SCHEDULE "K." Summary Statement of all amounts collected and paid to the State through the efforts of the attorney general, also including the sum received as fees for approving articles of association, etc., of insurance companies, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1908. Escheated estates (Sch. E) Inheritance taxes, including interest (Sch. F). Insane, support of (Sch. G).. Assumpsit case (Sch. H)... City Savings Bank, (claim of the State v.) amount received $883 21 4,197 62 16,154 31 5,254 74 255,745 34 104 88 95.00 $282,435 10 SCHEDULE “L.” OFFICIAL OPINIONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL. CONCURRENT RESOLUTION. Senate resolution No. 81 was not adopted in accordance with the state constitution. A resolution requiring the secretary of state to take the necessary steps to submit to the electors of the state a question to be voted upon at a special election called for another purpose is legislation which might be accomplished by bill or joint resolution and therefore requires a majority vote (Const. art. iv, sec. 19) notwithstanding it is denominated a "concurrent" resolution. The lieutenant governor cannot cast the de ciding vote, as he belongs to the "executive" department of the government and cannot exercise powers which belong to the legislative department. July 5, 1907. *Hon. George A. Prescott, Secretary of State, Lansing, Michigan: Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your communication of the 29th ultimo, calling my attention to Senate Resolution No. 81, and submitting the following questions in relation thereto : "First. Was said resolution adopted in accordance with the requirements of the state constitution? "Second. If it shall be your opinion that said resolution has not been adopted in accordance with the requirements of the state constitution, should the secretary of state give the notices and take all such proceedings as are required of him by said resolution, or should he treat said resolution as having failed of adoption by the necessary vote of the Senate, as such vote appear in the Senate Journal?” In reply thereto would say that the resolution in question is designated as a concurrent resolution and entitled as follows: "Concurrent resolution submitting to a vote of the people the question of nomination of United States senator, governor and lieutenant governor, by direct vote of the electors." The Senate Journal of June 19, 1907, pages 1914 et seq., shows that when this resolution came before the Senate to the voted upon, in the regular course of business, sixteen senators voted yea and sixteen senators voted nay; whereupon the lieutenant governor, as president of the Senate, voted yea and declared the resolution adopted. Thereafter, the resolution was transmitted to and adopted by the House of Representatives, and approved by the governor June 28, 1907. In considering the constitutionality of this resolution, the right of the lieutenant governor, as president of the Senate, to cast the deciding vote, the Senate being equally divided, is necessarily involved, and, if such right exists, it must be expressly conferred by constitutional authority. (Cushing on the Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, Sec. *See case of Kelley v. Secretary of State (Schedule "B'), sustaining this opinion, and opinion to Hon. Jesse R. Cropsey, Oct. 17, 1907. 308.) The rule laid down in this section, with respect to a presiding officer of a legislative body, is as follows: "When the presiding officer is not a member of the assembly over which he presides, but holds that office by constitutional provision in virtue of some other to which he is elected or appointed, he has and can have no other authority as such than that conferred upon him by the power from which he derives his appointment, and consequently, can only give the casting vote where authority to do so is alone conferred." Section 14 of article V, of the constitution of this state, reads as follows: "The lieutenant governor shall, by virtue of his office, be president of the Senate. In committee of the whole he may debate all questions; and when there is an equal division, he shall give the casting vote." It is important to determine whether, under this section of the constitution, the right of the lieutenant governor to cast the deciding vote in the Senate as its presiding officer is limited to the action of that body in committee of the whole; or whether it extends to the action of that body, generally, when there is an equal division. It is my opinion that if the people of the state, in adopting this provision of the constitution, had intended to confer upon the lieutenant governor, as president of the Senate, the right to give the casting vote when the Senate was equally divided, generally, such intent would have been expressed in the first sentence of said section substantially as follows: The lieutenant governor shall, by virtue of his office, be president of the Senate; and when there is an equal division he shall give the casting vote. It will be noticed that in said section as incorporated in the constitution the authority of the lieutenant governor to give the casting vote where there is an equal division is made a part of that clause which limits his action in this respect to the committee of the whole. It is also a general rule, laid down by the courts for the construction of constitutional provisions, that in case of ambiguity the whole constitution is to be examined, in order to determine the meaning of any part; and the construction is to be such as to give effect to the entire instrument and not to raise any conflict between its parts which can be avoided. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 17; Black's Constitutional Law, page 69.) I therefore call attention to certain other provisions of the constitu tion of this state. Article III, with respect to the divisions of powers of government, reads as follows: "Section 1. The powers of government are divided into three depart ments; the legislative, executive and judicial. "Section 2. No person belonging to one department shall exercise the powers properly belonging to another, except in cases expressly provided in this constitution." Article IV, with respect to the legislative department, provides, in part, as follows: "Section 1. The legislative power is vested in a Senate and House of Representatives. "Section 2. The Senate shall consist of thirty-two members." Article V, with respect to the executive department, in part, reads as follows: "Section 1. The executive power is vested in a governor, who shall hold his office for two years. The lieutenant governor shall be chosen for the same term." Said Article V further designates who shall be eligible to the office of governor or lieutenant governor, and prescribes the manner of election of such officers. It is therefore apparent that the lieutenant governor belongs to the executive department of government, and, as provided in said Article III, cannot exercise the powers properly belonging to another department of the government, except in the cases cxpressly provided in the constitution. Considering the several constitutional provisions to which I have. referred, in connection with Section 14 of Article V, I find no express provision which in any manner tends to extend the power or authority of the lieutenant governor, as president of the Senate, to give the casting vote where there is an equal division in the Senate, beyond that found in Section 14. It is therefore clear that such power and authority cannot be extended by implication, and in my opinion is limited to the action of the Senate when in committee of the whole. While this resolution on its face purports to be a concurrent resolution, it is in effect a joint resolution as defined by the supreme court in the case of Olds v. State Land Commissioner, 134 Mich. 446, 447, and as such requires for its adoption the affirmative vote of a majority of all the members elected to each house. (Sec. 19, Art. IV, Constitution of Michigan.) In this connection I would say that in my opinion legislation which is to have the force of law, whether designated as a bill, concurrent resolution or joint resolution, cannot be legally enacted without the affirmative vote of a majority of the members elected to each house. The resolution under consideration did not receive the affirmative vote of a majority of the members elected to the state Senate. While there are other objections to this resolution from the standpoint of its constitutionality, I do not deem it essential to discuss them in this opinion, in view of my conclusion outlined above. I would therefore say, in answer to your first question, that this resolution was not adopted in accordance with the requirements of the State Constitution, and is unconstitutional and void. In answer to your second question, would say that, by reason of the fact that said resolution is unconstitutional and void, it has no legal force or effect and does not impose upon you any duty to give the notices referred to or to take any action whatever in the premises. Respectfully yours, JNO. E. BIRD, TAX LAW-Cancellation of the sale of certain lands in Tuscola Co., for taxes of 1858, 1859 and prior years. The lands in question were assessed for the years mentioned and were subsequently returned delinquent and sold, the assessments and sales being under the general tax law of 1853 or under said law as amended by Act 32, Sess. laws, 1858. It also appears that the lands in question were owned by the U. S. at the time of the assessments and sales mentioned, and were therefore not subject to taxation under state laws. For the purpose of clearing the records application was made to Auditor General for cancellation of such sales, under the act of 1853 and he was advised to charge back to the county such delinquent taxes, with interest. July 6, 1907. Hon. James B. Bradley, Auditor General. Lansing, Michigan: Dear Sir:-I am in receipt of your letter of the twenty-seventh ultimo, relative to the cancellation by you of the sale of certain lands in Tuscola County for taxes assessed for the years 1858, 1859 and certain prior years. It appears that the lands in question were assessed for the years mentioned and were subsequently returned delinquent and sold, the assessments and sales being under the general tax law of 1853 or under said law as amended in 1858 by Act No. 32 of the Session Laws of that year. It also appears that the lands in question were owned by the United States at the time of the assessments and sales mentioned, and were, therefore, not subject to taxation under the laws of this State. (See Section 5, Act No. 86, Session Laws of 1853). Subsequent to the return and sale of said lands for taxes, as above indicated, certain individuals acquired title thereto from the United States, and, for the purpose of clearing up the records which show an assessment for certain years, their return and sale for taxes, application was made to the Auditor General for the cancellation of such sales. Under the general tax law of 1853, as I have indicated, the lands in question were not subject to taxation, by reason of the fact that they belonged to the United States, and there was no change in the law by the amendments in 1858 in this particular. It is clearly apparent that, under the law of 1853, the Auditor General was authorized to cancel the sale when this state of facts was established and refund the amount of purchase, and such refund would be properly charged against the county from which the lands were returned delinquent for taxes. (See Sections 99 to 104, inclusive, Act No. 86 of the Laws of 1853). Under Section 101 of said Act the Auditor General was authorized to cancel a sale for general invalidities, within two years after the date of purchase, where land was sold for taxes. There was no limit of time with respect to the cancellation of such sales where it was made to appear to the Auditor General that the land was not subject to taxation at the date of assessment, or that the taxes had been paid. The Legislature, however, in 1858, sought to amend certain of these provisions of the tax law of 1853, particularly Section 101, and made pro |