his sceptre, abandoning his companions in arms, is desirous to attribute his misfortune to secondary causes. It is at least in this spirit that the work of general Gourgaud is written, and all the accounts published, have partaken more or less of it. They have endeavoured to cast the entire blame upon Napoleon's two lieutenants, and this, by arguments the more unsatisfactory both in matter and manner, as they are unsupported by any official documents, and deduced from plans of the campaign made after the events had occured.

'The first thing which strikes us, is, that few of the writers have remarked the enormous disproportion between the French army and that of the allies; the one containing scarce 110,000 men, while Blucher and Wellington commanded 222,000 strong. Ought not such a numerical superiority to have great weight in settling the accounts of this campaign?

'Count Grouchy, after four years of exile, and silent resignation, has just published his observations upon the work of general Gourgaud, the only one which he admits has any authenticity. He at the same time refutes the assertions of the other writers. Attacked and criticised under disadvantageous circumstances, the severity with which he sometimes replies is excusable; more especially as he sustains himself by facts and official documents.

"We will attempt a brief analysis of this work. Count Grouchy attributes the loss of the battle of Waterloo, to the inaction of the French army on the 17th, the day following the battle of Fleurus. It was not till half past twelve that Napoleon gave orders to pursue the Prussian army, which had been in retreat since ten o'clock the preceding evening. The battle of Fleurus, won by the French army, was not decisive in its character, and on the morning following (the 17th,) the Prussians were reinforced by 30,000, fresh troops (the corps of general Bulow.) The verbal instructions given to count Grouchy by Napoleon himself, were to follow the Prussians, to attack them, and not to lose sight of them: when he parted from Napoleon, he supposed that the Prussian army was in the direction of Namur; he was soon apprised that it had retired towards Gembloux; he marched for this town, where his rear guard did not arrive until ten at night. It was not until the 18th, following, at ten in the morning, that the right of his corps, only 32,000 strong, and pursuing the Prussian army of 95,000, who had eighteen hours march advance, came up with their rear guard: this was successively attacked and repulsed, until it reached Wavres. On the evening of the 17th, during the night, and in the morning of the 18th, Count Grouchy had sent many officers to Napoleon with reports of his situation and movements, all of which reached the quarter-master general. On the 18th, about noon, the cannonade of Waterloo was heard by the right wing; count Grouchy was astonished not to receive new instructions; but he had positive orders to attack the Prussians, and supposed that he ought

I

to continue his operations, without being drawn aside by a cannonade four leagues to his left, which could be no other, from the direction in which it appeared, but the effect of a partial engagement at the entrance of the forest of Soignes. Beside, could he so soon forgot what he had himself witnessed the preceding evening, the reproaches which Napoleon had cast upon marshal Ney, for having halted and sent troops to Soignes, upon hearing the noise of the cannonade of Fleurus, instead of marching upon QuatreBras, as his instructions directed; and his example as well as a sense of duty decided him, to execute strictly the orders he had received.

'It is certain that on the 18th, about seven o'clock in the evening, count Grouchy received a despatch from the commander in chief, dated from the field of battle at half past one. This despatch approved of all the movements of the right wing; it announced also, that a battle had been gained on the line of Waterloo, and it was only in a postscript, that it directed count Grouchy to manœuvre upon Saint Lambert, or to show himself at the head of Bulow's column. Count Grouchy made all his dispositions in comformity with this important order; but it had arrived much too late for him to execute in a way to have any influence upon the battle of Waterloo, he being four leagues in a direct line from Mont SaintJean. The enemy was master of the direct communication by the left bank of the Pyle, the passage of which was defended with spirit. It was not until night that our troops effected it; and even supposing there had been no resistance, they could not have arrived at Waterloo until eleven at night, long before which hour the fate of the battle had been decided.

'Not content with proving that he had executed his orders literally, count Grouchy goes on to show, that general Gourgaud has been led into an error when he states that on the evening of the 17th, and in the morning of the 18th, orders were sent to him to march upon Saint Lambert. He conceives it impossible, that on the 17th, Napoleon, who was ignorant of the movements both of the Prussians, and of the English, could foresee that he should give them battle at Waterloo.

A note of Col. Grouchy, who has charge of the publication of his father's work, exposes the error of general Gourgaud, still more clearly, by evidence. The register of the orders of the commander in chief, from which he extracts the only orders given his father on the 17th, and in the battle of the 18th, is an unanswerable document. He could find there but one letter, and this is the very letter which was not received; it is dated from the field of battle at ten in the morning, and commands him preremptorily to march upon Wavres, and not upon Saint Lambert, as general Gourgaud and other writers have asserted.

'We are entirely of opinion with count Grouchy, when he declares that he cannot believe, that a general ought directly to move

towards a cannonade which he hears upon his flank, when he has special instructions to execute from the commander in chief. The passive and literal obedience of orders appears to us, to be the first duty of a soldier, and the most certain pledge of victory. Exceptions cited after a battle has been decided, prove nothing against the principal rule, especially when on the other hand a hundred instances could be cited in its support, to one in opposition.

'All military men will read this pamphlet with deep interest. It supplies all those details which hitherto have been wanting, relative to the campaign of 1815:* it will serve as a preface to the memoirs of count Grouchy, which would throw no small light upon the events of his time, heretofore but little understood.

'We unite in the wishes of his family, from whom he has been four years separated, and sincerely hope that he may soon be restored to the bosom of his kindred, and crown with repose a life, in which, the folly of ambition and the tumult of war never produced a single blot, and to finish which with glory, it cannot for a moment be doubted, no exposure to danger or suffering will be avoided.'

6

From L'independant.'

Many contradictory accounts have detailed the events of the campaign of 1815, and have distributed censure or praises to the actors in that memorable drama, according to the different opinions of their authors. Public opinion was still unsettled, when there appeared in 1818, a relation announced as having been written in St. Helena, and published by general Gourgaud. It was impossible not to see that the source from which this author drew his information, retained some bitterness, and that all the efforts of the narrator were designed to throw the responsibility of a tremendous catastrophe upon others than the chief director of all the operations of that campaign. But many assertions contained in this tardy and seemingly official publication received new importance from divers preceding dissertations published by practical men, and with which they coincided.

"Nevertheless, those who considered impartiality a duty, regretted to see reproaches cast upon two generals, so much distinguished in the French army, whose first exploits and whose wounds were

*It has been suggested to us, that this pamphlet contains some inaccuracies, which it would be proper to mention. For instance count Grouchy gives the credit to general Vandamme, for the handsome defence of Namur, which held out so long against the enemy, and secured the retreat of the French army. This handsome feat belongs entirely to general Teste, who was it is true under the orders of general Vandamme, but who remained with his division alone at Namur, not exceeding 2000 strong without cannon, and which after having caused the third Prussian corps a loss of 3000 men, did not retire until six at night, when the post was evacuated, after the enemy had lost all hopes of impeding the retreat of our men.

united with our first success, whose blood, shed on numberless fields of battle, secured their devotedness, and whose talents were attested by great military exploits, by the esteem of the brave, and by the confidence of the chief of the army. Circumstances rendered this regret still more painful, for the blow was aimed at men not in a situation to defend themselves.

"The one sinking under the weight of his own glory, a sacrifice offered up by conquerors, little accustomed to victory, and forgetful of that elevated respect with which it is so delightful to render honour to misfortune, had seen the remnant of his life submitted to the chances of a law suit, and unaccustomed forms attend his death. His heroic shade could no longer make a reply; silent and indignant it reposes under the laurels gathered at Altenkirchen, Salsback, Dierdorff, Manheim, Helvetia, the Nidda, Mein, Moerkirch, Hohenlinden, Elchingen, Ulm, the Tyrol, Jena, Eylau, Friedland, in the Peninsula, at Smolensko, at Moscow, the Berezina, Lutzen, and in the campaign, in France, of 1814.

'If so many glorious recollections could not gain forgiveness for his conduct on the 16th June, at least no Frenchman should have had the cruelty to judge this officer with culpable precipitancy, and to refuse to his memory every latitude necessary for his defence. History, severe but impartial, proceeds less hastily than passion, and hazards not her judgments, as policy at once timid and venturous, hazards her proscriptions and state executions.

'The other general thrown by evil times at a distance from a country to which he has constantly done honour by his courage and virtues; covered with numerous wounds, which his generous heart had hoped to use in favour of the proscribed, dragged also before the tribunals, and defended like another Manlius by filial piety, could not until very lately, learn in the other hemisphere, the strictures uttered against his operations of the 17th and 18th June 1815. He hastens to reply to them, and whatever may be our opinion as to the manner in which the right wing fulfilled its orders, after the victory of Ligny-Fleurus, to pursue the Prussians and not to lose sight of them, and to preserve a communication with the centre of the army, we cannot refuse to read with the greatest interest, the new details, which the count de Grouchy furnishes on this subject. A bosom furrowed with so many wounds, received during five and twenty years of fighting, gives to this officer the right to justify himself, and imposes on the friends of their country the duty of hearing him,' &c. &c.

From the Censeur Europeen."

'General Gourgaud's work has produced a great sensation, because the place in which it was written gave it an appearance of authenticity, that no one thought of doubting. We see nevertheless with pain, that the author has attributed the disasters of the 18th of June to two generals, who seemed protected in public

opinion as much by their misfortunes as by their services. It argues ignorance of the French character, to endeavour to disgrace marshal Ney, and general Grouchy, when one was dead, and the other exiled. A relation of marshal Ney, thought it incumbent to answer the attack directed against this unfortunate commander; it was useless, public opinion has sufficiently avenged him. Every one knew that at Waterloo, as well as elsewhere, he displayed all the resources of his undoubted courage, and this conviction, has not rendered the tears less bitter, that were shed on the tomb of this noble victim. General Grouchy has received the same justice from his countrymen. No one thought him responsible for the fatality that attended our arms. They saw with sorrow his exile from a country he had honoured, and the voices which demand his return, have more than once, in another hemisphere, afforded a solace to his heart.

'Nevertheless his feelings have been wounded by the thought, that his fellow citizens, on the faith of some slight assertions, could attribute to him the greatest disaster that ever happened to France. He has endeavoured to controvert the facts, that have imputed it to him; and his son, a worthy defender, has published the observations. This his justification so interesting in itself, becomes still more so, since it is presented to the public under the double recommendation, of exile, and filial piety.

'The observations of general Grouchy have been read with avidity, not that we looked for his justification, for no one accused him, but there was a melancholy pleasure in reviewing this terrible drama, and in following the divers chances with more interest and anxiety than if the result was not already known. That Napoleon committed a great fault in dividing his army, and in sending to a distance a corps so considerable as that of general Grouchy, cannot be disputed; and we will easily concede that this first fault was the cause of others. We must give credit to general Grouchy, who in guarding his reputation, and in the necessity of answering unjust attacks, has not been carried beyond the bounds of moderation, in regard to a misfortune, still greater than his own.

'General Grouchy's work contains much precious matter for history, and it may even at the present day afford ample subject for reflection to military men. What is most important to a great number of readers, is that in the irremediable catastrophe which forms its subject, the honour of the French army remained unsullied, and, Heaven be praised! this consoling fact appears in every page! As to general Grouchy, his claims are known, his life speaks for him, the interest that his misfortune excites, the regrets that accompany him in his exile, are the most honourable testimony

that a citizen can receive.

'The day is not afar off, when justice will triumph, when general Grouchy will be restored to the embraces of his family, and to the sight of his countrymen,' &c.