this state or who continue to preach the gospel in this state. This is the construction that has uniformly been placed upon this statute by this department. Very respectfully, See also opinions to Rev. H. C. Foote, June 25 and 30, 1908. LIQUOR LAWS. Qualifications of sureties on liquor bonds, and obligation of saloon-keeper to know that sureties are properly qualified. July 24, 1907. Mr. John H. Fleming, St. Ignace, Michigan: Dear Sir-I am in receipt of yours of July twenty-second, in which you state to me "A few days before the bill creating the new township went into effect, one Ben Hudson, desiring to run a saloon in the new township when formed, secured his bondsmen, who executed a bond May 11, 1907, but the bond was not presented to the township board of the township of Hendricks for approval, but it was held until the new township came into existence, which was on May 14, 1907, when the bond was presented without change and approved very promptly by that board. The bondsmen, at the time of signing the bond, were residents of the township of Hendricks, and the bond so recites, although they are, by the division aforesaid, now residents of the new township.” My opinion is that these men, so far as concerns this question, are legal sureties. They reside in the township in which the bond is to operate and in which it is proposed to carry on the business. This satisfies the statute. You further state "At the time of signing the bond they were both of them school officers in the township of Hendricks." This would clearly disqualify them from acting as sureties upon the bond. That part of the statute which is an inhibition against this is as follows-"Neither of whom shall hold any elective or appointive office in any county, city, village or township of this state, except notaries public." Again, you state "At the time of signing the bond neither of them had any real estate in his own name in the county." If this should prove to be correct, this would disqualify them, also, from being sureties upon the bond. The provision of the statute is very clear, that they should be freeholders, and if they are the owners of no real estate in the county they are not freeholders of the county nor of the township in which they live. As to the bad faith of the board that approved the bond, it is not necessary to consider that question. The foregoing defects the saloonkeeper himself is bound to know are made right and comply with the law at his peril, and the action of the approving board does not relieve him of this obligation. If these defects exist, you should launch a prosecution against him at once. This would be justified under Wolcott v. Judge of Superior Court, 112 Mich. 311. The material part of that decision, bearing upon this question, is as follows "He (speaking of the saloon-keeper) must know that his sureties are males and that they are resident freeholders of the township, village or city in which the business is to be carried on; that they hold none of the offices prohibited by the act," etc. If this was a case of oversight and the bond was good otherwise, I think the prosecuting officer of the county should bear with a good deal in these matters; but if, as you say, it is the rule to give "straw" bonds, I think it is your duty to wade into the proposition and teach them a lesson. Trusting that this will make the way clear for you, I am, JNO. E. BIRD, APPROPRIATION ACT. Binder twine and cordage plant for the state prison at Jackson: House enrolled act 393, which was signed by the governor did not contain the word "thousand" after the words "one hundred seventy-five" as in the original bill passed by the Legisla ture. Held that money should not be paid out until error corrected or law declared valid by supreme court. July 25, 1907. Hon. James B. Bradley, Auditor General, Capitol, Lansing, Michigan : Dear Sir:-I have carefully considered your oral inquiry submitted through Mr. Hamilton in which you ask for my opinion as to the validity of House Enrolled Act No. 393, being: "An act to provide for the installation, maintenance, equipment and operation of a twine and cordage plant to be operated by prison labor at the State Prison at Jackson, Michigan, to provide for the sale and disposition of the manufactured product; to define the duties of the warden and board of control of said prison in relation thereto; to make an appropriation for the fiscal year ending June thirty, nineteen hundred eight, to carry into effect the object and purposes of this bill and to provide a tax to meet the same." The bill was introduced in the House March 13 and referred to the Committee on State Prison, (House Journal p. 564) which committee on March 27 reported the bill out with the recommendation that it pass which report was accepted and the bill referred to the Committee on Ways and Means. House Journal pp. 731, 732. April 11 the Committee on Ways and Means reported the bill out with certain amendments which report was accepted, the amendments adopted and the bill referred to the Committee of the Whole and made a special order for April 18. House Journal pp. 878, 879. On April 18 the bill was considered as a special order and was passed by the House. House Journal pp. 956, 957, 958. On April 19 the bill was transmitted to the Senate where it was read a first and second time by its title and referred to the Committee on State Prison at Jackson. Senate Journal pp. 887, 888. May 2 the Committee on State Prison at Jackson reported the bill out with the recommendation that it be referred to the Committee on Finance and Appropriations which report was accepted and adopted. Senate Journal p. 1021. June 12 the Committee on Finance and Appropriations reported the bill out with the recommendation that it pass which report was accepted and adopted and the bill referred to the Committee of the Whole and placed on the General Order. Senate Journal pp. 1657, 1658. June 13 the Committee of the Whole was discharged from further consideration of the bill and it was passed by the Senate. Senate Journal p. 1660. June 14 the bill was returned to the House by the Senate and referred to the clerk for printing and presentation to the Governor. House Journal p. 1856. The foregoing is a synopsis of the legislative history of the act in question. The bill which passed the House and Senate and which is now on file in the office of the Secretary of State has been compared with House Enrolled Act No. 393. The original bill and House Enrolled Act No. 393 are identical except that in the original bill the word 'thousand' appears after the words 'one hundred seventy-five' in the proviso in section one. An examination of the said act will disclose that the word 'thousand' does not appear after the words 'one hundred seventy-five' in the proviso of said section one. It is therefore believed that the only question presented at this time is whether the bill as passed by the House and Senate has been approved by the Governor. Section 14 of Article 4 of the constitution provides in part: "That every bill and concurrent resolution, except of adjournment, passed by the Legislature, shall be presented to the Governor before it becomes a law." It is perhaps an elementary statement of the law to say that it is an absolute requirement that the bill which has passed the two Houses is the one which must be presented to the Governor; i. e. the Enrolled Act must represent the action of the two Houses, and if any other than the bill which has passed the two Houses is presented to the Governor, his approval of same would not constitute that which is signed a law. In accordance with the above constitutional language it is the bill and concurrent resolution passed by the Legislature that is required to be presented to the Governor. It seems to be the rule that: "The bill approved must be that passed. A change made after the passage and before the approval invalidates the act in those states where the enrollment is not conclusive." 26 Am. & Eng. Eney. of Law, 2nd E. p. 548. The enrollment of a statute is not conclusive in this state. Atty. Gen. v. Joy, 55 Mich. 94. A number of cases are cited as supporting the above quotation. Thus where material amendments are made to a bill and omitted from the enrolled copy as signed by the Governor the latter cannot have the force of law. Moody v. the State, 48 Ala. 115. An enrolled bill and signed by the Governor which authorizes the imposition of a tax upon certain credits without any deduction, while the bill which passed the two Houses of the Legislature authorizes a deduction, is not a valid enactment. Moog v. Randolph, 77 Ala. 597. Where a proviso which was rejected by both Houses was included in the enrolled copy as signed by the Governor it does not become a law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721. Where certain proposed amendments which were not adopted by both Houses are included in an enrolled bill as presented to and signed by the Governor, the bill so signed does not become a law. Roche v. Phelps, 80 Mich., 598, State v. Wendler, 94 Wis., 369. It will be observed that in all of these cases there was either an addition or an omission of essential matter and of such material substance as to clearly affect the measure. The rule which relates to the addition or omission of unessential words seems to be as follows: "The omission in the enrolled bill of words not essential to its substance or effect will not render the act invalid. A material variance between the subject expressed in the title of the bill passed as shown by the legislative journal and that approved is fatal; otherwise the variance is immaterial." 26 Am. & Eng. Ency. of Law, 2nd E. p. 549. The case which clearly illustrates this point is Walnut v. Wade, 103 U. S., 683. In this case a bill was introduced and passed in the House entitled: "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Illinois Grand Trunk Railway.'" The message from the House to the Senate informed the latter body that the House had passed the bill entitled: "An act to amend an act entitled 'An act to incorporate the Grand Trunk Railway.'" It will be observed that the word 'Illinois' was omitted. The bill was referred to a standing committee which committee when it reported the measure out inserted in the title the word 'Illinois. The next day the Senate passed the bill with the same title except that the word 'Illinois' was again omitted therefrom. The bill was then returned by the Senate to the House and was finally enrolled with the title: "An act to amend an act to incorporate the Illinois Grand Trunk Railway," which was approved and signed by the Governor. It was contended that the act in question was unconstitutional for the reason that it had not been properly passed. It was held that the omission of the word Illinois' was a mere clerical error which could deceive or mislead no one and that this did not furnish a sufficient ground for holding the act invalid. In People v. Supervisor, 16 Mich., 253, the law there considered, authorized the levying and collection of a certain bounty tax.' In engrossing the bill after its passage by the two Houses a clerical error was made and the word 'county' was inserted for 'bounty' and the bill was submitted to and signed by the Governor with this mistake in the entitling. In commenting upon this error Judge Cooley said: "I am not prepared to say that an act of the legislature can be valid which, as engrossed for the signature of the governor, would be void if passed by the legislature in that form. A law must have the concurrence of the three branches of the legislative department; and if it differs in an essential particular, when presented to the governor for his signature, from the bill passed by the two houses, there is difficulty in saying that it has been concurred in by all: Prescott v. Trustees Illinois & Michigan Canal, 19 Ill., 324. And, under our constitution, the title is not only important, but it is absolutely made to control, so that I do not see how any important change in the title can be said to be immaterial." 16 Mich., 256, 257. However the error was held not fatal to the act by Judges Campbell and Christiancy who sat in the case. In Stow v. Grand Rapids, 79 Mich., 595, it appears that the clerk affixed an immediate effect clause to a bill after its passage by the Legislature, although the bill had not been ordered to take immediate effect by the Legislature. The bill presented to the Governor and signed by him contained this clause. It was held that this clause was no part of the bill itself and that the unauthorized addition of same by the clerk would not operate to destroy the validity of the enactment. The title of the act considered in that case reads as follows: "An act to amend section 4 of Act No. 282 of the Local Acts of 1877 entitled" etc. The bill passed the Legislature and was presented to the Governor in that form. The figures 1877 should have been 1887 and when the bill was returned by the Governor the title had been corrected by some one outside of the Legislature. The court held that the change of the figures was simply the correction of a clerical error which did not invalidate the act. Again in People v. Dettenthaler, 118 Mich., 595, it was held that where an enacting clause, which was not a part of the act as passed by the Legislature, was supplied by the clerk before the bill was presented for the Governor's signature that the signing of same by the Governor would not constitute the bill a valid law. In Warner v. Foote, 41 Minn., 492, it was claimed that four words were contained in the bill which passed the Legislature but were omitted from the enrolled bill which was signed by the Governor. The court held the statute valid on the ground that the omission was immaterial and that it changed neither the substance nor the legal effect of the statute. |