a larger interest allowed by the savings banks than could be obtained elsewhere; and the loss, if any, to the institutions, was made good by the commissioners of the sinking fund. Added to these circumstances, the law of partnerships in England is such, that there is no limit to responsibility. Each individual is liable to the extent of his means, for the debts of the partnership, however small his share of the capital. It is not wonderful, therefore, under these circumstances, that the deposits in the savings banks should increase as the institutions became better known. But even if there had not been any of these extra inducements to deposit in savings banks, the Professor could not have claimed these statistics as supporting his natural law of progress. The intelligent classes of England are beginning to be considerably imbued with Malthusian principles, in spite of the prejudice which has been heaped upon them. Under these circumstances, and the gradual improvement of the habits of the people in general, it is only fair to presume, that a large amount of money is now deposited in savings banks which used to be spent otherwise, by small tradesmen, clerks, skilled workmen, and servants. So that, instead of these circumstances being caused by a natural “law of progress," they have been caused by the moral superseding the natural law. But we must proceed. The Professor says: "The next test is found in the accounts furnished to Parliament of the number of persons receiving dividends upon portions of the public debt. These divide the fundholders into ten classes. Then follow the figures, which show an increase of the small dividends; those not exceeding £5, of a little more than 9 per cent. The next class, not exceeding £10, is stationary, and all other intermediate amounts, until they exceed £2,000, decrease, more or less, and those above that sum have increased nearly 3 per cent. Now, if Professor Smith and Mr. Carey are willing to take this as a test of the "natural tendency to an equalization of wealth," I certainly can have no objection. The small sums have increased 9 per cent, while the intermediate sums have decreased from 2 to 20 per cent, and the extreme large ones have increased. If Professor Smith can see any tendency toward an equalization of wealth in this, I can only say that his perceptive faculties are more acute than those of ordinary men. The fact is, the tendency to the investment of small sums in savings banks and the funds, are only the effect of a necessary law of the circumstances in which England is placed. Large sums can readily be invested in lands, and there is every reason to believe, from what has been elsewhere stated, that large capitals continually migrate, from the banks to the funds, and from the funds to the land, giving place to smaller sums, which cannot be so invested. The next test which the Professor offers us, is to be found in the tables of the income tax. He says: "The following table, giving the number of persons assessed in different classes, shows the increase in the number of moderate and a comparative diminution in the number of colossal incomes." Now, whether this assertion belongs to Professor Smith or to Mr. Porter, is not exactly clear; but, according to these tables, all the classes of income have increased in numbers; the smallest 196 per cent, and the largest 180, but none of the intermediate sums have reached the rate of increase of the largest class, by more than 30 per cent. If there is any tendency to an equalization here, I can only say I cannot see it. It ap * The land in England, in the latter end of the last century, was in the hands 250,000 proprietors, while at present it is in the hands of about 30,000. pears very natural to me that small sums should increase faster than large ones, in a prosperous community, simply because the small sums must have time to grow into large ones. If the large incomes had decreased while the small ones had increased, there would have been some show of plausibility in the Professor's reasoning; but as it is, it is quite absurd. He has again endeavored to enlighten us by a calculation. The Professor appears to think that there is some fatality about large incomes, which prevents them from hanging well together. He has therefore endeavored to make it appear, at least to his own satisfaction, that although the large incomes have increased in number, in nearly as large a ratio as the small ones, that they have decreased in the average amount of each. Now, if this were actually the case, I do not see that it would at all benefit the Professor's theory, as, no doubt, some good economical reason could be given for it, if we only knew all the circumstances. I believe that the property and income tax does not reach Ireland, but reaches all sources of income in England. In that case, the incomes of many of the aristocracy would be affected by the depreciation of property in Ireland, land being at a mere nominal value in that country, from which they used to draw large revenues. The next test offered us of this natural tendency "to an equalization of wealth" is to be found in the statistics of the probate duty, between the years 1833 and 1848, but apparently without any nearer approach to an equalization. For instance, the sums under £1,500 have increased 15 per cent, while those of the third class, between £5,000 and £10,000, have increased sixteen per cent; and those above £15,000, 7 per cent; but, "the amount of duty received on estates of £30,000 and upward, has been slowly but steadily decreasing." I rather suspect that the Professor has made a mistake in the last line; instead of using the adverb steadily, I suspect it ought to have been comparatively; for I must confess, that I do not clearly see how it is, that, while large fortunes in England are increasing at nearly the rate of 200 per cent in forty years, that they do not pay probate duty in descending from parent to child. But if it be as the Professor has stated it, there must be some slight-of-hand trick, which probably the Professor could explain; but if not, I could give a pretty near guess. * Upon the whole, speaking as a Malthusian, I should say, the results shown by these tables are highly satisfactory; that they have caused surprise in England I can readily believe; but not because of any perceptible tendency to an equalization of wealth, but rather that it should have gone on so steadily increasing, while the great mass of her population were in distress and deteriorating in condition. The opinion that England had been declining in wealth, for the last twenty years, no doubt arose from the numerous periods of distress, affecting all classes but the landowners, the enormous amount of the "poor's rate," and the continued decline of the revenue previous to the adoption of "free trade." But the most gratifying part of Mr. Porter's statistics are those relating to the savings banks. Less than thirty years ago it was no disgrace for an Englishman of any rank, from the prince to the peasant, to be seen drunk after dinner; to drink to excess was the rule, to be sober was the exception. It is therefore gratifying to have this evidence that the English people are becoming more moral, prudent, and economical. It is said that the father of a late celebrated baronet, distributed previous to his death, £600,000 in one week among his family. After all his long article, the Professor appeared to regret that your space would not allow him to quote the whole history of the human race, in support of his theory, and to show us how mankind had progressed from one state of slavery to another, and finally to freedom. It appears that the Professor wished to change the subject; for we do not want to know how mankind progressed, but the cause of that progression. After all, it does appear to me, to be rather ridiculous, to be seriously discussing this question, at this time, when the point has so long been considered as settled, by all logical thinkers. Machinery can be produced and improved ad infinitum, or at least without any natural limitation, and if it could be applied under the same circumstances to the productions of the soil, it does not require a Solomon to tell us, that the rate of profit on capital must continually increase, instead of being continually diminished; and no such principle as that of rent would exist. RICHARD SULLY. JOURNAL OF MERCANTILE LAW. WHETHER CERTAIN MEMORANDA TAKEN TOGETHER WITH OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES AMOUNTED TO A BARGAIN AND SALE. In the United States Circuit Court, (Boston, Massachusetts,) 1852. Salmon Falls Manufacturing Company vs. William W. Goddard. This action was brought to recover some $19,000 for damages sustained by the plaintiffs from the refusal of defendant to make and deliver to them his note of that amount for goods bargained for and sold, and also to recover a similar sum for goods sold and delivered. The defendant resisted the demand upon the ground that the plaintiffs could not produce any written note or memorandum of the contract, as by statute is required; also, that the plaintiffs were bound to deliver the goods to him, prior to any right of recovery, which he averred they had not done. It was in proof, that Mason & Lawrence, commission merchants, were the factors in Boston, of the plaintiffs; that Goddard on the 19th September, 1850, had a negotiation with Mason, for the purchase of some goods which he intended to ship. A memorandum was written and signed, in the following, words, namely: 19th September-W. W. Goddard, 12 mo. 300 bales S. F. Drills. 74. 66 100 cases blue Cr. to commence when ship sails, not later than 1st December. The blues if color satisfactory to purchaser. W. W. G. At the time of this negotiation the 300 bales were in the storehouse of plaintiff's in New Hampshire, and Mason so informed the defendant, and requested that he would give notice when he desired the goods, that they might be sent for. On the 11th of October, at which time the 100 cases of blue had been received at the store of Mason & Lawrence, a clerk in their store made a bill of parcels, dated September 30, 1850, which stated that W. W. Goddard had bought of Mason & Lawrence 300 bales of S. F. drills at 74 cents, and 100 cases blue at 8 cents, carrying out the sums total; and underneath this general bill was writ ten the marks, numbers, and yards of each bale, and of each case. The terms were also stated to be, "Note at twelve months to the treasurer of the Salmon Falls Manufacturing Company." This bill of parcels, on the same day it was made, was sent through the post-office to the defendant, to which he made no reply. On 22d October, defendant said to Mason he wished him to send for the goods at Salmon Falls, so that he might receive them by the middle of the then next week (which would be the 30th.) On the same day, Mason & Lawrence communicated to the plaintiffs the request of the defendant. On 25th October the defendant requested Mason & Lawrence to substitute other goods for those which he had purchased, with which request they would not comply, and declined. The 300 bales arrived at the Boston and Maine depot, in Boston, on and before the 30th of October, on which day the defendant was notified that the goods were at the depot, and were ready for delivery to him-he replied, "Dont send them." On the next day, Mason & Lawrence, by letter delivered to the defendant, notified him that the goods which had been forwarded from Salmon Falls by his direction, were at the depot of the Boston and Maine Railroad, subject to his risk and charge for storage, stating the marks and numbers of the bales, to which letter he made no reply. On the 2d of November, Mason called at the counting-room of defendant, and not finding him, inquired of his clerk why Goddard did not remove his goods, and the clerk answered that his ship was full. The 300 bales were destroyed by fire at the depot, during the night of November 4th. On the morning of the 5th, the defendant called on Mason & Lawrence, and during the conversation with them, admitted he had his invoice, had been notified, and spoke of the goods as his. On the 30th of September, Mason & Lawrence notified the plaintiffs, at Salmon Falls, that 300 bales had been sold, stating the numbers, which corresponded with those upon the bill of parcels subsequently sent to the defendant, upon which notice the plaintiffs counted and set them apart, and the overseer who had charge of the goods was informed that these 300 bales had been sold, and were not to be forwarded till specially ordered. On the morning of the 4th of November, the railroad company were notified by Mason & Lawrence that the 300 bales which were pointed out had been sold to Goddard. The defendant was owner of a ship called the Crusader, which on the 19th of September was at sea, which arrived at Boston October 15th, cleared on the 2d November, and sailed on the 6th upon a new voyage. It was in proof that it was the usage of Mason & Lawrence upon their sales, to require the note of the purchaser; that the defendant was aware of such usage, having purchased of the plaintiffs, through Mason & Lawrence, goods on six occasions prior to the 19th of September, for which purchases he had given his notes. On the 14th November, plaintiffs demanded a note of defendant, which he refused. Some other things were in evidence, not changing the general aspect of the case. The plaintiff's submitted that the contract between the parties was one which the law regards as a bargain and sale; that the title passed from them, and vested in the defendant on the 19th of September, notwithstanding the plaintiffs agreed to pay the cost of transportation; that this provision was collateral, and had no such force or effect as would defeat the vesting of the title in the defendant; that if the title did not so pass to the defendant, inasmuch as he had directed the transportation, which had, in pursuance of such direction, been commenced, and had declined to direct the place to which it should be trucked from the depot, a delivery at Salmon Falls, to the carrier, must be regarded as a delivery to Goddard; that having directed the transportation to commence, he could not, by neglect to designate the place to which it should be completed, or by refusal to receive the goods, interrupt such transportation, and thereupon avoid the responsibility of ownership; that such interruption at the depot was an exercise of ownership, and was in law to be regarded as a delivery. The plaintiffs requested the court to instruct the jury that the paper of 19th September was a sufficient writing to bind the defendant. They also requested an instruction that the bill of parcels, which represented the defendant as purchaser, by reason of his alleged recognition of, and action under it, must be regarded as a sufficient signature on his part to bind him to the contract therein stated. Also, that the two papers, taken together, constituted one contract, and, so regarded, were sufficient to answer the purpose of the statute, which requires a note of the contract to be in writing. The plaintiffs also submitted that the acts of the parties constituted a delivery to, and acceptance of, the property by the defendant, so as thereby to render a written memorandum unnecessary. If not so, as matter of law, these acts were competent to go to the jury, and were sufficient to authorize them to find such delivery and acceptance. They also requested the court to instruct the jury that the defendant by his conduct was estopped to say, that the property had not been delivered to and accepted by him; that he was estopped to say that the property was not at his risk; there was no proof that defendant ever requested a delivery of the 100 cases, which were offered to him by letter on the 16th November; no proof that he ever said to the plaintiffs or their agents in what ship he intended to send his goods, or at which he wished a delivery. The defendant resisted all these grounds upon which the plaintiff sought to recover. The court directed the jury to return a verdict for the defendant, giving the reasons at length. In substance, the court considered the paper of the 19th September as insufficient, because it did not disclose who was vendor or vendee, what the price, or the terms. That the bill of parcels was made by a clerk of Mason & Lawrence, and not by the agent of the defendant; that he did not profess to act for the defendant, that the defendant had not by any writing recognized the paper; that the acts and declarations of the defendant in relation thereto did not amount to a legal recognition of the paper to an extent sufficient to bind him. That a paper not signed by a party, or by his agent, must be adopted by some writing to make it available; that the two papers were not to be regarded as a compliance with the statute, although it was assumed they related to the same transaction, because they did not refer to each other; they did not call one for the other. The court also held that the acts in proof did not, in law, constitute a delivery and acceptance of the goods-that it was not competent for the jury from the facts in proof to infer such delivery and acceptance—that the defendant was not estopped by his conduct to say the goods did not belong to him, and were not at his risk at the time they were destroyed. To all these rulings of the court the plaintiffs excepted. Under the direction of the court, the jury returned a proforma verdict for the defendant, that "he did not promise in manner and form, as set forth in the plaintiff's writ and declaration." The counsel for the plaintiffs gave notice that they should file exceptions for the purpose of bringing the case before the United States Supreme Court, at Washington. C. G. Loring and C. B. Goodrich for the plaintiffs, and R. Choate and F. O. Watts for the defendant. BANKS AND BORROWERS—USURY. In the Supreme Court (Cincinnati, Ohio,) 1852, Bank of Xenia vs. Gibson and others. Judge Hoadly. The defendants claim that the acceptance on which this suit is brought is infected with usury, and it now becomes my duty to point out to you the legal result, if such be the case. I may, without objection, state the outlines of the facts as they are admitted to exist, in order that you may fairly appreciate the law as I shall state it, and may properly adapt it to the facts in their detail. It appears that Bennett, Veazey & Co., and P. and T. Gibson all reside in Cincinnati. By an agreement with the President of the Bank, Bennett was to have a standing accommodation of one thousand dollars at the Xenia Branch of the State Bank, on paper having the names of these parties on it. The business was done in about the following manner:-Peter Gibson or P. and T. Gibson would draw in favor of themselves on Bennett, at ninety days date, payable at the Commercial Bank of Cincinnati in specie funds. The draft, when indorsed by Veszey and Co., and accepted by Bennett, the latter would send by mail to Xenia and the Bank, after deducting interest at the rate of six per cent per annum, would forward the residue in "currency" to Bennett by express. When the acceptance matured, Bennett had to pay it in gold, and then a few days after maturity he would procure a new amount of "currency" from the Bank, on another instrument of the same character, in the same manner; and this would be paid in gold. And so these transactions occurred several times, Bennett each time receiving |