under the authority of a state charter may have been lawful when
erected and not an obstruction to commerce as then carried on, the
owners erected it with knowledge of the paramount authority of Con-
gress over navigation and subject to the power of Congress to exercise
its authority to protect navigation by forbidding maintenance when
it became an obstruction thereto. Ib.
4. Abrogation by Interstate Commerce Act of common-law remedy for recovery
of unreasonable charges.
Texas & Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., ante, p. 426, followed
as to abrogation by passage of Interstate Commerce Act of common-
law remedy for recovery of unreasonable freight charges on interstate
shipment where rates charged were those duly fixed by the carrier
according to the act and which had not been found unreasonable by
Interstate Commerce Commission. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cisco
Oil Mill, 449.
5. Right of shipper to maintain action in state court for unreasonable freight
rates where rates had been fixed in conformity with Interstate Commerce
Act and found not unreasonable by Commerce Commission.
The Interstate Commerce Act was intended to afford an effective and
comprehensive means for redressing wrongs resulting from unjust dis-
criminations and undue preference, and to that end placed upon car-
riers the duty of publishing schedules of reasonable and uniform rates;
and, consistently with the provisions of that law, a shipper cannot
maintain an action at common law in a state court for excessive and
unreasonable freight rates exacted on interstate shipments where the
rates charged were those which had been duly fixed by the carrier
according to the act and had not been found to be unreasonable by
the Interstate Commerce Commission. Ib.
6. Rates; when tariff in force; effect of not posting.
A tariff of rates of which schedules have been filed by a carrier with the
Interstate Commerce Commission and also with its freight agents
is in force and operative although the copies thereof may not have
been posted in the carrier's depots as required by the act. Such post-
ing is not a condition precedent to the establishment of the rates, but
a provision for affording facilities to the public for ascertaining the
rates actually in force. Ib.
7. When a shipment ceases to be interstate commerce.
An interstate shipment-in this case of car-load lots-on reaching the
point specified in the original contract of transportation ceases to be
an interstate shipment, and its further transportation to another point
within the same State, on the order of the consignee, is controlled by
the law of the State and not by the Interstate Commerce Act. Gulf,
C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Texas, 403.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF, 1;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 12;
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, 2;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 3, 5.
COMMERCIAL PAPER.
See BILLS AND NOTES.
COMMISSIONERS.
See UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS.
COMMISSIONS.
See BROKERS;
INDIANS, 2.
COMMON LAW.
See COMMERCE, 4, 5;
LOCAL LAW (MONT.);
STATUTES, A 3.
COMMUNITY PROPERTY.
See DOMESTIC RELATIONS.
1. Nature of proceeding as suit.
A condemnation proceeding is a suit even though the condemning corpora-
tion may be free to decline to take the property after the valuation, it
being charged with costs in case it elects not to take. Mason City
R. R. Co. v. Boynton, 570.
2. Parties to condemnation proceedings as respects removal of cause.
In condemnation proceedings the words plaintiff and defendant can only
be used in an uncommon and liberal sense, and although a state statute
may describe the landowner and the condemning corporation as plain-
tiff and defendant respectively, and the state court may hold them to
be such, this court is not bound by that construction in construing the
act of Congress regarding removal of causes and may determine the
relation of the parties and who is entitled to remove the suit. Ib.
3. Removal of proceeding into Federal court; effect of state statute aligning
parties.
Under the Iowa statute, in a condemnation proceeding, the landowner is
the defendant within the meaning of the act of Congress regarding re-
moval of causes, and may remove the proceeding to the proper United
States Circuit Court, notwithstanding the state statute provides that
he is the plaintiff in such proceedings. Ib.
1. Power to create canals.
Under the commerce clause of the Constitution, Congress has power to
create interstate highways, including canals, and also those wholly
within the Territories and outside of state lines. Wilson v. Shaw, 24.
2. Power to construct interstate or territorial highways-Effect of former
declarations of this court.
The previous declarations of this court upholding the power of Congress to
construct interstate or territorial highways are not obiter dicta; and
to announce a different doctrine would amount to overruling decisions
on which rest a vast volume of rights and in reliance on which Congress
has acted in many ways. Ib.
3. Power of Congress to impose duty upon executive officers; unlawful delega-
tion of legislative or judicial power.
Congress when enacting that navigation be freed from unreasonable ob-
structions arising from bridges which are of insufficient height, or width
of span, or are otherwise defective, may, without violating the con-
stitutional prohibition against delegation of legislative or judicial
power, impose upon an executive officer the duty of ascertaining what
particular cases come within the prescribed rule. Union Bridge Co.
v. United States, 364.
See ALIENS, 1;
COMMERCE, 1, 3;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 12;
COURTS, 7;
1. Commerce clause; equal protection and due process of law-Validity of
New York stock transfer law.
The tax of two cents a share imposed on transfers of stock, made within
that State, by the tax law of New York of 1905, does not violate the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as an arbitrary
discrimination because only imposed on transfers of stock, or because
based on par, and not market, value; nor does it deprive non-resident
owners of stock transferring, in New York, shares of stock of non-
resident corporations of their property without due process of law;
nor is it as to such transfers of stock an interference with interstate
commerce. Hatch v. Reardon, 152.
See CONGRESS, POWERS OF;
TAXES AND TAXATION, 3.
2. Contracts; impairment of obligation of contract with foreign corporation
by imposition of tax-Colorado statutes of 1897, 1902.
Although a State may impose different liabilities on foreign corporations
than those imposed on domestic corporations, a statute that foreign
corporations pay a fee based on their capital stock for the privilege of
entering the State and doing business therein and thereupon shall be
subjected to all liabilities and restrictions of domestic corporations
amounts to a contract with foreign corporations complying therewith
that they will not be subjected during the period for which they are
admitted to greater liabilities than those imposed on domestic corpora-
tions, and a subsequent statute imposing higher annual license fees
on foreign, than on domestic, corporations for the privilege of continu-
ing to do business, is void as impairing the obligation of such contract
as to those corporations which have paid the entrance tax and receive
permits to do business; nor can such a tax be justified under the power
to alter, amend and repeal reserved by the state constitution. So
held as to Colorado Statutes of 1897 and 1902. American Smelting Co.
v. Colorado, 103.
3. Contracts, impairment of obligation-Validity of ordinance of city of
Cleveland affecting franchise of street railroad company.
The action of the city council of Cleveland, and the acceptance by the
Cleveland Electric Railway Company of the various ordinances adopted
by the council did not amount to a contract between the city and the
company extending the time of the franchise involved in this action;
and a later ordinance affecting that franchise after its expiration as
originally granted is not void under the impairment clause of the
Federal Constitution. Cleveland Electric Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 116.
4. Due process of law defined.
Due process of law has never been precisely defined; while its fundamental
requirement is opportunity for hearing and defense, the procedure may
be adapted to the case, and proceedings in court are not always essen-.
tial. Ballard v. Hunter, 241.
5. Due process of law; deprivation of property without opportunity to be heard.
Even though a statute providing for forfeiture and sale of buildings erected
on National lands of the Choctaw Nation may be valid, the title to the
buildings is not forfeited by the mere act of building, but the forfeiture
must be enforced by valid action; and to deny to those erecting the
buildings an opportunity to be heard would deprive them of their
property without due process of law. Walker v. McLoud, 302.
6. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Validity of law of Nebraska
fixing penalty and mode of execution for embezzlement of public money.
The statute of Nebraska, providing that one embezzling public money shall
be imprisoned and pay a fine equal to double the amount embezzled,
which shall operate as a judgment for the use of the persons whose
money was embezzled, is not unconstitutional as depriving the person
convicted of embezzlement of his property without due process of law
because it provides for such judgment irrespective of whether restitu-
tion has been made or not. In such a case the fine is a part of the
punishment and it is immaterial whether it is called a penalty or a civil
judgment, and the only question on which defendant can be heard is
as to the fact and amount of the embezzlement, and if he has an op-
portunity to be heard as to that he is not denied due process of law.
Coffey v. Harlan County, 659.
7. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Validity of Idaho sheep
grazing law.
Sections 1210, 1211, Revised Statutes of Idaho, prohibiting the herding
and grazing of sheep on, or within two miles of, land or possessory
VOL. CCIV-44
claims of persons other than the owner of the sheep, having been con-
strued by the highest court of that State as not affecting the right of
the owner of sheep to graze them on his own lands but only on the
public domain, is not unconstitutional as depriving the owner of sheep
of his property without due process of law because he cannot pasture
them on public domain, or as an arbitrary and unreasonable discrimina-
tion against the owners of sheep, as distinguished from other cattle,
and is a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power of the
State. Bacon v. Walker, 311.
8. Due process of law; deprivation of property-Validity of state statute re-
quiring admission to places of amusement on terms of equality.
A State may in the exercise of its police power regulate the admission of
persons to places of amusement, and, upon terms of equal and exact
justice, provide that persons holding tickets thereto shall be admitted
if not under the influence of liquor, boisterous, or of lewd character,
and such a statute does not deprive the owners of such places of their
property without due process of law; so held as to California statute.
Western Turf Assn. v. Greenberg, 359.
9. Due process of law; deprivation of property—Right of municipality to grant
to a new company property of railroad company whose franchise has
expired.
In the absence of any provision to that effect in the original franchise, the
city granting a franchise to a street railway company cannot on the
expiration of the franchise take possession of the rails, poles and operat-
ing appliances; they are property belonging to the original owner, and
an ordinance granting that property to another company on payment
to the owner of a sum to be adjudicated as its value is void as depriving
the owner of its property without due process of law. Cleveland Elec-
tric Ry. Co. v. Cleveland, 116.
10. Due process of law-Validity of personal judgment against corporation
rendered without notice or appearance.
If a personal judgment be rendered in one State against a corporation of
another State, bringing such corporation into court, that is, without
any legal notice to the latter of the suit, and without its having ap-
peared therein in person or by attorney or agent, it is void for want
of due process of law. Old Wayne Life Assn. v. McDonough, 8.
11. Due process and equal protection of laws-Validity of St. Francis Basin
Levee Act of 1893.
The St. Francis Basin Levee Act of Arkansas of 1893 does not deprive
non-resident owners of property assessed and sold pursuant to the
statute of their property without due process of law or deny such owners
the equal protection of the laws. Ballard v. Hunter, 241.
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