That the amount of the judgment is excessive is no cause for a new trial. McIlvain v. State, ex rel., 80 Ind. 69; Hamilton v. State, ex rel., 117 Ind. 348.

The amount of the judgment to be rendered rests in the discretion of the court. Medler v. State, ex rel., 26 Ind. 171; Reeves v. State, ex rel., 37 Ind. 441; Scott v. State, ex rel., 102 Ind. 277.

The persons having the legal custody of the child are entitled to the money collected on the judgment. Bright v. Sexton, 18 Ind. 186; Heritage v. Hedges, 72 Ind. 247. Persons who have agreed to support the child in consideration of its being bound to them can not collect the money on the judgment. Young v. State, ex rel., 53 Ind. 536. If the child is not born alive no allowance can be made for its support. Canfield v. State, ex rel., 56 Ind. 168.

If suit is commenced before the birth of the child and it is afterward still-born, a judgment in favor of the mother may be rendered. Evans v. State, ex rel., 58 Ind. 587; Robinson v. State, ex rel., 128 Ind. 397.

It is discretionary with the court to make the deferred payments draw interest. Morris v. State, 'ex rel., 115 Ind. 282.

The provision authorizing the commitment of the defendant to jail is constitutional. Ex parte Teague, 41 Ind. 278.

The defendant can not be discharged from jail under the insolvent debtors act. Lower v. Wallick, 25 Ind. 68.

The defendant can only be released from jail by showing performance of the judgment, or in the manner provided by statute. Reynolds v. Lamount, 45 Ind. 308; Ex parte Haase, 50 Ind. 149.

When the defendant has been in jail for a year and shows to the court that he is unable to pay or replevy the judgment, he will be entitled to be discharged. State, ex rel., . Woodward, 123 Ind. 30.

If the defendant escapes after arrest the court on rendering judgment may order that he be arrested and committed to jail. Lucas v. Hawkins, 102 Ind. 64.

If the defendant escapes from jail and the officer is compelled to pay the judgment, he may rearrest the defendant and commit him to jail. Ex parte Voltz, 37 Ind. 237. Where the defendant escapes and is retaken and committed to jail, the officer can only be held liable for actual damages. State, ex rel., v. Newcomer, 109 Ind. 243; State, ex rel., v. Caldwell, 115 Ind. 6.

[2 R. S. 1852, p. 485. In force May 6, 1853.]

1005. (993.) Execution without relief.-16. Execution may issue on such judgments, whenever any amount is due on the same; and shall be executed without any relief whatever from valuation or appraisement laws.

[1875 S., p. 16. In force August 24, 1875.]

1006. (994.) Suit, how dismissed-Entry.-17. The prosecuting witness, if an adult, may, at any time before final judgment, dismiss such suit, if she will first enter of record an admission that provision for the maintenance of the child has been made to her satisfaction; and if such witness be a minor, she may dismiss such suit, if it be first shown to the satisfaction of the court in which the same is pending, that suitable provision has been made and properly secured for the maintenance of the child, and a finding of the court to that effect entered of record. And such entry, in either case, shall be a bar to all other prosecutions for the same cause and purpose.

The admission must be entered of record. Provision, without admission of record,

is no bar. Harness v. State, 57 Ind. 1; Fisher v. State, 65 Ind. 51; Reeves v. State, et rel., 37 Ind. 441.

A minor relatrix can only enter satisfaction by consent of the court. Malson v. State, ex rel., 75 Ind. 142.

If the record of a justice of the peace shows a substantial compliance with the statute on the dismissal by a minor relatrix, it will be sufficient. Allyn v. Allyn, 108 Ind. 327; Maker v. State, ex rel., 123 Ind. 378.

If the relatrix is induced by fraud to enter a dismissal and acknowledge that provision has been made for the support of the child, such record will not bar a subsequent suit. Gresly v. State, ex rel., 123 Ind. 72; Ice v. State, ex rel., 123 Ind. 590.

A settlement may be made and the suit dismissed which will bar another suit without the defendant having been arrested. Gipe v. State, ex rel., 40 Ind. 158.

A settlement made by an infant defendant is valid and may be enforced. Gavin v. Burton, 8 Ind. 69; Garner v. Cook, 30 Ind. 331.

Actions may be maintained to recover the consideration promised for the dismissal of the suit. Noble v. State, ex rel., 39 Ind. 352; Barker v. Wallace, 62' Ind. 71; Allyn v. Allyn, 108 Ind. 327; Smith v. Kirkpatrick, 58 Ind. 254; Moon v. Martin, 122 Ind. 211. Death of the child does not affect the right of recovery. Harter v. Johnson, 16 Ind. 271; Eaton v. Burns, 31 Ind. 390; Potter v. Earnest, 45 Ind. 416; Marshall v. Bell, 1 App. 506.

If the suit is dismissed the defendant is not liable for costs. Dodd v. State, ex rel., 30 Ind. 76.

[2 R. S. 1852, p. 485. In force May 6, 1853.]

1007. (995.) Limitation two years.-18. No prosecution under this act shall be instituted after two years from the birth of such bastard child.

Infancy of the mother does not extend the time for commencing the suit. State, ex rel., v. Pavey, 82 Ind. 543.

This section only applies to the institution of the suit, and not to the time of rendition of judgment or the arrest of the defendant. Patterson v. State, ex rel., 91 Ind. 364.

1008. (996.) Judgment may be reduced on child's death.—19. Upon the death of any bastard child after judgment rendered as aforesaid, and before the expiration of the time limited for the last payment on such judgment, the court rendering such judgment may make such reduction in the amount of the same as may be rendered proper and just in consequence of such death.

1009. (997.) Child's death not to abate or bar.-20. The death of a bastard child shall not be cause of abatement or bar to any prosecution for bastardy; but the court trying the same shall, on conviction, give judgment for such sum as shall be deemed just.

The death of the child does not affect proceedings after verdict. Evans v. State, 58 Ind. 587.

The still-birth of the child after verdict and before judgment is no cause for a new trial or for arrest of judgment. Evans v. State, 58 Ind. 587.

If it is alleged that the relatrix has been delivered of a bastard child, proof of the birth of a still-born child does not support the allegation. Canfield v. State, ex rel., 56 Ind. 168.

If suit is commenced during pregnancy, the birth of a still-born child will not prevent a judgment being rendered in favor of the mother. Robinson v. State, ex rel., 128 Ind. 397.

Death of the child will not defeat the collection of a note given on a compromise of bastardy proceedings. Marshall v. Bell, 1 App. 506.

1010. (998.) Prosecutor conducts suit.-21. The several prosecuting attorneys within their respective circuits shall prosecute all causes originating under this act.

1011. (999.) Defendant dying, action survives.-22. In case of the death of the putative father of such child, either before or after the commencement of prosecution, and after the preliminary examination before the justice, the right of action shall survive, and may be prosecuted against the personal representatives of the deceased with like effect as if such father were living, except that no arrest of such personal representatives shall take place or bond be required.

The right to prosecute survives against the estate of the putative father. State v. Williams, 8 Ind. 191.

And the mother is a competent witness. State v. Han, 23 Ind. 539.

SEC.

ARTICLE 34.-CHANGE OF NAME.

SEC.

1015. Proof of publication.
1016. Copy of decree evidence.

1012. Petition to circuit court. 1013. Application, where made.

1014. Notice by publication.

[2 R. S. 1852, p. 238. In force May 6, 1853.]

1012. (1000.) Petition to circuit court.-1. The circuit courts in the several counties of this state may change the names of persons and corporations on application by petition.

1013. (1001.) Application, where made.-2. The application of a person may be made to the circuit court of the county in which such person resides, and of a corporation to the circuit court of the county in which such corporation is situate or in which its principal office is located.

1014. (1002.) Notice by publication.-3. Upon a petition being filed for such change, the applicant shall give notice thereof by three weekly publications in some newspaper of general circulation printed and published in the proper county, or, if no newspaper be printed therein, in a newspaper printed and published nearest thereto in some adjoining county, thirty days prior to the first day of the term at which such petition shall be heard.

1015. (1003.) Proof of publication.-4. Proof of the publication required in this act shall be made by filing a copy of such published notice, verified by the affidavit of a disinterested person; and when such proof of such publication is made, the court shall proceed to hear and determine said petition, and make such order and decree therein. as to such court shall seem just and reasonable.

1016. (1004.) Copy of decree evidence.-5. A copy of the decree of such court, changing the name of any person or corporation, certified under the seal of such court by the clerk thereof, shall be sufficient evidence of the name of such person or corporation, and of such change having been made, in any court of this state.

1017. (1005.) Direct-Disturbing business of court.-1. Every person who shall, by the commission of any felony, misdemeanor, or other unlawful act; or who by talking, moving about, or by signs, or gestures, or in any other manner, in any court of record, while the same is open for the transaction of business, and engaged therein, create any noise or confusion therein, whereby the business and proceedings of said court shall be disturbed, shall be deemed to be guilty of a direct contempt of said court.

Direct contempt is where the act is committed in the presence of, or so near to the 'court, as to interrupt the proceedings thereof. Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196; Ex parte Wright, 65 Ind. 504; Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513.

Disrespectful conduct of an attorney towards the court constitutes a contempt. Redman v. State, 28 Ind. 205.

Courts of superior jurisdiction have an inherent power to determine what are contempts, and to punish the same, which power can not be abridged by the legislature. Little v. State, 90 Ind. 338; Holman v. State, 105 Ind. 513; Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301; Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570.

An attorney can not be summarily disbarred for a contempt of court. Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47.

1018. (1006.) Direct-Refusing to testify, etc.-2. Every person who being sworn to testify as a witness in any court of record, in any trial or proceeding therein, shall refuse to testify touching the same; or who, being required by any court to be sworn in any such trial or proceeding, shall refuse to take an oath or affirmation therein; or who, while upon the witness stand, shall purposely so demean himself as to retard or disturb the proceedings thereof shall be deemed guilty of a direct contempt thereof.

1019. (1007.) Indirect-Disobeying process.-3. Every person who shall be guilty of any willfull disobedience of any process or any order lawfully issued by any court of record, or by the proper officer thereof under the authority of law or the direction of such court, after the same shall have been served upon him, shall be guilty of an indirect contempt of the court from which such process or order shall have issued.

Refusal to obey process after service is prima facie a contempt. Wilson v. State, 57 Ind. 71.

Refusal to appear before a grand jury after service of process constitutes a contempt. Baldwin v. State, 126 Ind. 24.

Disobeying restraining orders or injunctions constitute contempts. Mowrer v. State, 107 Ind. 539; Hawkins v. State, 126 Ind. 294.

Courts in which a cause is pending may punish contempts committed by the disobeying of process issued to another county. Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570. Refusal to surrender possession of property in obedience to an order of court is a contempt. Hawkins v. State, 125 Ind. 570.

1020. (1008.) Indirect-Resisting process, etc.-4. Every person who shall willfully resist, hinder, or delay the execution of any lawful process or order of any court of record shall be guilty of an indirect contempt of said court. And every person who shall offer, give, or promise any reward, or who shall threaten to assault or injure, or shall assault or beat, or in any other manner whatever influence or intimidate, or attempt to influence, any witness to give or abstain from giving testimony in any case, or to abstain from attending as such witness in any case; or who shall do any act to put such witness in fear, on account of any testimony which he or she may have given; or who, on account of any such testimony, shall injure or threaten to injure such witness-shall be guilty of a direct or indirect contempt of the court in which such witness may be called to testify, according as the same may be done in the presence of such court or elsewhere out of the presence thereof.

The taking of a minor who is a party to a suit out of the jurisdiction of the court, with the consent of the minor, is not a contempt. Whittem v. State, 36 Ind. 196.

The inducing of a person to be absent so that he can not be summoned before the grand jury is not a contempt when no subpoena has been issued for such person. McConnell v. State, 46 Ind. 298.

The preventing of a person from being summoned as a witness after a subpoena has been issued is a contempt. Haskett v. State, 51 Ind. 176.

1021. (1009.) Indirect-False report of trial.-5. Every person who shall falsely make, utter, or publish any false or grossly inaccurate report of any case, trial, or proceeding, or part of any case, trial, or proceeding thereof, shall be deemed guilty of an indirect contempt of the court in which such case, trial, or proceeding may have been instituted, held, or determined, if made at any time after such proceeding shall have been commenced, and at any time while the same is pending, and while the court shall have jurisdiction thereof, and at any time before it shall be fully determined and ended, or, if such report be so made pending such case, trial, or proceeding, touching any ruling, or order of said court therein, such person shall be deemed guilty of an indirect contempt of the court making such ruling or order.

As to what publications in a newspaper will constitute a contempt, see Worland v. State, 82 Ind. 49; Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301.

Publications as to past proceedings do not constitute contempts. Cheadle v. State, 110 Ind. 301.

1022. (1010.) Punishment.-6. Punishments for contempts of court, under this act, may be by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court inflicting the same; but no fine shall exceed the sum of five hundred dollars, nor shall any imprisonment extend beyond the term of three months.