The provision as to absence from the state applies to actions to recover real estate. Lagow v. Neilson, 10 Ind. 183.

The statute of limitations of a foreign state or country, when a bar there and pleaded here, is a bar here. Harris v. Harris, 38 Ind. 423; Van Dorn v. Bodley, 38 Ind. 402; Wright v. Johnson, 42 Ind. 29.

In a suit on a foreign judgment, the statute of this state will, as a general rule, control the action. Hendricks v. Comstock, 12 Ind. 238.

299. (298.) Death of party-Extension of limitation.-44. If any person entitled to bring, or liable to any action, shall die before the expiration of the time limited for the action, the cause of action shall survive to or against his representatives, and may be brought at any time after the expiration of the time limited, within eighteen months after the death of such person.

The effect of this section is to extend the period of limitation for a time equal to the difference between eighteen months and the residue of the limitation unexpired at the death of the party. Harris v. Rice, 66 Ind. 267; Knippenberg v. Morris, 80 Ind. 540. The death of a party may extend the time for bringing suit, but it can not shorten it. Emerick v. Chesrown, 90 Ind. 47.

300. (299.) New action after failure-Limitation.-45. If, after the commencement of an action, the plaintiff fail therein, from any cause except negligence in the prosecution; or the action abate, or be defeated by the death of a party; or judgment be arrested or reversed on appeal, a new action may be brought within five years after such determination, and be deemed a continuation of the first, for the purposes herein contemplated.

If an action is voluntarily abandoned, it can not be used to save another action from the bar of the statute. Null v. White Water Co., 4 Ind. 431.

This action does not apply to actions defeated by reason of being wrongly instituted. Hawthorn v. State, ex rel., 57 Ind. 286.

The failure of a suit on account of a defect of title does not fall within this section. Sidener v. Galbraith, 63 Ind. 89.

301. (300.) Concealment of cause of action.-46. If any person liable to an action shall conceal the fact from the knowledge of the person entitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any time within the period of limitation, after the discovery of the cause of action.

The "concealment " meant herein must be more than silence-must be some affirmative act, and must be so alleged and proven. Wynne v. Cornelison, 52 Ind. 312; Jackson v. Buchanan, 59 Ind. 390; Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445; Ware v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 181; Stone v. Brown, 116 Ind. 78; Miller v. Powers, 119 Ind. 79.

If the party liable does any affirmative act to hide the truth or prevent inquiry the statute will not run. Boyd v. Boyd, 27 Ind. 429.

The concealment of the cause of action must be after it has accrued. Stanley v. Stanton, 36 Ind. 445.

This section applies to cases of fraud. Wynne v. Cornelison, 52 Ind. 312.

The statute begins to run when the action accrues, and not when it is discovered. Ware v. State, ex rel., 74 Ind. 181.

Diligence to discover the right of action must be shown. Stone v. Brown, 116 Ind. 78.

302. (301.) New promise to be in writing.-47. No acknowledgment or promise shall be evidence of a new or continuing contract, whereby to take the case out of the operation of the provisions of this act, unless the same be contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby.

No acknowledgment of a promise to pay a debt barred by the statute is sufficient to take the case out of its operation, unless it be in writing, signed by the party to be charged thereby. Kisler v. Sanders, 40 Ind. 78; Ketcham v. Hill, 42 Ind. 64.

This section applies to causes of action arising out of contracts or promises, and not to trusts. Cunningham v. McKindley, 22 Ind. 149.

This section does not apply to actions on judgments. Niblack v. Goodman, 67 Ind. 174.

303. (302.) Promise of joint contractor, executor, etc.-48. The acknowledgment or promise of one joint contractor or executor or administrator, shall not render any other joint contractor, executor, or administrator liable under the provisions of this act.

The acknowledgment of one partner, after dissolution, will not take the case out of the statute as to the other partners. Yandes v. Lafavour, 2 Blkf. 371; Kirk v. Hiatt, 2 Ind. 322.

304. (303.) Effect of payment-Exception.-50. Nothing contained in the preceding sections shall take away or lesson the effect of any payment made by any person; but no indorsement or memorandum of any payment made upon any instrument of writing, by or on behalf of the party to whom the payment shall purport to be made, shall be deemed sufficient to exempt the case from the provisions of this act.

Part payment must be a payment on account of the debt sued for; and the amount of the debt must be shown to be greater than the payment. Prenatt v. Runyon, 12 Ind. 174; Elliott v. Mills, 10 Ind. 368.

Payment must be made to the creditor, payment to his administrator not being sufficient. Kisler v. Sanders, 40 Ind. 78.

An admission of continued indebtedness may be inferred from part payment, but it is a question of fact, and not of law. Carlisle v. Morris, 8 Ind. 421.

Proof of credits given by the plaintiff is not alone sufficient to take the case out of the statute. Elliott v. Mills, 10 Ind. 368.

Presumptions arising from payment may be rebutted. Willey v. State, ex rel., 105 Ind. 453.

305. (304.) State not barred-Sureties excepted.-51. Limitations of actions shall not bar the state of Indiana, except as to sureties. 306. (305.) Judgments, when deemed satisfied.-52. Every judgment and decree of any court of record of the United States, or of this or any other state, shall be deemed satisfied after the expiration of twenty years.

Presumptions as to payment may be rebutted. Bright v. Sexton, 18 Ind. 186.

307. (306.) Bar as to joint debtors.-54. Neither a joint debtor or his representatives, in whose favor the statute of limitations has operated, shall be liable to a joint debtor or surety, or their representatives, upon payment by such joint debtor or surety, or their representatives, of the debt, or any part of it.

The statute does not run, during the existence of war, between the citizens of the different belligerent powers. Perkins v. Rogers, 35 Ind. 124.

308. (307.) Real actions in county where land lies.-30. Actions for the following causes must be commenced in the county in which the subject of the action, or some part thereof, is situated:

First. For the recovery of real property, or of an estate or interest therein, or for the determination in any form of such right or interest. and for injuries to real property.

Second. For the partition of real property.

Third. For the foreclosure of a mortgage of real property.

The circuit court of an old county has jurisdiction in suits concerning the lands in the new county prior to the time fixed for holding courts in the new. Milk v. Kent, 60 Ind. 226.

An action for specific performance must be commenced in the county where the land lies. Parker v. McAllister, 14 Ind. 12.

So, with an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance. New Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Huff, 19 Ind. 444.

This is a section defining jurisdiction, not venue. Loeb v. Mathis, 37 Ind. 306.

If mortgaged lands are in more than one county, the courts of either county have jurisdiction to foreclose. Holmes v. Taylor, 48 Ind. 169.

An action for injury to lands caused by fire should be brought in the county where the lands are situate. Indiana, etc., R. R. Co. v. Foster, 107 Ind. 430; Du Breuil r. Pennsylvania Co., 130 Ind. 137.

An action can not be brought in this state for injury to lands occurring in another state. Du Breuil v. Pennsylvania Co., 130 Ind. 137.

309. (308.) Actions for penalties, etc., where commenced.-31. Actions for the following causes must be commenced in the county where the cause, or some part thereof, arose:

First. For the recovery of a penalty or forfeiture imposed by statute; except when imposed for an offense committed on a lake or river or other stream of water, situated in two or more counties, the action may be brought in any county bordering on such lake, river, or stream, and opposite to the place where the offense was committed.

Second. Against a public officer or person specially appointed to execute his duties, for an act done by him in virtue of his office; or against a person who, by his command or in his aid, shall do anything touching the duties of such officer.

In all cases enumerated in this and the section immediately preceding it, process may issue to and be served in any county in this state.

The words "public officer" as used in this section apply only to officers of this state. Freeman v. Robinson, 7 Ind. 321.

310. (309.) Corporations, etc.-Agency.-32. When a corporation, company, or individual has an office or agency in any county for the transaction of business, any action growing out of, or connected with, the business of such office may be brought in the county where the office or agency is located, at the option of the plaintiff, as though the principal resided therein; and service upon any agent or clerk employed in the office or agency shall be sufficient service upon the principal; or process may be sent to any county, and served upon the principal.

A railroad company is a resident of any county in which it has an agent or officer upon whom process can be served. Toledo, etc., R. R. Co. v. Owen, 43 Ind. 405; New Albany, etc., R. R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301.

Actions growing out of contracts made by foreign corporations in other states can not be brought in this state under this section. Etna Co. v. Black, 80 Ind. 513.

It must be shown that the corporation had an agency in the county for the transaction of business at the time the suit was commenced. Indiana Co. r. Capehart, 108 Ind. 270.

Actions will lie under this section when the defendants are non-residents of the state and have an office or agency in a county for the transaction of business in this state, and the cause of action grows out of such business. Rauber v. Whitney, 125 Ind. 216.

311. (310.) Wills.-33. An action to establish or set aside a will must be brought in the county in which the will, if valid, ought, according to law, to be proved and recorded.

An action to contest the validity of the will of a non-resident of the state should be brought in the county where assets are left or might have come. Harris v. Harris, 61

Ind. 117.

The complaint should aver the necessary jurisdictional facts. Thomas v. Wood, 61 Ind. 132.

312. (311.) Railroads and other carriers.-34. An action against a railroad or canal corporation or company, or owner of a line of stages or coaches, for an injury to person or property upon the railroad, canal, or line of stages or coaches of the defendant, or upon a liability as a carrier, may be brought in any county through or into which such railroad, canal, or line of stages or coaches passes; and the summons may be served in any county in the state.

Actions for injuries to animals by railroad cars brought under the statute creating a liability, must be brought in the county where the injury is done. Railroad Co. v. Renner, 17 Ind. 135; Railway Co. v. Breckenridge, 64 Ind. 113; Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 496; Croy v. Railway Co., 97 Ind. 126.

Actions against railroad companies for injuries to animals growing out of their common law liability may be brought in any county through which the road runs. Railway Co. v. Milligan, 52 Ind. 505; Railroad Co. v. Barton, 61 Ind. 293; Railroad Co. v. Pierce, 95 Ind. 496.

[2 R. S. 1852, p. 222. In force May 6, 1853.]

313. Corporations, venue of actions against.-796. Any action against a corporation may be brought in any county where the corpo

ration has an office for the transaction of business, or any person resides upon whom process may be served against such corporation, unless otherwise provided in this act.

This section was omitted from the revision of 1881, but it has not been repealed, and under it a suit may be brought against a railroad company in any county where there is any person upon whom process may properly be served. Evansville, etc., Co. r. Spellbring, 1 App. 167.

[1881 S., p. 240. In force September 19, 1881.]

314. (312.) Residents and non-residents-Assignees.-35. In all other cases, the action shall be commenced in the county where the defendants, or one of them, has his usual place of residence. Where there are several defendants, residing in different counties, the action may be brought in any county where either defendant resides, and at separate summons may be issued to any other county where the other defendants may be found; and in cases of non-residents, or persons having no permanent residence in the state, action may be commenced and process served in any county where they may be found. But any action brought by the assignee of a claim, arising out of contract, whether assigned in writing or by delivery, shall be commenced in the county where one or more of the parties immediately liable to judgment and execution reside, and not elsewhere.

Replevin may be brought in the county where the defendant resides. Hodson r. Warner, 60 Ind. 214.

If the defendant in attachment proceedings resides in the state the action must be commenced in the county where he resides. Robbins v. Alley, 38 Ind. 553; Boorum v. Ray, 72 Ind. 151.

Attachment in one county against a non-resident will not confer jurisdiction over persons in other counties. Brown v. Underhill, 4 App. 77.

Actions may be commenced in any county where any of the parties reside who are liable in the first instance on contracts. Keiser v. Yandes, 45 Ind. 174; Lindley v. Kregelo, 121 Ind. 176.

Bastardy proceedings must be commenced in the county where the defendant resides if he is a resident of the state. Hawley v. State, ex rel., 69 Ind. 98.

Defendants jointly liable for a tort may be sued in the county where one resides. Shearer v. Evans, 89 Ind. 400.

Personal actions against residents and non-residents of the state should be brought in the county where the residents have their domiciles. McCauley v. Murdock, 97

Ind. 229.

Non-residents who are induced by a person to come into this state for a certain purpose can not, while here, be sued by such person. Wilson v. Donaldson, 117 Ind. 356. The latter clause of this section has no application to actions by assignees when the suit is in rem, and the party immediately liable is a non-resident. Singleton v. O'Blennis, 125 Ind. 151.

Actions may be commenced in this state against non-residents, and process served in any county where they are found. Reed v. Browning, 130 Ind. 575; Brown v. Underhill, 4 App. 77.

315. (313.) Foreign corporations.-36. Actions may be brought against a corporation created by or under the laws of any other state. government or county, in any court having jurisdiction of the amount demanded, by any person having a cause of action, in any county within the state, where any property, moneys, credits or effects belonging or due to the corporation may be found.