olution under consideration embraced two objects. The first part of it was intended to render the mode of electing the members of this House uniform throughout the United States; the other part was intended to produce a uniformity in the mode of choosing Electors of the President and Vice President of the United States. He was in favor of both parts of the resolution. He would, he said, however, premise that he had no objection to the modification of the resolution in the manner proposed by his colleague, (Mr. ROOT,) who had just resumed his seat. With respect to the first part of the resolution, Mr. H. said, the States, immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, by their practice under it might be said to have expressed an opinion favorable to the proposed amendment. Most, if not all the States, immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, had been divided into districts, for the purpose of electing members in the House of Representatives of the United States, in the manner contemplated by the proposed amendment. The same system would probably have been continued to the present time, had it not been for the struggle between the two great parties which had for several years past divided this nation. Mr. H. said that he could not perceive that any serious inconvenience could arise from engrafting this part of the resolution into the Constitution, while at least one important advantage would result from it. DECEMBER, 1816. The voice of the people, constitutionally pronounced at the poll of an election, is the only sovereign and independent exercise of authority acknowedged in this nation. And, sir, the further you remove an officer from a direct dependence for political existence on the voice of the people thus expressed, in that proportion you diminish the power and privileges of the citizen. If this doctrine be correct, it is then totally inconsistent with the general principles of our Government, that the elected should choose Electors. This machinery is unnecessary in ascertaining the will of the majority of the people on the great question, "who shall be their Chief Magistrate." It is inconsistent with that republican simplicity which ought to characterize the government of a free people. It is, sir, a machinery which, in the hands of bad men, may be used to thwart that very public will which, by an election, is supposed to be declared. The mode of choosing Electors by the people, by general ticket, as it was called, Mr. H. said was equally objectionable. Almost all the arguments which had been, or could be urged against choosing members of Congress by general ticket, applied with equal, if not stronger force, against choosing Presidential Electors in the same manner. those States where Electors were chosen by general ticket, he believed it was universally the case that they were nominated by the members of the State Legislature. Sir, said Mr. H., according to the present laws of party, a nomination amounts to a choice. In If the Electors residing within a territory comprehending only thirty-five thousand inhabitants, But, said Mr. H., I contend that it is not right vote for one man only within that territory, their that the Legislatures of the respective States means of personally knowing the political princi- should have the power of determining the mode ples, talents, and morals of the candidate, would of choosing Electors for the President. The danbe far better than they could be where the mem-ger of a combination of great States to the prejubers of Congress are chosen by general ticket, in a State containing a population equal to New Jersey or New Hampshire. Mr. H. said, that, in his view, the principal value of the elective franchise consisted in this: that the Elector having in his eye several of his fellow-citizens, with whose moral characters and mental endowments he was well acquainted, would by his vote declare which of them he thought most worthy to be intrusted with his rights. As, therefore, by adopting the proposed amendment, the value of the elective franchise would be increased, and no serious evil would, in the opinion of Mr. H., result from it, he said he was decidedly in favor of that part of the resolution. But, said Mr. H., I consider that part of the resolution which proposes so to alter the Constitution as to render the mode of choosing Electors for President and Vice President uniform throughout the United States, far the most important. The practice in many of the States under the Constitution is, that the Electors for President are chosen by the members of the State Legislatures. This practice is, I think, inconsistent with the genius of our Government. The American Government is essentially a popular one. All power is declared to be derived from the people. dice of small ones, furnishes to my mind a strong objection to allowing to the respective State Legislatures the power of determining the mode of choosing Electors. One hundred and eleven votes will elect your President. The States of Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, and Virginia, give one hundred and one votes These four States therefore, connected with a comparatively small State, can elect a President. Thus a mere bald majority of one in the State Legislatures of five States can impose a President on the fourteen States, even if the inhabitants of the remaining fourteen States were to a man opposed to him. It it unnecessary to pursue this part of the subject further, because it must appear evident that, if the Constitution is not altered, the minority can and possibly, nay probably, will govern the majority. It may be objected against the proposed amendment, that if adopted it will diminish the influence of the great States. Be it so. I am willing, sir, that the influence of the great States in their corporate capacity in the election of a President should be diminished. While I say this, I do not forget that I come from a great State. But, sir, when this question comes to be fairly submitted to the people of the State of New York, I have the fullest confidence that their patriotism will induce them to make a DECEMBER, 1816. Amendment to the Constitution. H. OF R. influence over the opinions of other citizens, ought to be guarded against-ought to be resisted. And sir, can it for a moment be doubted but that the State Legislatures present bodies of men on whom the Executive influence can be brought to bear with more effect than on the whole mass of the American people? I think not. sacrifice of any advantage they may derive as a State under the present provisions in the Constitution, for the purpose of placing the union, independence, and liberties of the United States on a firmer basis. Sir, the question of who shall be elected President, is not a State, but a National question. The President is an officer who exists for the benefit of the people of the United States, A practice, said Mr. H., has been resorted to, and not for any one State or any part of the and will probably be resorted to again; a practice States. He ought not, therefore, to be created by which, on this occasion, I beg leave to mention, the States, but by the people. The personal merit without either censure or approbation, of desigand political principles of the candidate are the nating the Presidential candidate in a Congresonly proper objects to which the attention of the sional caucus. Putting for a moment out of view Electors ought to be directed. A great State, Executive patronage, surely no one will deny but therefore, cannot claim, because she is great, that that the political friends of the Executive, after she should furnish a Chief Magistrate for the a residence for some time in his immediate neighnation. But so long as the Legislatures of the borhood, will, at such meetings, be greatly influrespective States choose or direct the mode of enced by the known wishes and views of the Exchoosing the Electors, so long State claims, as they ecutive. And, sir, when you add to the influence are called, will enter more or less into considera- which political partialities and court blandishtion in the selection of a President. But, sir, ments will necessarily have on the minds of the alter your Constitution, cause the Presidential best of men, that influence which is produced by Electors to come directly from the people, and the power to dispose of all offices of honor and they will bring with them the public sentiment, profit, it is not to be presumed that a majority of unbiassed and unadulterated. We shall then the political friends of the Executive will ever be hear no more of State claims. The great mass found who will designate a candidate in opposiof the people will pay homage to talent and poli-tion to his wishes. The moment the designation tical virtue-and whether the man who chal-is made, the minority in such caucuses will, from lenges their preference for these qualities is found a respect to the great political party to which they on the heights of the Green Mountains, at the are attached, and from at least an implied hononorthern extremity of the Union, or on the banks rary engagement, be disposed to give their sup of the Mississippi, to them it will be indifferent. port to the Executive favorite. Thus the personal Mr. H. said he had another objection against the influence of the members of both Houses of Conchoice of Electors being made by order of the gress is brought to bear, in conjunction with ExState Legislatures. It was the danger arising ecutive influence, on the State Legislatures. from the influence of the Executive of the United States on the State Legislatures exerted for the purpose of continuing himself in office or of selecting his successor. In the few remarks I wish to offer to the Committee on this subject, said Mr. H., I protest against the inference that I intend any allusion to transactions in relation to any past Presidential election. It is not so. I mean to state what in my opinion will be the conduct of the Executive, taking man as he is. Sir, the person who will fill the Executive Chair will have his preferences. He will have views of his own in relation to the great question respecting the first office in the nation. He has a right to them and his opinions are entitled to the same respect as those of any other individual possessed of equal experience and judgment. But he has no right to make use of the official patronage given him by the Constitution for other purposes, to aid him in carrying those views into effect. But, possessing an inclination like all other men, to carry into effect his own wishes, are we not to presume that he will call to his aid in accomplishing his views some of the patronage of which he finds himself possessed? He must be more than man not to do so. If then it be desirable that the free unbiassed judgment of a majority Mr. JEWETT, of Vermont, proposed a division of the people of this nation, pronounced at the of the question, so as to take the sense separately election, should determine the momentous ques-on the two parts of the resolution; as some gention, Who shall be the First Magistrate? every- tlemen would be inclined to vote for one who thing which tends to give one citizen an undue I would not vote for the other. Can Electors chosen by the State Legislatures under such circumstances be presumed to pronounce the wishes of the majority of the people? No sir, they will be a species of machinery got up to respond the will of the Executive, and not men who announce to the nation the voice of the people. It will be, as an honorable gentleman from Virginia, (Mr. RANDOLPH,) in some animadversions which he made during the last session on this mode of choosing Electors, said, with an energy and strength of language peculiar to himself the shadow of a shade" of an election. Sir, the power of the States to choose, or direct the manner of choosing Electors for the President, is a rotten, a gangrenous part of our Constitution, which if not removed will infect and poison the body politic. I hope it will be extirpated. If this in fact be a Government founded on the opinions of a majority of the people, if in truth the people are not their own worst enemies, let your Electors be created immediately by, and come directly from, the people. When you do that, and not till then, you will be certain that your President holds his office by the consent and at the request of a majority of the people over whom he presides. Mr. Ross, of Pennsylvania, said, that for his own part he had not given this subject that attention which it merited, and was not prepared to vote on it at this moment. The views which had been presented by gentlemen who had spoken were impressive, and had excited his reflection. Still he was not convinced, until he had further opportunity for consideration, that the mode proposed by the resolve was the best possible that could be adopted. Mr. R. said he was not satisfied, if an amendment in regard to the mode of choosing Electors was necessary, that one greatly preferable to that now before the House might not be adopted. When the Constitution had been originally framed, it had been supposed, he said, that the members of the Electoral Colleges would get together, and consult as to the best person upon whom to bestow their votes; but the practice under the Constitution had shown this expectation to be idle, and that the election did not in fact turn upon the principle on which the Convention had intended to fix it. On the contrary, the Presidential candidates were fixed and announced before the election of Electors. Mr. R. thought the mode of election ought to be changed, but doubted whether the mode proposed would be the best. Might not the election, he asked, be better trusted at once to the people? Why the intervention of Electors? Surely the whole body of the people would be less subject to bribery or corruption than any smaller body. It did appear to his mind, as at present impressed, that to the people, and to them only, could the election be safely confided; and that all the present machinery, for electing a President, which sometimes is wielded by mere legerdemain, corruption, or unfair influence, be put out of the way This power would be no longer dangerous when confined to the people themselves. As to the mode of electing Representatives, Mr. R. did not see any great objection to it; but to attain the gentleman's object completely, the choice should be restricted to the district by which an individual is chosen. The feature, however, might be added by an amendment to the resolution. Not having, he said, made up his mind on this subject, and presuming that a number of the Committee were in the same situation, and considering the great importance of the subject on which they were about to act, he moved that the Committee rise and report progress. Mr. CALHOUN, in acceding to this motion, took the opportunity to observe that he considered this a question of great importance. He thought the proposed amendment to the Constitution, if adopted, would remove some evils which experience has shown to exist, and which in future time, if uncorrected, may menace the existence of the Republic. He therefore thought this subject en titled to the most mature consideration. The Committee rose, reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again. WEDNESDAY, December 18. Mr. PICKERING presented a petition of the representatives of the yearly meeting of the religious DECEMBER,1816. Society of Friends, held in Baltimore, praying that other and stronger provisions may be enacted to prevent the traffic in negro slaves from one State to another, within the United States, in which traffic they allege that many persons of color, free, or entitled to freedom at a given time, are carried into perpetual slavery.-Referred to the committee appointed on that part of the President's Message which relates to the African slave trade. Mr. LOWNDES. of South Carolina, from the Committee of Ways and Means, reported a bill for the relief of Henry Malcolm; and a bill to discharge from his imprisonment John Ricaud, late a paymaster in the army; which were severally twice read, and committed. Mr. CALDWELL, of Ohio, submitted for consideration the following resolution: Resolved, That a committee be appointed to inquire into the expediency of authorizing the President to appoint Commissioners to locate and mark out the road from the Ohio river, opposite to Wheeling, in the State of Virginia, through the State of Ohio, with leave to report by bill or otherwise. The resolution having been amended on motion of Mr. TAYLOR, of New York, so as to refer the subject to the standing Committee on Roads and Canals, was agreed to. COMPENSATION LAW. Mr. JOHNSON, of Kentucky, from the committee appointed on the subject, submitted a report relative to the compensation of the members of Congress, embracing an elaborate and ample view of the subject, accompanied by a bill to rethereof to provide a daily allowance of dolpeal the present compensation law, and in lieu lars, and dollars for every twenty miles travelling to and from the Seat of Government. The report is as follows: The committee to whom was referred the consideration of the expediency of repealing or modifying the law passed at the last session, relative to the compensation of members of Congress, ask leave to report. The power, vested in Congress by the Constitution, of providing for the pay of its own members, is, doubtless, a delicate trust; and it might have been apprehended, as well from the nature of the subject, as from former experience, that the most judicious exercise of that trust would not be exempt from some degree of public animadversion. The committee, however, cannot perceive, either in the increase of compensation provided by the late act, or in the mode of making that compensation, cause of excitement or alarm, adequate to the effects which are understood to have been produced. The addition which this law has made to the public expenditure is not considerable; and if it had been created by other measures of Government, would not, probably, of itself, have been thought worthy of great attention. And the change in the mode of compensation, even if it be not attended with real and manifest advantage, does not still appear to be wrong, so clearly, and in such dangerous measure, as to furnish grounds for any high degree of public inquietude. The committee, therefore, cannot but be of opinion, that the law in question has not been considered without some mixture of misapprehension of its principles and objects, and that a more accurate knowledge of its provisions, and more mature reflection on its design and tendency, if they should not end in a conviction of its usefulness, would yet result in a different and far more moderate estimate of its probable evils. It would not become the committee to claim any infallibility for the body of which they are members, nor to take it for granted, that every law which it may pass, must, necessarily, be a wise and wholesome act of legislation. Human errors and imperfections find their way into all bodies. And there is, doubtless, existing in the judgment of the community, a power under whose revision this and other acts of Government must and ought to pass. If, however, on a review of this subject, the House should still be of opinion, that the law in question, or some equivalent provision, has become essentially necessary for the useful exercise of the powers of Government, and for the safety, security, and honor of the people themselves, its members may still hope, that in not hastily departing from it, they will be justified by the enlightened sense and generous sentiments of the nation. The abandonment of a measure, which, accordingly to their most conscientious conviction, is intimately connected with the general good, would be no means of obtaining favor with the American people. If, in passing the law in question, the House of Representatives discharged any portion of its duty, it acted upon general and public principles, with an entire disregard to the convenience of its own members, any further than their convenience was supposed to be connected with the public service. It treated the question, not as one between them and the public, but as exclusively of public and national concern. It regarded it as a subject of general policy, by which the nation, and the nation only, was to be affected; as much so as any other act of legislation whatever. Any imputation, so gross as to impeach its conduct in this essential particular, a feeling of self-respect must compel the House to pass over in silence, and its members must rely on their known character, as members of the Government, and as citizens of the community, to disprove it. The House would not presume to judge whether its services, in the various and important matters upon which it has acted, have deserved any consideration or respect from the public; but for those services, such as they are, it has not sought, nor would accept, any reward which could be measured out to it in a mere pecuniary compensation. And while the members of the House would certainly not think of claiming any merit for passing the law in question, any more than for the discharge of what they thought their duty in any other case, the committee do not see that they have any cause for taking humiliation upon themselves, on account of having passed an act which they believed would be essentially useful to the country, but which they must have foreseen would be exposed, itself, and might expose its authors, to misapprehension and misrepresentation of all sorts. Holding offices in the immediate gift of the people, of short duration, and at a time when the people were soon to exercise, in most districts, their accustomed privilege of a new election, if these offices had been objects of their regard, and if they had permitted personal considerations to influence their conduct, it is obvious that all such considerations pointed to a course different from that which they pursued. They must have known, that no measure could be more easily misconstrued and perverted to the purposes of obloquy and reproach. The committee cannot yet believe that H. OF R. a faithful discharge of duty, in the face of these probable consequences, is to be reckoned among dangerous political errors. At the commencement of this Government, it was of course among its first measures to fix, by law, agreeably to the requisition of the Constitution, the pay of members of Congress. In the old Congress under the Confederation, the members were paid, not out of the national Treasury, but, by the States which they represented. The rates of compensation were different in different States; some States paid to their delegates eight dollars a day; others six; others less; and one State at least paid them by annual provision six hundred pounds sterling. It was natural to recur to these precedents, when the subject was taken up by the first Congress, under this Constitution. Taking as a just and obvious standard, by which to regulate the amount of compensation, the average of the rates which had been paid, by the different States, to their Delegates in the old Congress, it was found that such average amounted to somewhat more than six dollars a day. The compensation was accordingly fixed at six dollars a day, by the law of 1789. As it was foreseen, that the depreciation of money, or the increased expense of living, might render this provision adequate, the law was limited in its duration, in order that it might be considered and altered, if necessary, at a future period. The subject was again brought before Congress, in 1795, by the expiration of the former law. On this occasion, as the committee have learned, and indeed as some of them remember, there was much diversity of opinion in the House of Representatives; some members wished, then, to change the mode from a daily sum to an annual allowance; others preferred to retain the existing mode, but to increase the sum; and a committee of the House reported in favor of increasing the daily pay to eight dollars, assigning for reason, a proportionate increase in the price of all commodities, and the expense of living, since the passage of the act. Those who opposed this augmentation, admitted it would be reasonable, if the price of commodities and the expense of living should keep up; but they hoped the rise would be temporary, and that money would soon resume, in relation to the expense of living, its former value. The proposition to increase the pay was lost by one or two votes only, and a law passed establishing the former rate. The state of things existing in the Government and in the country, from 1796 to the close of the late war, furnish obvious reasons to account for the circumstance that, during that period, no attempt was made to raise the pay of members of Congress. In the mean time, the Seat of Government had been transferred to the City of Washington, and the expense of living, instead of returning to its former rate, as was expected by some, has gone on increasing progressively, until money, in relation the means of life, does not retain more than half its former value. In other words, if six dollars a day was no more than a reasonable provision, in the cities of Philadelphia and New York, eight-and-twenty years ago, twelve dollars would not be more than a reasonable and equal provision in the City of Washington, at the present time. Forty years ago, as has been stated above, some of the States paid their Delegates in Congress, eight dollars a day; and yet it never was supposed, during the Revolution, or afterwards, that the people of the United States had made unreasonable or exorbitant provision for their public agents. But, unless the early history of the country was marked by great extravagance in this particular, the rate of six dollars a day, fixed by the law of the first Congress, was no more than a moderate and necessary allowance at that time, because it was no more than the average of what all the States had found it necessary to pay to their respective delegates during the Revolution. DECEMBER 1816 adverted to for the purpose of showing that Congress has been as favorable to others as to itself, or that it has made itself the latest object of its own bounty, In neither case has it supposed itself to be bestowing bounty or conferring favor. It has sought only to make such provisions as the public interest demanded. But the circumstance is referred to as furnishing eviThe only question then, is, whether there has been dence of the necessity of the late law, by showing that in truth such a change in the country, in the value of a similar necessity had been found to exist in other money and the expense of living, as to render that cases; and that by that law, Congress had done nothprovision which was no more than sufficient in 1789, ing for its own members which Executive recommeninsufficient in 1816. It is a truth, plain to all whose dation, and its own opinion of propriety, with the genexperience or information enables them to judge, that eral concurrence of public sentiment, had not comso great has been the change in the foregoing particu-pelled it to do at an earlier period, and in ample mealars, which eight and twenty years have produced, sure, for other officers of Government. that it is not incorrect to estimate the expenditures necessarily attached to a seat in Congress at twice their former amount. This change has not been confined to the condition of members of Congress. It has extended all over the country, and as well the National Government as every State government has been obliged to provide for it in a proportionate increase in the salaries of their public officers. complying with the change of circumstances, have The State Legislatures, from the same necessity of made corresponding changes in the salaries of the officers of their governments; and it may not be inapplicable to recent occurrences to remark, that the members of these Legislatures have, in almost every State, increased, in many doubled, in some trebled, their own members of Congress has remained at its original pay, during the period in which the compensation to rate. As far, also, as the committee can learn, this increase of pay to members of State Legislatures has, in every instance, taken place in the same session in which it was voted. The Statute Book of this Government exhibits a constant and progressive increase of compensation in all the Departments of the Government, with the exception of the Legislature and the Supreme Judiciary. On the recommendation of the Executive, or its branches, the Legislature has repeatedly augmented Objections have been made to the manner of comthe provisions for that Department, patiently raising pensation introduced by the law of the last session. the pay of the clerks and of writers far above that of It has been said to have created salaries. If by this it its own members, without agitating either itself or the is intended that the law allows to every member a country with any question about its own compensation. defined and certain sum, without any deduction for From the Heads of the Departments to the lowest absence or omission of duty, it is not a correct repreclerkships in the public offices, a general augmentation sentation. Such deductions are provided for by the has obtained throughout. A long enumeration of in-law, as completely as under the former mode. It has stances is not necessary. One may suffice. When members of Congress were first paid six dollars a day, the salary of the Attorney General was one thousand five hundred dollars a year. This salary has since been increased to three thousand dollars; and the Executive has, at the present session, found it necessary to recommend a still further increase, as essential to the public service. If the duties of that officer have increased, so have the duties of members of Congress in at least an equal proportion; and which of the two stations requires the greatest sacrifice of private pursuits may be easily discerned. already been observed, that a difference of opinion has long existed on this point, and it still exists. When the law of 1796 was passed, there were those who thought it advisable to change the mode then in practice, and to adopt the example of an annual allowance, which had been formerly set by a very respectable State. There have been and still are those who are not without fear that an augmentation of the daily pay, if it should not in fact tend in some cases to the protraction of the session, might produce an evil of equal magnitude, by subjecting the Legislature to such an imputation. At the time of passing the late act, it was found Nor is it at all true, that the inconvenience of attendupon inquiry that from the organization of the Gov- ing a session of Congress is always in proportion to ernment to the commencement of the thirteenth Con- its length. The season of the year in which the sesgress, (1813,) Congress had, on an average of all the sion is holden may be as material as its duration. The years, been in session one hundred and fifty-nine days length of the journey to the Seat of Government is in a year. For eight years, ending with the thirteenth the same in both cases; and both cases require an Congress, (1813,) it had been in session, on an aver- entire breaking off of all private engagements, and an age, one hundred and sixty-five days in each year. exclusive devotion to public business. It may be addAn easy computation will show that, supposing Con-ed, also, that while the compensation was computed by gress to sit hereafter as many days within the year as it has usually done heretofore, the present amount of compensation, including travel and attendance, will exceed the amount received for travel and attendance under the former law, thirty-eight per centum. After the lapse of eight-and-twenty years, then, Congress has, for the first time, increased the pay of its members. It has increased it about one-third, and no more; although, within the same period, it has been called upon to raise, and has raised, the compensation of nearly all other officers of Government in a far greater proportion. This enhancement of other compensations is not the day, as the sessions would naturally be longest in |