INDIANA STATUTES.

ART.

CHAPTER 1.

ACTS AND LAWS GOVERNING THE STATE.

1. THE LAW, AND WHEN IT TAKES EFFECT.

2. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

SEC.

ᎪᎡᎢ .

3. REPEAL AND EXCEPTIONS.

ARTICLE 1.-THE LAW, AND WHEN IT TAKES EFFECT.

236. Law of state.

237. Offenses defined.

SEC.

238. Clerk's certificate.

239. Governor's proclamation.

[1 R. S. 1852, p. 351. In force May 6, 1853.]

236. (236.) Law of state.-1. The law governing this state is

declared to be

First. The constitution of the United States and of this state. Second. All statutes of the general assembly of the state in force, and not inconsistent with such constitutions.

and

Third. All statutes of the United States in force, and relating to subjects over which congress has power to legislate for the states, not inconsistent with the constitution of the United States.

Fourth. The common law of England, and statutes of the British Parliament made in aid thereof prior to the fourth year of the reign of James the First (except the second section of the sixth chapter of forty-third Elizabeth, the eighth chapter of thirteenth Elizabeth, and the ninth chapter of thirty-seventh Henry the Eighth), and which are of a general nature, not local to that kingdom, and not inconsistent with the first, second and third specifications of this section.

This adoption of the common law, and English statutes in aid thereof, prior to the fourth year of James I (1607), with certain exceptions, has been repeated in every revision of our statutes since 1807. Stevenson v. Cloud, 5 Blkf. 92.

The common law prevails in Indiana in the absence of a domestic statute on the subject. Lafayette, etc., R. R. Co. v. Shriner, 6 Ind. 141; Dawson v. Coffman, 28 Ind. 220; Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198.

The statute of Anne, relating to the negotiability of promissory notes, is not in force in this state. Holloway v. Porter, 46 Ind. 62.

The principles of the statute of 43 Eliz., relating to charitable uses, with a few ex

ceptions, are in force in this state. McCord v. Ochiltree, 8 Blkf. 15. See Grimes v. Harmon, 35 Ind. 198.

Neither the common nor civil law canons of descent were ever in force in this state. Cloud v. Bruce, 61 Ind. 171.

237. (237.) Offenses defined.-2. Crimes and misdemeanors shall be defined, and punishment therefor fixed by statutes of this state and not otherwise.

There being no common law offenses in this state, all offenses must be defined by statute. Stephens v. State, 107 Ind. 185.

If statutes creating crimes do not define them they may be defined by the courts, or the common law definition may be adopted. Ardery v. State, 56 Ind. 328; State v. Berdetta, 73 Ind. 185.

The statute requiring crimes to be defined is not binding as a rule of legislation. State v. Oskins, 28 Ind. 364.

[1855, p. 204. In force August 17, 1855.]

238. (238.) Clerk's certificate.-1. It shall be the duty of the several clerks of circuit courts in this state, immediately on the receipt of the laws of any session, to transmit to the governor a certificate stating the day when such laws were so received.

239. (239.) Governor's proclamation.-2. So soon as certificates. from all the counties have been received, the governor shall issue and publish his proclamation, announcing the date at which the latest filing took place; of the facts contained in which proclamation all courts shall take notice.

The courts take judicial notice of the proclamation of the governor, as to the taking effect of the acts. State v. Baily, 16 Ind. 46.

SEC.

ARTICLE 2.-RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.

240. Statutes, how construed.

SEC.

241. Rules universal.

[2 R. S. 1852, p. 339. In force May 6, 1853.]

240. (240.) Statutes, how construed.-1. The construction of all statutes of this state shall be by the following rules, unless such construction be plainly repugnant to the intent of the Legislature or of the context of the same statute:

First. Words and phrases shall be taken in their plain, or ordinary and usual sense. But technical words and phrases, having a peculiar and appropriate meeting in law, shall be understood according to their technical import.

It is only when the intent of the legislature will be defeated that words will not be construed in their plain, ordinary and usual sense. Spaulding v. Harvey, 7 Ind. 429; Rourke v. Rourke, 8 Ind. 427.

Second. Words importing joint authority to three or more persons shall be construed as authority to a majority of such persons, unless otherwise declared in the law giving such authority.

A majority of the persons appointed to assess damages for property taken for a public use can act in the matter. Piper v. Connersville Co., 12 Ind. 400; Cicero Co. v.

Craighead, 28 Ind. 274; Evans v. Clermont Co., 51 Ind. 160; American Co. v. Huntington, etc., R. R. Co., 130 Ind. 98.

Two of the viewers of a proposed public highway may make a report. Scraper v. Pipes, 59 Ind. 158.

A majority of the school trustees of school corporations establishing graded schools may control such schools. Hanover Tp. v. Gant, 125 Ind. 557.

Third. The word "highway" shall include county bridges, state and county roads, unless otherwise expressly provided.

A public street is a public highway. State v. Mathis, 21 Ind. 277.

Every street is a highway, but every highway is not a street. Common Council v. Croas, 7 Ind. 9.

Fourth. The word "inhabitant" may be construed to mean a resident in any place.

Fifth. The word "month" shall mean a calendar month, and the, word "year" shall mean a calendar year, unless otherwise expressed; and the word "year" be equivalent to the words "year of our Lord.”

When a year is mentioned in judicial or legislative proceedings the Christian calendar is generally understood. Engleman v. State, 2 Ind. 91.

The word "month" may mean thirty days. Heaston v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co., 16 Ind. 275.

The 29th of February is counted as a day in computing time of service of process. Helphenstine v. Vincennes Bank, 65 Ind. 582.

Sixth. The words "preceding," and "following," referring to sections in statutes, shall be understood as meaning the sections next preceding or next following that in which such words occur, unless some other section is designated.

Seventh. The word "state," applied to any one of the United States, shall include the District of Columbia and the several territories; and the words "United States" shall include the said district and territories.

The District of Columbia is a "state" within the meaning of the statute regulating foreign insurance companies. State v. Briggs, 116 Ind. 55.

Eighth. The word "will" shall include the words "testament' and codicil."

Ninth. The words "written" and "in writing" shall include printing, lithographing, or other mode of representing words and letters. But in all cases where the written signature of any person is required, the proper handwriting of such person, or his mark, shall be intended.

A signature by mark is the same as a written signature of the person. Shank v. Butsch, 28 Ind. 19.

The signing of a christian name only may be a good signature. Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind. 136.

Tenth. When a statute requires an act to be done which, by law, an agent or deputy as well may do as the principal, such requisition shall be satisfied by the performance of such act by an authorized agent or deputy.

Deputies of clerks of circuit courts may take depositions on behalf of their principals. Trout v. Williams, 29 Ind. 18.

Eleventh. When a person is required to be disinterested or indifferent in acting on any question or matter affecting other parties, consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree, inclusive, by the civil law rules, or within the degree of second cousin, inclusive, shall be deemed to disqualify such person from acting, except by consent of parties.

The cousin of a party is an incompetent juror. Hudspeth v. Herston, 64 Ind. 133. The father-in-law of a party is incompetent to act. Bradley v. Frankfort, 99 Ind. 417. An officer can not act where he has a personal interest, or where persons related to him within the prohibited degrees are interested. Markley v. Rudy, 115 Ind. 533. If parties act in ignorance of the relationship the proceedings will be invalid. Hudspeth v. Herston, 64 Ind. 133.

In the construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature must, if possible, be ascertained from the act itself; and such intention will prevail over the literal meaning of the terms used therein. Clifford, ex parte, 29 Ind. 106.

Statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed. Gavin v. Shuman, 23 Ind. 32. Also those exempting persons or property from taxation. Trustees v. Ellis, 38 Ind. 3. So with penal statutes. Steel v. State, 26 Ind. 82. Remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. Tousey v. Bell, 23 Ind. 423.

Statutes providing for forfeitures are strictly construed. Sellers v. Beaver, 97 Ind. 111. Statutes importing the singular number may be applied to the plural. Garrigus v. Board, 39 Ind. 66.

Statutes passed at the same session of the legislature are to be construed in pari materia. State v. Rackley, 2 Blkf. 249; Indiana Canal Co. v. State, 53 Ind. 575.

The intent of a statute is to be ascertained from an examination of all its parts, and the intent may prevail over its literal import. Mayor v. Weems, 5 Ind. 547; Zorger v. Greensburgh, 60 Ind. 1; Storms v. Stevens, 104 Ind. 46; Stout v. Board, 107 Ind. 343.

241. (241.) Rules universal.-2. The foregoing rules of construction and definitions of terms shall be in addition to, and part of, those adopted in the code of civil practice, and, together with those, shall apply to all statutes or acts of the legislature.

242. (242.) Acts repealed.-1. All laws not enacted at the present session of the general assembly are repealed, except

First. Acts of incorporation and acts amending the same.

Second. Special acts vacating streets and alleys; or establishing or vacating towns or changing particular roads; or declaring streams navigable or highways.

Third. Special acts for the relief of individuals therein named.