court proceedings. In so far as American interests are concerned, the German Government will communicate the result to the American Government. Thus also in the Persia case if the circumstances should call for it.

"4. If commanders of German submarines should not have obeyed the orders given to them, they will be punished; furthermore, the German Government will make reparation for damage caused by death of or injuries to American citizens."' 3

These pledges were of course tantamount to further admissions that the submarine campaign was illegal; but Count Bernstorff's promise in settlement of the Arabic incident was, in the immunity given "liners," not limited to locality and read in connection with the assertions of the German note of May 4th, replying to our ultimatum in the Sussex case, cast doubt on the bona fides of all the pledges. In this communication—which will be treated more in detail later-Germany said that no assurances had been given the United States concerning the warfare against enemy trade in enemy ves

8 At the time these pledges were made, Secretary Lansing published the note of November 29, 1915 concerning the Frye case and defining the measure of safety to be accorded those on vessels that were to be sunk. See above, p. 106.

sels-yet the note of September 1st in promising that "liners" would not be sunk without warning surely was calculated to convey a contrary impression to the American people. But before this open avowal of May 4th, the locality mentioned in this pledge of January 7th was sufficient to cause many doubts to be cast upon the sincerity of the German undertakings.

Nevertheless, the "conversations" between Secretary Lansing and Count Bernstorff over the Lusitania continued, and there were prolonged negotiations during which, it was reported, diplomatic relations were several times on the point of being broken off because Germany refused to admit that her act was unjustifiable. The exact terms of the settlement have not been made public, but their general nature has been the subject of apparently inspired newspaper reports. Germany, in view of the fact that, contrary to her own interpretation of international law, the United States did not consider reprisals legal, admitted that the attack on the Lusitania was unjustifiable so far as it involved the lives of neutrals, agreed to pay an indemnity for the American lives lost "as an

act of liability," and promised that the outrage would not be repeated.*

But on February 8th, while the negotiations neared a conclusion, Germany announced a new policy toward armed merchantmen which wiped out her repeated pledges, vitiated the Lusitania agreement, and reopened the whole submarine controversy. For the attitude of the United States was that in sinking the Lusitania Germany had committed a hostile act which would have to be disavowed with offers of reparation in order that diplomatic relations might continue between the two powers, and pending any attitude on Germany's part other than an intention to abide by her pledges, the settlement would not be proceeded with.

Before considering the question of armed merchantmen, which in some respects raises more difficult points of international law than any other phase of the controversy, it may be well to enumerate briefly once more just what concessions the United States had thus far se

4

The last point of difference was as to whether Germany would assume" or "admit" liability and the latter word was assented to by Berlin on February 15th.

cured. Austria-Hungary had in general agreed to abide by existing international rules-although contrary to the demands of the first Lusitania note submarines could be used against merchant ships if the safety of those on board was assured-and this pledge was joined in by Germany so far as the Mediterranean operations were concerned. In the socalled war zone around the British Isles the pledges were limited only to "liners" that did not attempt to escape, and while the right of American vessels to traverse this war zone was apparently admitted, Germany did not consider "unfortunate accidents" in sinking them illegal but simply as imposing liability on her under

"One other incident caused further exchanges between the United States and Austria-Hungary. On April 11, 1916, the Russian bark Imperator was destroyed by an Austrian submarine in the Mediterranean and an American citizen was wounded. It was explained that after the vessel had been warned by a shot across her bows, no disposition was shown on the part of the crew to abandon her. A second shot was fired through the rigging. The crew then embarked in boats, and of two sailors who had been wounded, neither was an American citizen. According to the ship's papers there was only one American citizen on board, and if, "to the regret of the Austro-Hungarian authorities,'' he was wounded, the explanation was that "the bark failed to comply with the submarine's challenge to stop when ordered.”’

the old Prussian treaties. Finally, the measure of safety to be accorded was but poorly defined. Nevertheless, while relinquishing the international spirit of the first Lusitania note that submarines were not adapted for cruiser warfare on commerce, the United States had conceded none of its neutral rights. But all these questions were again opened, with the position of the United States more assailable, by the announcement that after March 1st all armed private ships would be sunk without warning.