conversation or conduct, is essentially characteristic of bad taste. An excess of vanity, and the tendency to engross conversation, is one form of it which occurs in society, and arises from over-active Love of Approbation and Self-Esteem. The tendency to wrangle, dispute, and contradict is another fault, springing from excessive activity of Combativeness. The disposition to fatter, and utter a profusion of agreeable things to persons whom we do not esteem, but wish to please, is also characterized by bad taste, and arises from an improper manifestation of Secretiveness and Love of Approbation.

The question naturally occurs, What is the distinction between bad taste and bad morality? I would answer, that bad morality always implies bad taste, for it springs from an improper manifestation of some lower feeling, to the outrage of the sentiments of Justice, Benevolence, and Veneration. Bad taste, however, may occur without turpitude, and this arises from an undue activity of any of the faculties, without offence against any moral sentiment. The effeminacies of Peter Bell, for example, stand low enough in the scale of taste; but as the greatest tenderness for asses does not necessarily imply any breach of justice, kindness, or respect to other beings, the taste only is bad, and not the morality. In like manner, when an individual, under the influence of an excessive SelfEsteem and Love of Approbation, constitutes himself the bore of a party -as his offence does not amount to a serious attack upon such rights as we recognise by the sentiments of Conscientiousness, Veneration, and Benevolence, we set him down as ill-bred, but not as immoral.

Chesterfield, and some dictators in manners, deliberately recommend slight offences against candour, not only as not liable to the imputation of bad taste, but as essential to good taste. Thus, Chesterfield admits a great deal of deceitful compliance into his characteristics of a gentleman; but, with great deference to his lordship's authority, I cannot subscribe to the doctrine, that bad morality and good taste are in any degree com patible in the same action. An individual may act very improperly in many parts of his conduct, and show considerable refinement in other instances; and this is easily understood: for the higher sentiments may coexist with strong animal propensities, and one occasion may call forth the former, and another excite only the latter, so that the conduct may

thus assume different aspects at different times. But the question is, Whether the same action can be characterized both as immoral and as distinguished by good taste? In my opinion it cannot. It is good taste to restrain the expression of our opinions or views in society, when an opposite conduct would cause only dissensions and broils; but this is good morality also. Chesterfield, however, goes farther, and allows, as perfectly compatible with good manners, an expression of sentiments which we do not entertain, if they be pleasing to those to whom we address them; and this is a breach of candour. Such a practice is an insult to the person who is the object of it; and, if he saw the real motives, he would feel it to be so. Nothing which, when examined in all its lights, and seen in its true colours, is essentially rude and unprincipled, can possibly be correct in point of taste; it has only the appearance, and not the true elements, of politeness. Purity in the motive is requisite equally to good taste and to sound morality; for the motive determines the essential quality of the action.

The sources of good taste may now be adverted to. The nervous and sanguine temperaments, by giving fineness to the substance and vivacity to the action of the brain, are highly conductive to refinement. All authors and artists, whose works are characterized by great delicacy and beauty, have fine temperaments, along with Ideality. The most exquisite mental manifestations are those which proceed from a favourable combination of the whole faculties, in which each contributes a share of its own good qualities, and is restrained by the others from running inte excess or abuses. If a favourable developement of this kind be possessed the higher Ideality rises-without running into excess-and the finer the temperament, the more perfect will be the taste.. At the same time, and for the same reason, there may be much good taste, of a simple kind, with moderate Ideality, if the other faculties be favourably balanced.

As Taste arises from fine quality of brain and a favourable combination of organs, the explanation is simple, how it may be possessed without genius. Genius springs from great vigour and activity, depending on large size, and a high temperament: these are greater endowments than equability, and an individual may be deficient in them, and yet be so favourably constituted, with respect to the balance of his powers, as to feel acutely the excellencies or, the faults of genius manifested by others. Hence many persons are really excellent critics, who could not themselves produce original works of value; hence also, many original authors, of great reputation, display very questionable taste.

In applying these principles to actual cases, I find them borne out by numerous facts. Dr. Chalmers occasionally sins against taste, and in his head Ideality and Comparison are out of due proportion to Causality and some other organs. In Lord Jeffrey's bust, on the contrary, there is a very beautiful and regular developement of Eventuality, Comparison, and Causality, with a fair balance between the propensities and sentiments; his temperament is nervous-bilious; and his taste is generally admirable. As good taste is the result of the harmonious action of the faculties, we are able to perceive why taste is susceptible of great improvement by cultivation. An author will frequently reason as profoundly, or soar as loftily, in his first essay, as after practice in writing for twenty years; but he rarely manifests the same tact at the outset of his career as he attains by subsequent study and the admonitions of a discriminative criticism. Reasoning depends on Causality and Comparison, and lofty flights of imagination on Ideality; and if the organs of these faculties be large, they will execute their functions intuitively, and carry the author forward, from the first, on a bold and powerful wing: but as taste depends on the balancing and adjusting, the suppressing and elevating, the ordering and arranging of our thoughts and emotions, so as to produce a general har

mony of the whole-it is only practice, reflection, and comparison with higher standards that will enable us successfully to approximate to excellence; and even these aids will suffice only when the organs are by nature equally combined; for if the balance preponderate greatly in any particular direction, no effort will produce exquisite adjustment.

Much has been written about a standard of taste; and, in considering this question, a distinction should be made. If, by fixing a standard, we mean determining particular objects, or qualities of objects, which all men shall regard as beautiful, the attempt must necessarily be vain. A person weli endowed with Form, Size, and Ideality, may experience the most delightful emotions of beauty from contemplating a Grecian temple, in which another individual, in whom these organs are very deficient, may perceive nothing but stone and mortar. One individual may discover, in an arrangement of colours, beauty which is quite imperceptible to a person deficient in the organ of Colouring. Or one may be delighted with music, in which another, through imperfection in the organ of Tune, may perceive no melody. Thus no object, and no qualities of objects, can be fixed upon, which all mankind, whatever be their original constitution, will unanimously acknowledge to be beautiful; and in this view no standard of taste exists.

But degrees of beauty may be estimated, in which sense a scale at least, if not a standard, of taste may be framed. The more favourable the original constitution of an individual is, and the greater the cultivation bestowed on his powers, the higher authority he becomes in questions of taste. The existence of a sentiment of Justice has been denied, because individuals are found in whom it is so weak that they seem scarcely to experience the influence of it in their conduct; but Phrenology, by pointing out their defect, shows that these persons form exceptions to a general rule, and no one thinks of appealing to them as authorities to determine whether any particular action be just or unjust. In like manner, men deficient in the faculties which give the perception of beauty, are not authorities in taste; but that individual is the highest judge in whom the most favourable developement of the organs of propensity, sentiment, and intellect is combined with a fine temperament and large Ideality; and who, besides, has cultivated his faculties with the greatest assiduity. His determinations in regard to degrees of beauty in objects will form the best standards of taste which our imperfect nature is capable of attaining.

EFFECTS OF SIZE IN THE ORGANS ON THE

MANIFESTATIONS OF THE FACULTIES.

HAVING now unfolded the primitive faculties of the mind, (so far as discovered,) with their organs and modes of action, I proceed to treat of their effects when acting in combination. In order to understand this subject, it is necessary, in the first place, to attend particularly to the effects of size in the organs on the manifestations of the faculties.

The reader is referred to the distinction between power and activity in the mind, as stated on page 98 of the present work. Cæteris paribus, size in the organs is the measure of power in the faculties.

As great size in the organs is an indispensable requisite to the manifestation of mental vigour, no instance ought to occur of an individual who, with a small brain, has manifested, clearly and unequivocally, great force of character, animal, moral, and intellectual, such as belonged to Bruce, Bonaparte, Cromwell, or Fox; and such, accordingly, phrenologists affirm to be the fact. The Phrenological Society possesses casts of the skulls of Bruce, La Fontaine, Rammohun Roy, and other men distin

tinguished by great power of mind, and they are all large. The busts and portraits of Lord Bacon, Shakspeare, and Bonaparte indicate large heads; and among living characters no individual has occurred to my observation who leaves a vivid impression of his own greatness upon the public mind, and who yet presents to their eyes only a small brain.

The European head is distinguished from the Asiatic and native American, not more by difference of form than of size; the European is much the larger, and the superior energy of this variety of mankind is known. The heads of men are larger than those of women, and the latter obey; or, to bring the point to the clearest demonstration, we need only to compare the head of a child with that of a full-grown man, or of an idiot with that of Rammohun Roy, as represented on page 46. If, then, size is so clearly a concomitant of power in extreme cases, we are not to presume that it ceases to exert an influence where the differences are so minute that the eye is scarcely able to detect them. The rule, Extremis probatis, media præsumuntur, is completely applicable here.

The doctrine, that power is a characteristic of mind, distinguishable at once from mere intellectual acumen and also from activity, is one of great practical importance; and it explains a variety of phenomena of which we previously possessed no theory. In society we meet with persons whose whole manner is little, whom we intuitively feel to be unfit for any great enterprise or arduous duty, and who are, nevertheless, distinguished for amiable feelings and good sense. This springs from a small brain favourably proportioned in its parts. Other individuals, again, with far less polish, inferior information, and fewer amiable qualities, impress us with a sentiment of their power, force, energy, or greatness; we feel that they have weight, and that, if acting against us, they would prove formidable opponents. This arises from great size. Bonaparte, who had an admirable tact in judging of human nature, distinguishes between mere cleverness and force of character, and almost always prefers the latter. In his Memoirs he speaks of some of his generals as possessing talents, intellect, and book-learning, but as still being nobody-as wanting that weight and comprehensiveness which fit a man for great enterprises: while he adverts to others as possessing limited intellect and little judgment, but prodigious force of character; and considers them as admirably adapted by this qualification to lead soldiers through peril and difficulty, provided they be directed by minds superior to their own. Murat was such a man; and Bonaparte appears, on the whole, to have liked such officers; for they did not trouble him with thinking for themselves, while they possessed energy adequate to the execution of his most gigantic designs. The leader of a popular party, who has risen to that rank by election, or assumed it with acquiescence, will be found to have a large brain. The leaders of an army or a fleet also require a similar endowment, for otherwise they would possess artificial authority without natural weight, and would never inspire confidence in their followers. Bonaparte had a large head; and officers and soldiers, citizens and statesmen, bowed before his mental greatness, however much they might detest the use he made of his power. In him all the organs, animal, moral, and intellectual, (Conscientiousness, and perhaps Firmness, excepted,) seem to have been large; great activity was added; and hence arose commanding energy, combined with profound and comprehensive intellectual capacity.

The society possesses casts of the heads of Captains Franklin and Parry; and both are decidedly large, with an excellent proportion in the different orders of organs. These commanders displayed great force of character in their respective expeditions in quest of a north-west passage. No tendency to mutiny or insubordination occurred even in the most trying circumstances; and this would be the case, because the men

under their command would instinctively feel natural superiority coinciding with artificial rank.

The men who are able to attend to their private duties, and at the same time carry a load of public business on their minds, without feeling encumbered, owe this quality to great size in the brain, with an active temperament and large knowing organs. Those who, having small brains, find their whole powers absorbed and exhausted by their particular Occupations, wonder at such men, and cannot comprehend either their motives or the means by which they accomplish so much. It is power which distinguishes them; so that duties which to others would prove oppressive, press lightly on them, or afford them only amusement. Mr. Joseph Hume, M. P., is a striking illustration of this doctrine. He possesses moderate organs of Causality, little Wit, less Ideality, and no great endowment of Language; yet even his opponents allow him to

DR. SPURZHEIM.

manifest great force of character, with a power of application and perseverance which, to ordinary minds, is incomprehensible. If we look at the large brain indicated in his cast, and attend to the combination of organs which it displays, we shall perceive the source of his weight. Dr. Spurzheim also showed great force of character, and his brain was large. This quality in him was the source of the intense and long enduring interest which he created and supported in the minds of those who came in contact with him. He was calm, mild, and unobtrusive, yet there was a degree of depth and power about him, which made lasting impressions on those who listened to his public discourses, or conversed with him in private

[graphic]

In examining the heads of criminals in jail, I have found the most daring, desperate, and energetic to possess large brains. When great size and an unfavourable combination occur together, the officers of justice are reduced to despair in attempting to correct the offender. They feel a strength of character which they cannot subdue, and an evil bent which they cannot direct;-the result generally is a report from the police that the individual is incorrigible; his first capital offence is prosecuted to extremity, and he is hanged for the sake of protecting society from farther mischief. In professional pursuits also, the men who are indisputably paramount to their fellows, not merely in cleverness, but in depth and force of character, have large heads; and this holds, not only in the learned professions, but in mercantile avocations. I have observed that individuals who, born in indigence, have arisen to wealth by conducting great and extensive establishments, have uniformly brains above an average size; and that mercantile travellers who succeed in procuring orders, and pushing a trade amid a keen and arduous competition, are distinguished by the same quality. Such men make an impression, and act with a confidence of power which gives effect to all they say or do. In a school, if the children care nothing for the master, and treat him with disrespect, and if he fail, after using every severity, to maintain discipline and subordination, he will be found to have a small brain. In

« AnteriorContinuar »