When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers; and shall have the sole power of impeachment. prohibition or duty. The basis of representation was finally settled, it would seem, rather because the Southern members manifested a steady determination to bring their slaves into it, than because they offered, or attempted to offer, any convincing arguments in favor of the plan. The Northern members were exceedingly anxious that the Convention should agree, and for that purpose were disposed to make large concessions. The Southern members, too, urged that the apportionment of direct taxes by the same rule, and the giving of the power to regulate commerce to a bare majority in Congress, were concessions on their part especially favorable to the North. The proportion of three fifths induced no great discussion. The substance of the clause was borrowed from a resolve of the continental Congress, passed April 18, 1783, recommending that the Articles of Confederation should be so amended that the National Treasury should be supplied by contributions from the several States in proportion to the whole number of free inhabitants, including those bound to service for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons, except Indians not paying taxes. The provision for filling vacancies is of obvious expediency. A Representative so chosen would serve only for the unexpired term of the one whose seat had become vacant. Impeachment is a prosecution for maladministration, or corrupt conduct in office. There is an evident propriety that the prosecuting party should never constitute the tribunal that is to judge and give sentence. Such a prosecution be Why was the basis finally settled as it was? What concessions did the Southern members suppose they were making in favor of the North? Where did they obtain the substance of the clause, and the proportion, three fifths? How are vacancies to be filled when they happen in the House of Representatives? What do you understand by a writ of election? a member so chosen serve? What is meant by the Speaker of the House? How long would What is impeachment? What is the power of impeachment? ing in behalf of the people, their Representatives are properly intrusted with it; while, as a guard to public men against wanton or causeless prosecution, also against unfair and interested adjudication, the power to try all such cases, as appears in the next Section, was given, not to the House, but to the Senate. The number of which a legislative body ought to consist, is a matter on which nations and confederations have differed exceedingly. We see from the apportionment of members of the first Congress, and from subsequent practice, what views prevailed on that subject in the Convention, and have since prevailed in the nation. We see also throughout a strenuous aim at a fairly proportional representation. Indeed Among ancient nations, we may notice the Athenian Senate, which consisted of 500 Senators. These were chosen annually by lot from the different tribes. But the assemblies of the people were also legislative bodies, and as such, were remarkable for their numbers. An assembly of the people could not legally consist of less than 6,000 citizens. these assemblies were more properly legislative than the Senate was. There were comparatively few matters on which the Senate could act definitely and finally. Their business was rather to debate the matters to be brought before the people. All proposals intended to come before the people must first come before the Senate, and nothing could be submitted to the people which the Senate judged to be unconstitutional, or for any reason improper. In this view the Senate of Athens bore some resemblance to the first branch of modern legislatures, with the right of originating all acts; while the assemblies of the people occupied the place of the second. The relative duties of the Senate and popular assemblies of Sparta were much the same as of those of Athens; and the governments of these two States, which were much the most important States of Greece, give a general idea of those of the smaller States. The Spartan Senate, What makes it proper that the House should have this power? Why should they not also try impeachments? How have nations practised in regard to the numbers of their legislative bodies? How numerous was the Athenian Senate? And the assemblies of the people? Were these assemblies legislative bodies? What was the main business of the Senate? What power had the Senate with regard to matters to be brought before the people? What resemblance in the Athenian Senate? What is said of the Senate and Assemblies of Sparta? What general idea do we get from the governments of Athens and Sparta? however, consisted of only twenty-eight members, and the numbers of their popular assemblies seem not to have been prescribed by law. The Senate was what the word signifies, a body of old men. The required age was sixty years, and they were chosen for life. We may also notice the Amphictyonic Council, which was the body that presided over the affairs of confederated Greece. The greatest number of States so confederated was twelve, and the number of deputies was two from each State. The Roman Senate consisted at first of 100 old men. Afterward, and for some centuries, its number was 300. In the time of Julius Cæsar its number reached 900. They were chosen at first by the kings, and afterward by the Consuls and Censors. Their power was very great, but, as in the case of the Grecian Senates, there was much to be acted on in the assemblies of the people. Besides, there were many officers of state chosen by the people, though they did not choose their Senators. In modern history, the German Diet is an example of a small legislative body. It consists of but seventeen members. An apportionment is aimed at, by giving the large States one member each, and uniting two or more small States, or free cities, in their representation, by a single member. But when we turn to France, we find the Chamber of Deputies, the popular branch of the French legislature, consisting of 459 members. These are chosen by as many electoral colleges, in the formation of which a fair representation was aimed at. The British Parliament, however, affords the most remarkable modern example of a numerous legislative assembly. And this body, numerous as it is, seems to be on the increase, owing to the power of the king to form new corporations with the right to be represented in Parliament. In Dr. Paley's time, who wrote upwards of sixty years ago, the House of Commons consisted of 548 How many members were in the Spartan Senate? What was the required age? For how long were they chosen? What was the Amphictyonic Council? What was the greatest number of confederated Grecian States? How many deputies from a State? What were the different numbers of the Roman Senate? How were they chosen at different times? Had popular assemblies any part to act? How many are the menbers of the German Diet? How is an apportionment aimed at? What is the number of the French Chamber of Deputies? Is the British Parliament a numerous body? Is its number stationary? What power of the king affects its number? How many members in the House of Commons sixty years ago? SEC. 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. members. But within these twenty years it has been stated at 658. The irregularity of popular representation is also remarkable. Property enters largely into the qualifications of electors, so that the proprietors of great estates enjoy a representation in Parliament which no others can. And even this rule does not apply equally in all cases; but, in a manner the most arbitrary, one county or town has a vastly greater representation than another, without any regard to extent, wealth, or population. Dr. Paley states as fact, that 200 representatives are chosen by no more than 7,000 constituents; and even that the present structure of the British Constitution admits the possibility that a single voter may appoint two representatives. And farther, that there are portions of the kingdom not represented at all. These flagrant incongruities are the result, doubtless, of a long series of causes, which have been in operation ever since the government was established; such as Acts of Parliament, Corporations, and the royal prerogative. We will only add here that the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and the university of Dublin, are represented in Parliament. SEC. 3. Mr. Randolph, in his plan, gave no intimation whether the States should, or should not, be equally represented in the Senate. The plans of Messrs. Pinckney and Hamilton both provided expressly for different numbers of Senators from different States. Mr. Hamilton's plan also was that Senators should be chosen to serve during good behavior. The other plans would have limited their term of service, making it so long, however, as in a good measure to secure their independence. Again, Mr. Randolph proposed that the Senators should be chosen by the House of Representatives, out of a suitable number nominated by the State Legislatures; Mr. Pinckney's plan was the same, except that he How many within twenty years? Is the representation fairly apportioned? Who enjoy the greatest representation? Is this rule uniform? What does Dr. Paley state? What are the causes of these irregularities? Repeat the first clause of Sec. 3. What were the several plans proposed? proposed no nomination; while Mr. Hamilton would have had them chosen, as the President is, by electors chosen for that purpose by the people. Mr. Pinckney also proposed the division of the Senate into three classes, whose terms of service should expire in rotation. Motions were also made to have the Senate chosen directly by the people; and, finally, that the Senators should be appointed by the President, out of a suitable number to be nominated by the State Legislatures. And The numbers of which the Senate should consist, and the mode of their appointment, occasioned much and very able debate. The general opinion was that the Senate should be a much smaller body than the House; and that its efficiency, as a check to the rashness and precipitancy to which the House would be liable, depended much on its being a smaller body. It seemed necessary also to draw it from a different source; at least that the appointing power should be different. If, like the House, it should be appointed by the people, it would be like the House in its frailties, partialities, prejudices, and temptations; and so fail of being a balancing power. To allow the President to appoint it, would be a stride towards monarchy which few were prepared for. to give the choice of the Senate to the House would, like its being chosen by the people, make it too much like the House to be a check upon it; and all these methods would diminish State sovereignty and importance too much. Many members had received instructions to maintain the equality of the States; and having been obliged to concede a proportional representation in the House, they were the more determined to maintain State dignity in the Senate. On the whole, it appeared that a representation of the States, as independent sovereignties, rather than of the people of the States, in the Senate, was what must be sought for; and this could best be obtained by devolving the choice of the Senators on the State What other motions were made? Have you any opinion respecting the best manner in which the Senate might have been constructed? What need was there of having a Senate at all? What general opinion prevailed? What seemed necessary ? What objection to the Senate's being chosen by the people? By the President? And by the House? What objection common to all these methods? What instructions had many members received? What had they been obliged to concede? What were they the more determined on? What did it seem, on the whole, must be sought for? How did it appear that this could best be attained? |