credit, bankrupt and unpopular, and already sinking under its difficulties, -that an administration, which should be thankful, that cannot be too thankful, that those who have the power of granting the taxes should not seek to embarrass it and drive it from power by withholding from it the necessary supplies, - should reject those supplies, although every way sufficient, because the mode of raising them is not exactly the one, or does not include the one which it thinks expedient, does seem to border somewhat on insanity.

It is impossible, in short, to imagine a case in which the power in question could manifest a greater tendency to abuse, a greater facility for exaggeration; or which could more forcibly illustrate the impossibility of the government's being carried on, or the danger of its being often brought to a stop, with such a triple complication of the legislative power. The community is at present so stunned with this blow to their industry, so occupied with the effect it is to have in prolonging those sufferings which have so long required all their care, that they do not look at the still more fatal and permanent effect which it is to have upon the Constitution, and upon the present march of their government. Their own industry, which has been so long in distress, and is almost at its last gasp, has all their sympathy and all their concern. Their political Constitution they think is so strong, they have such confidence in its strength, that they do not give one moment's anxiety to the trials and the exposures which it undergoes. But whatever may be the effects of this exercise of the veto power upon the industry of the country, of which it wantonly prolongs the inactivity, who, that takes time to consider it, can anticipate, without much more serious alarm, the effect upon the government of the country of this collision between the Executive and the Legislature ? Who can see any prospect of its termination, without a concession to the Executive, which would be an act of cowardice, a selling of their political birthright for their mess of pottage, which, much as the whole community in this part

of the country is interested that it should be made, so far as his property is concerned, nothing can justify, except a determination to apply a different and a better remedy to the abuses, for which this act of usurpation might serve as a precedent, — the only remedy which can be permanently effectual, the only one which can be applied without a contest, and without an interruption of the functions of the government, a change of the Constitution? If the Constitution is to remain as it is, ought Congress to yield to the President any more than he to them? Ought the Legislature to allow the Executive to dictate to them the mode of raising the taxes, if they can by an exercise of their powers prevent it? What right has he to object to their taxing themselves in their own way, or to any extent which they please? What right has he to compel them to limit their power of taxation, any more than he has to compel them to increase it, by a threat of stopping his own government? If they are willing to tax themselves more than they need, rather than to renounce the performance of what they consider an act of justice, or the execution of an act of policy, what right has he, when he has assented to the justice, to the policy, and to the constitutionality of that act, to compel them by a monstrous, tyrannical, unconstitutional exercise of his prerogative to renounce it?

We all know the impracticable, irritable obstinacy of Mr. Tyler. What then, with the Constitution as it is at present, is to be the result of this collision, in which he will not, and Congress cannot, recede without abandoning their most sacred duty? What is to be the effect of a bankrupt treasury; of a government without the means of paying its debts or its expenses? Is there any mode by which Congress may extricate themselves from their present situation, without such an abandonment of duty? If Congress is reduced to the necessity of defending itself against such a usurpation of the President, not by a change of the Constitution, but by a vigorous exercise of their own prerogatives, I see but one, and

that is impeachment. If they neglect that method of confining the different parts of the government within their allotted spheres, which is furnished to them by the nature and mode of formation of our Constitution, they must by necessity adopt that, by which, in governments founded on precedent, each part restrains the others within their own limits, - a vigor in the exercise of their own powers for defence proportioned to that of those by which they are invaded. In the present case the duty of defending their own prerogative, and of opposing a dangerous precedent of usurpation, imposes upon Congress the alternative either of an impeachment or of an amendment of the Constitution. The disorder and delay which an impeachment would produce in the administration of affairs, the folly of making such a contest a regular part of the mechanism of our government, when the Constitution offers us so obvious a remedy, is therefore one of the principal arguments in favor of an amendment of the Constitution, and is admirably illustrated in practice by the case in hand. If there is in this case no right of impeachment, it is only because the proper remedy is a change of the Constitution. But with the Constitution as it is, although, for various considerations peculiar to this case, and still more because the enormity of the abuse and the tendency to still further excess which it discloses, must ultimately result in a change of the Constitution, I should be sorry to see it made use of. I cannot but think that an impeachment might very well be resorted to, and that if Mr. Tyler escapes it, he will not owe it to a want of constitutional power, but to the policy and prudence of a party from whom certainly he has no right to expect indulgence.

The Constitution provides that "the President, Vice President, and other civil officers of the United States shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors." It is a common notion that these high crimes and misdemeanors must be intentional violations of duty. But it seems to me

a much more just and necessary construction would be to include under it any grave maladministration, whether arising from incapacity, misconception, or usurpation intended or mistaken. I can imagine no case of maladministration, no case of incapacity, no case of usurpation which can call more imperatively for the remedy of an impeachment, than one which, like the present, brings the government to a stop, and in which the executive, by encroaching upon the legislative power to an extent which would make our government purely monarchical, and by requiring their submission as the condition on which the government is to go on, either compels an absolute obedience to his will, or puts a stop to all the mechanism of government, makes the State a bankrupt, and subjects us to the danger of a revolution.

It is said that the President here merely exercises a constitutional right, that he merely exersises a power which the Constitution gives him, and that he cannot be impeached for any exercise, however excessive, of a constitutional right. But the spirit is as obligatory as the letter; and in this case it may be truly said that the letter killeth while the spirit maketh alive. If the House of Representatives and two thirds of the Senate, with the Chief Justice, should be of opinion that the object of the veto power was not to give to the President a share in the legislative power, to make a legislature with three branches, but to give it to him for the purpose, and to be exercised in the manner in which it had been exercised in all the countries in which it existed at the time of the formation of our Constitution, and to prevent wilful and flagrant violations of the Constitution; if they should be of opinion that to use his Veto for any other purpose is to usurp a legislative power which he was not intended to have; if they should find that in consequence of this usurpation, which they were bound by their duty not to submit to, the government was brought to a complete stop, the Treasury bankrupt, the public faith violated; I do not see why the House of Representatives should not impeach, and the Senate remove him.

"All legislative power herein granted," says the first section of the first article of the Constitution, "shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives." The President is not even made a part of this Congress, of this legislative power, as the King is of the Parliament, or legislative power in England. But if the President is to use literally, and to the full letter, his veto power, if he is to use it as Mr. Tyler has done, I do not see that he wants any other to make himself absolute dictator, and to absorb all the powers of the government. If the President is to make this absolute, unlimited, and literal use of his Veto, I know of no power of the House of Representatives to counterbalance it, to bring it into harmony with theirs, and to prevent its being downright despotism, but the power of impeachment. I know of no power of theirs, or any other branch of the government, behind which they can intrench themselves, and by which they can make good the defence of their legislative power, except by giving a commensurate extension, a proportionate vigor to this power of theirs. I think that if the Constitution could not be changed, they would not only be justified, but are called upon, by their regard to the Constitution, to exercise it for this purpose. If the President will not content himself to use this power for the purpose for which all cotemporary history, -all cotemporary exposition demonstrate that it was intended, the protection of his own prerogaative, and will make use of it to invade their peculiar province, they can only defend themselves, by giving an equal vigor, an equal extension to the powers with which the Constitution has armed them.

There could be no better illustration of this position than the present emergency. If the Congress should refuse to yield to the opinion of Mr. Tyler, and should adjourn without passing any revenue bill which he could approve, if he should again convene them, and with the same result; when, I ask, is this difficulty to terminate, if we are not relieved