the President acting by himself, and on the weight entirely of his own opinions and his own responsibility to exercise his veto power. The reasons, given by the President for using his veto power in this case, are in fact what would be considered a very feeble and a very inconclusive argument, if uttered by a member of Congress as the justification of the vote he was about to give.

The President, it is true, speaks of "discharging the high duty imposed upon him by the Constitution," but it is only after showing that it was, as he conceives, imposed upon him not by the Constitution, but by a combination of two acts of Congress itself the Compromise act and the Distribution act. The whole argument of the message rests simply upon the assumption, that the Compromise act is a fundamental law, a sacred compact of the highest moral obligation, binding on this and on all future generations, and that the Distribution act is a part of this law, because it refers to it, and is therefore equally binding and equally sacred. The whole argument of the Message is a commentary on these two laws, upon the particular expressions made use of, upon the intention of their framers, upon the circumstances connected with them, and which go to throw light upon those intentions, exactly as if it was an article of the Constitution which was the subject of interpretation. The whole argument rests upon an assumed assimilation of these statutes to the Constitution itself. There is no pretence of any other. After speaking of the "high moral obligation" of the compromise act, he goes on to say, that "he regards the suspension of the law for the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands in certain cases as an indispensable condition of this universal acquiescence, and the harmony, and confidence, and many other benefits that will certainly result from it." He then states the cases in which, according to the act of September, the distribution is to cease, namely, in case of war and in case of the rate of duties being raised above 20 per cent, and adds, "nothing can be more clear, express, or imperative than this language.

It is in vain to allege that a deficit in the Treasury was known to exist." He speaks of the spirit and principle of the statute even, being binding on the present Congress. He maintains that the President may veto an act of Congress, because it violates, as he conceives, a former act, which he regards as essential to the universal acquiescence, and the harmony, and confidence, and the many other benefits that will certainly result from another act, which "he has always regarded as of the highest moral obligation," "whatever in theory may be its character;" and because it severs a connexion "meant to be inseparable" between the supplementary law and the original and solemn law. Meant to be inseparable-by whom? — Not certainly by the framers of the first law! - for they could not have anticipated the second; but by the framers of the second law. According to Mr. Tyler, then, it is sufficient to launch one law, which a President considers to be of a high moral obligation, upon the current of legislation, and every law emendatory, explanatory, or declaratory, which any future Congress may mean to be attached inseparably to it, will be so attached, and will float down the stream with it to all future ages.

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What difference does it make, whether this connexion was meant to be inseparable? What difference does it make "how clear, express, or imperative is the language," as addressed to those over whom they can have no control? and if, as I contend, both statutes can be done away with by the same power that made them, and that power chooses to abrogate them? What difference does it make, how much harmony and confidence has been the result of these laws, if they no longer continue to produce it; and how can they continue to preserve harmony and confidence, when the majority of Congress are already determined to abrogate them, and when in fact the whole country is in a violent state of fermentation and discord upon the subject of their continuance ? What difference does it make how long they have been acquiesced in, if that acquiescence has at last ceased? And how

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can they derive any recommendation from that acquiescence, when that acquiescence is at an end? Is it not an insult to the present Congress, to tell them that that was meant to be inseparable, which they have a right to separate; that that is universally acquiesced in, to which they refuse their acquiescence; that that alone will produce harmony, to which they are all opposed; that that is demanded by a great majority of the people, which they, the legal, constitutional representatives of the majority of the people, protest against ?

The whole question is, - Is there anything in the nature or character of the compromise act, which can prevent its being abrogated in the same manner in which it was created? Is the compromise act an exception to the general rule, which governs not only the statutory law, but even the Constitution of the United States? And if it is, can it communicate this virtue to every other statute, which the President or any succeeding Congress shall declare, or the President thinks that they mean, shall be inseparably connected with it? Is the President to be the judge of the moral obligation of every statute, and is he to force his convictions upon Congress?

The President does not condescend to give the reasons why he "regards the compromise act as imposing the highest moral obligation." He seems to consider it sufficient that he has always so regarded it, "whatever may be in theory its character." In other words, whatever may be the technical, usual, legal, essential effect of the act itself, it is enough that he so regards it. The fact of his so regarding it is, in his opinion, enough. It is of more consequence to him as a ground of action, than the nature of the act. This doctrine certainly would put an end to all argument on the subject, if it could be admitted; and that probably was its intention. But for my part I consider that the nature of the transaction is everything, and the mode in which the President regards it nothing, unless based upon considerations derived from its nature, from its technical character, or, as he calls it, "its character in theory." I have never been able to find any reason

for regarding it in any different light from any other statute, except its name. But if its name is to have any effect, it would be first necessary to ascertain who gave it that name. I believe it will be found that it is a mere nick-name, that there is no more authority for it than for that of the "little Tariff Bill," "the Sub-Treasury Bill," "the Gag Law," and other equally picturesque but insignificant epithets; and that it has just as much to do with the nature of the law it serves to distinguish, and is of about as much significance as a guide for interpretation. It would, in fact, make no difference in the nature of the transaction, if the bill had been entitled "an act to compromise, &c." Congress cannot, by baptism, give any different nature to a law. If they had called it "an addition to the Constitution," it would not have made it so. If they had entitled it "a solemn contract," it would not have made it anything else but a statute law. They were commissioned to make an act of Congress. They could make nothing but an act of Congress, having all the efficacy, the power, the permanence of an act of Congress, and no more; and having also all the frailties, the liabilities, and the conditions of such an act, one of the most inseparable of which is the being abrogated, amended, or changed, whenever their constituents, or their successors, should find it for their interest to do so. If they agreed to anything else, they agreed to what they had no commission for, no warrant for. The compromise then consisted simply in an agreement to pass that law, in preference to any other law that might have been passed. It could consist in nothing else. Anything more was out of their power. When that law was passed, the compromise was executed and fulfilled. The passing of the act was itself the compromise. It was both agreement and performance. There were a great variety of opinions and interests to be conciliated, some demanding one law and some another; and they were compromised by passing the law in question, instead of some other law which might have passed. But I cannot see that this could alter the nature or

the obligation of the act in which the compromise resulted, or that it would have made any difference, whether it was one of the extreme laws on either side which was passed, or some medium between them.

If the compromise had resulted not in a law, but in an alteration of the Constitution, that would have been a compromise which the subsequent legislation of Congress could not affect, and which could only be abrogated or altered by the same power and the same process by which it was entered into. But even then it could have been altered, for change is the inseparable condition even of our Constitution. There were difficulties and dissensions at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, which were got over by a compromise, by several compromises, compromises between the Constitution, such as the Convention made it and a majority of the States accepted it, and the wishes of the dissenting or reluctant States. These States were then independent and sovereign States, perfectly free and unconnected with the assenting States, and driven by no compulsion to accept the Constitution. And will it be pretended that those articles, which were the result of this compromise, could not now be amended? Or that there is any principle of honor or good faith, any "moral obligation" to prevent the people whenever they please to alter or amend these articles of the Constitution, as well as all the others, when the Constitution itself provides for the alteration of the whole? Is it pretended that they are of a more sacred or obligatory nature than the rest of the Constitution? The whole Constitution is a compromise, by which it was agreed to pass that constitution in preference to some other constitution, or articles which some of the contracting States might have preferred. It is a compromise Constitution. Every act of Congress is in this sense a compromise act. They are all compromises of conflicting interests and opinions, each party conceding by way of compromise what it cannot help, and getting all it can. And is this compromise act alone of all the constitutions and