Fifth. To maintain inviolate the confidence, and, at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his client.

Sixth. To abstain from all offensive personality, and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged.

Seventh. Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding from any motive of passion or in

terest.

Eighth. Never to reject, from any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed.

Attorneys should maintain a respectful bearing toward the court, and refrain from abusive language, and courts have power to enforce such conduct. Redman v. State, 28 Ind. 205.

An attorney must act with the most scrupulous good faith towards his clients. Judah v. University, 23 Ind. 272; Hughes v. Willson, 128 Ind. 491.

An attorney can not act for a party after he has been consulted by the opposite party. Wilson v. State, 16 Ind. 392; Price v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ind. 137.

If an attorney in the general course of business obtains knowledge of his client's affairs, he will not, for that reason, be precluded from appearing against such client in a suit. Price v. Grand Rapids, etc., R. R. Co., 18 Ind. 137.

When the interest of

each side of an action.

parties are not adverse an attorney may represent parties on Wallace v. Furber, 62 Ind. 103.

Attorneys can not use information obtained by virtue of their employment for their own gain to the detriment of their clients. Downard v. Hadley, 116 Ind. 131.

Communications made by witnesses to a prosecuting attorney are not privileged communications. State v. Van Buskirk, 59 Ind. 384.

Attorneys are under no legal obligations to make affidavits or to execute bonds for their clients. Foulks v. Falls, 91 Ind. 315.

An attorney is liable to his client for the consequences of his ignorance, carelessness and unskillfulness. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 29 Ind. 435; Walpole v. Carlisle, 32 Ind. 415; Skillen v. Wallace, 36 Ind. 319; Jones v. White, 90 Ind. 255; Moorman v. Wood, 117 Ind. 144; Citizens' Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143.

Attorneys should be acquainted with the settled rules of law and practice in the courts where they practice. Hillegass v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225.

The giving of an erroneous opinion in a case where well informed lawyers might differ will not render an attorney liable for damages. Citizens' Ass'n v. Friedley, 123 Ind. 143.

If a client does not see fit to follow the advise of his attorney, the attorney should obey the instructions of the client. Nave v. Lane, 12 Ind. 318.

When necessary to protect the interest of the client, an attorney should cause a judgment to be taken against himself. Moorman v. Wood, 117 Ind. 144.

An attorney is not liable in an action for money collected until after a demand. Black v. Hersch, 18 Ind. 342; Pierse v. Thornton, 44 Ind. 235; Claypool v. Gish, 108 Ind. 424.

An attorney may, in certain cases, be taxed with the costs of a cause. Brown, 4 Ind. 627; Loveland v. Jones, 4 Ind. 184.

Brown v.

Communications between an attorney and client should not be disclosed without the consent of the client. Jenkinson v. State, 5 Blkf. 465; Borum v. Fouts, 15 Ind. 50; Bowers v. Briggs, 20 Ind. 139; Bigler v. Reyher, 43 Ind. 112.

980. (968.) Authority of attorney.-837. An attorney has authority, until discharged or suspended by another—

First. To bind his client in an action or special proceeding, by his agreement filed with the clerk, or entered upon the minutes of the court, and not otherwise.

Second. To receive money claimed by his client in an action or special proceeding, during the pendency thereof or afterward, and, upon the payment thereof, and not otherwise, to discharge the claim or acknowledge satisfaction of the judgment.

An attorney can not, without special authority, bind his client in matters not connected with the litigation in which he is employed. Osborn v. Storms, 65 Ind. 321. An attorney may enter a retraxit in a cause. Barnard v. Daggett, 68 Ind. 305.

An attorney can not by agreement extend the time in which an appeal may be taken. Railway Co. v. Boland, 70 Ind. 595.

Nor can he verbally extend the time fixed by the court for filing a bill of exceptions. Goben v. Goldsberry, 72 Ind. 44.

An attorney can only enter satisfaction of a judgment when the amount due thereon is paid in money. McCormick v. Walter A. Wood Co., 72 Ind. 518; Holliday v. Thomas, 90 Ind. 398.

An attorney can not transfer the claims of his client. Russell v. Drummond, 6 Ind. 216.

He has no authority to compromise the claims of his clients. Wakeman v. Jones, 1 Ind. 517; Insurance Co. v. Buchanan, 100 Ind. 63.

An attorney in proceedings to condemn property has no authority to receive the damages assessed. Test v. Larsh, 98 Ind. 301.

An attorney may consent to the entry of a judgment against his client. Hudson v. Allison, 54 Ind. 215. See Jarrett v. Andrews, 19 Ind. 403; Thompson v. Pershing, 86 Ind. 303.

Attorneys have power to control executions issued in favor of their clients. State, ex rel., v. Boyd, 63 Ind. 428.

The general authority of an attorney ceases with the entry of judgment in the cause. Hillegass v. Bender, 78 Ind. 225.

Death of the client terminates the authority of the attorney. Rundles v. Jones, 3 Ind. 35; Harness v. State, ex rel., 57 Ind. 1.

Admissions made by an attorney on a trial will not bind the client on a subsequent West v. Cavins, 74 Ind. 265.

trial.

It is doubtful if an attorney can extend the time given by statute for filing a motion for a new trial. American Co. v. Clark, 123 Ind. 230.

Attorneys may receive money paid upon judgments in favor of their clients. Newman v. Kiser, 128 Ind. 258.

An attorney who merely appears as amicus can not take a valid exception. Campbell v. Swasey, 12 Ind. 70; Darlington v. Warner, 14 Ind. 449.

The appearance and answer of an attorney for an infant is a nullity. De La Huntv. Holderbaugh, 58 Ind. 285.

An attorney may bind his client by an agreement entered of record that proceedings have been had in a cause that are not shown by the record. Garrigan v. Dickey, 1 App. 421.

981. (969.) Written authority, when necessary.-838. No judgment shall be rendered against any party upon the agreement of an attorney, nor any judgment by default, where the party has not been notified, or personally entered his appearance, unless the written authority of the party be first produced, and its execution proved to the satisfaction of the court.

982. (970.) When to produce authority.-839. The court or judge may, on motion of either party, and on showing reasonable ground therefor, or without such motion, require an attorney to produce and prove the authority under which he appears, and until he does so, may stay all proceedings by him on behalf of the party for whom he assumes to appear.

The right of an attorney to appear must be questioned before the beginning of the trial. Indiana, etc., R. W. Co. v. Maddy, 103 Ind. 200.

As to what is a sufficient showing of authority to appear, see Hughes v. Osborn, 42 Ind. 450.

983. (971.) Relief against act-Repair of injury.-840. If it be alleged by a party for whom an attorney appears, that he does so without authority, the court may, at any stage of the proceedings, relieve such party from the consequences of the attorney's act. It may, also, summarily, upon motion, compel the attorney to repair the injury consequent upon his assumption of authority.

An appearance, although unauthorized, is binding upon the party until set aside. Bush v. Bush, 46 Ind. 70.

The appearance by an attorney without authority is no cause for proceedings in review of judgment. Floyd, etc., Association v. Tompkins, 23 Ind. 348.

Where an attorney appears without authority and judgment is taken by default, the defendant may appear and set up a defense. Floyd, etc., Association v. Tompkins, 23 Ind. 348; Wiley v. Pratt, 23 Ind. 628; Coon v. Welborn, 83 Ind. 230.

984. (972.) Deceit or collusion of attorney-Damages-Penalty. -841. An attorney who is guilty of deceit or collusion, or consents thereto, with intent to deceive a court or judge or a party to an action or judicial proceeding, is punishable for a misdemeanor, and shall also forfeit to the party injured treble damages, recoverable in a civil

action.

985. (973.) Suspending attorney-Causes.-842. Any court of record may suspend an attorney from practicing therein for any of the following causes:

First. When he has been convicted of a felony, or of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude, in either of which cases the record of conviction is conclusive evidence.

Second. When he is guilty of a willful disobedience or violation of the order of court, requiring him to do or forbear an act connected with or in course of his profession.

Third. For a willful violation of any of the duties of an attorney, as herein before prescribed.

may suspend

This section is held to read "any court of record having jurisdiction an attorney. The Marion Criminal Court is not such a court. Mattler v. Schaffner, 53 Ind. 245.

Proceedings to disbar for the commission of a crime may precede a criminal prosecution therefor. Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461.

Attorneys can only be suspended from practice for the causes specified in the statute. Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214; Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind.

An attorney can not be suspended for the misconduct of his partner. Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341; Kepler v. Klingensmith, 50 Ind. 434.

Forging and filing an affidavit in a cause is grounds for suspending an attorney. Ex parte Walls, 64 Ind. 461.

The board of county commissioners can not suspend an attorney. Garrigus v. State, 93 Ind. 239.

A trial by jury may be had in proceedings to suspend an attorney. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214.

An appeal lies from proceedings to suspend an attorney, but such appeal does not stay the effect of the judgment of suspension. Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493; Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463.

986. (974.) Refusal to pay money-Proceedings.-843. When an attorney, on request, refuses to deliver over money or papers to a person from whom or for whom he has received them in the course of his professional employment, whether in an action or not, he may be required, after reasonable notice, on motion of any party aggrieved, by an order of the court in which an action, if any, was prosecuted (or if no action was prosecuted, then by the order of any court of record) to do so, within a specified time, or show cause why he should not be punished for contempt.

This section contemplates a special proceeding by notice and motion; the proceeding can not be had as merely ancillary to an action for debt. Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463.

The charges hereunder must be definite, and contain a specific statement of the facts relied upon for punishment. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214.

The refusal of an attorney to pay over money collected is not, per se, a cause for disbarment or suspension. Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463.

987. (975.) Judgment-Execution.-844. In cases contemplated in the last preceding section, on such motion, or in an action brought by the party aggrieved, the court may suspend the attorney from practice in any of the courts of this state, for any length of time, in its discretion. Judgment may also be rendered for the amount of money withheld, deducting fees, if any are due, and costs paid by the attorney, with ten per cent. damages, which may be enforced by execution, without the benefit of stay or appraisement laws, and returnable within thirty days. The court may also render any judgment, and make any order respecting papers or property withheld, that may be necessary to enforce the right of the party aggrieved, subject to any liens the attorney may have thereon for fees.

In an action solely for the recovery of money collected, a judgment suspending an attorney from practice can not be rendered. Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463.

In a proper case an attorney may be suspended and a money judgment also rendered. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214.

988. (976.) Complaint to remove or suspend, how made.-845. The proceedings to remove or suspend an attorney may be commenced by the direction of the court or on motion of an individual. In the former case, the court may direct some attorney to draw up and prosecute the accusation; in the latter case, it may be drawn up by any

person, and sworn to by the person making it. Such accusation may be filed in any court in which the attorney practices; and after five days' notice of the filing, the attorney shall be bound to appear and plead to the same, or suffer judgment by default. If he appear, pleadings may be filed and trial had as in other cases.

An attorney can only be suspended from practice when a complaint is filed for that purpose. Heffren v. Jayne, 39 Ind. 463; Ex parte Trippe, 66 Ind. 531.

The complaint must specify the particular misconduct of the attorney. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214.

The statutes for suspension and disbarments of attorneys are penal, and must be strictly construed. Ex parte Smith, 28 Ind. 47; Klingensmith v. Kepler, 41 Ind. 341. An attorney against whom charges of malpractice are preferred is entitled to trial by jury as to the issues of fact formed. Reilly v. Cavanaugh, 32 Ind. 214.

989. (977.) Acquittal final-Appeal on conviction-Reinstatement.-846. In proceedings to remove or suspend an attorney, a judgment of acquittal shall be final and without appeal. But from a judgment of suspension or removal, or any other judgment against an attorney, the accused may appeal to the supreme court, in the same manner as from a judgment in a civil action. A motion may be made at any time to reinstate an attorney who has been suspended or removed.

An appeal from an order suspending an attorney does not have the effect of allowing him to continue to practice pending an appeal. Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493.

An application for reinstatement of an attorney may be made orally, no pleadings being contemplated, and is triable only by the court. Ex parte Walls, 73 Ind. 95. Attorneys appointed by the court for poor persons can not be compelled to render their services without compensation. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.

Counties are liable for the services of attorneys appointed by the court for poor persons. Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13.

Courts appointing attorneys for poor persons may fix their compensation. Board v. Wood, 35 Ind. 70; Gordon v. Board, 44 Ind. 475; Gordon v. Board, 52 Ind. 322; Board t. Courtney, 105 Ind. 311; State v. Miller, 107 Ind. 39.

As to the recovery of attorneys' fees when provided for in contracts, see Billingsley . Dean, 11 Ind. 331; Smith v. Silvers, 32 Ind. 321; Tuley v. McClung, 67 Ind. 10; Smiley v. Meir, 47 Ind. 559; Brown v. Barber, 59 Ind. 533; Proctor v. Baldwin, 82 Ind. 370; Smith v. Bank, 29 Ind. 158; Johnson v. Crossland, 34 Ind. 334; Churchman v. Martin, 54 Ind. 380; Goss v. Bowen, 104 Ind. 207; Harvey v. Baldwin, 124 Ind. 59; Holmes v. Hinkle, 63 Ind. 518; Kennedy v. Richardson, 70 Ind. 524; Bond v. Orndorf, 77 Ind. 583; Ogborn v. Eliason, 77 Ind. 393.

As to the right of attorneys to take a lien on judgments for their fees, see Johnson . Ballard, 44 Ind. 270; Blair v. Lanning, 61 Ind. 499; Adams v. Lee, 82 Ind. 587; Puett v. Beard, 86 Ind. 172; Day v. Bowman, 109 Ind. 383; Alderman v. Nelson, 111 Ind. 255; Putnam v. Tennyson, 50 Ind. 456.

Attorneys have equitable liens on funds that are secured by their services. Justice v. Justice, 115 Ind. 201.