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Indeed in the social sciences we entertain fewer doubts on the forms of reasoning, than on the facts themselves whence we derive our conclusions. Of these facts there are scarcely one sufficiently well established to form the basis of a principle. In the physical sciences, facts are scientific essays circumscribed by the object which we wish to attain; while, in the political and moral sciences, facts are the independent actions of men.

But ought the mortifying doubt which attaches to every part of political and moral science, to make us lose courage? Because the truth is not demonstrated, ought we to relinquish our search for it, ought we to abandon the hope of ever finding it? These sciences are so generally applicable, that we cannot move a step in life without invoking their aid. Even though we should renounce the search of truth, we cannot for that reason suspend all our actions; since each individual re-acts on his fellow creatures, each ought to be regulated by the great laws of human society, by those very political and moral sciences which some affect to despise.

When the ancient astrononers placed the earth in the centre of the universe, and made the sun rise and the firmament turn round the earth their errors could only extend over spheres of paper, and the celestial globes were not deranged in their glorious course by Ptolemy or Tycho Brahe. Galileo himself, when the Inquisition forced him to abjure his sublime theory, could not forbear exclaiming eppur si muove. The Inquisition could not stop the earth in its orbit, though it could impede the progress of the human understanding.

There are people who have never wished to reflect on the theory of human government; but have they, for that reason, imagined they could dispense with government? No, they have adopted by chance one of the systems, which they should only have selected after mature reflection. Men at Algiers as at Athens, at Venice as at Uri, at Constantinople as in London, have wished that their governments should smooth the way to happiness and virtue. All have the same object in view, and all exert themselves for its attainment; but should they act without regarding that object? should they proceed without knowing whether they advance or retrograde? It is impossible to propose to any sovereign or council, any political, military, administrative, financial, or religious measure, which shall not operate either for the benefit or the injury of mankind; and it is consequently judged by means of the social sciences. Must all our daily resolutions be blindly adopted? To prefer what we have, and to remain where we are, is to choose just as decidedly as if we did the contrary. Though we occasioually abandon the certain for the uncertain, or the reality for the shadow, must we therefore always choose without examination?

The social sciences are obscure, let us therefore endeavour to elucidate them; they are uncertain, let us endeavour to fix them; they are speculative, let us seek to establish them by experience. This is our duty as men, it is the basis of all our conduct, it is the principle of the good or the evil which we are capable of effecting. Indifference on such questions is reprehensible.

To carry the investigation of the social sciences to the utmost possible point, they must doubtless be divided; it is necessary that all the vigour of a speculative mind should be directed to a single branch, to prosecute as far as human weakness permits, the knowledge of the details and the connexion of the principles. But since all men are subject to the action of the social sciences, since all in their turn influence their fellow-creatures, since all judge and are judged, it is important that all should arrive at general results. It is important that all should understand the consequences of human institutions and actions; and these consequences are to be found in history.

History is the depository of the experiments of social science, no less than physics, chemistry, agriculture, and medicine, are the depositories of the natural sciences. High policy is experimental and legislation, political economy, finance, war, education and religion, are so likewise. Experience alone can inform us how far all that has been invented for the advantage of human society, to unite, defend, and instruct it, to elevate the moral dignity of man, or to augment his enjoyments, has fulfilled its object or produced a contrary effect.

But the difference between natural and social science is, that in the latter we find experiments instead of making them. We take them, such as they are preser.ted to us by past ages. It is not our part to direct these experiments; for whenever they fail, the virtue and happiness of our fellow-creatures are concerned; and not the interests of a few individuals, but of millions. We know but of one example of a plan for advancing political science by experiments, which might have for their object not the interests of the governed but the study of rulers. About the year 260 of the Christian era, the Emperor Gallienus, one of those who, during the long sucession of the Cæsars, most contributed by his indolence and levity to the ruin of the Roman empire, imagined that he was a philosopher, and he found a throng of courtiers to confirm him in the high opinion he had formed of his own abilities. He resolved to establish in the Roman empire a certain number of experimental cities, which were to be subjected to a plan of government invented by philosophers, with a view of bettering the condition of all. Plotinus was appointed to organize the republic of Plato in one of these cities. Meanwhile barbarous invaders advanced, Gallienus opposed no resistance to their

VOL. II. No. 11.-1821.

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encroachments; they successively laid waste all the districts in which the experimental cities were established, and this dream of an emperor was never carried into execution.

Assuredly no man possesses the right thus to make experiments on human nature. Yet a Roman emperor might calculate with tolerable certainty that the theory of a philosopher, whatever it might be, was likely to be better than the practice of his prætors or governors; and it is to be regretted that the singular experiment of Gallienus was abandoned. But every individual, except a Roman emperor, must, in pursuing the experimental study of social science, confine himself solely to the past. There the results of all institutions are manifested; but being complicated and confounded together, neither their causes nor effects are distinctly presented to us. In most cases we are separated from them by a long lapse of time, and we must look back through several generations for the origin of those opinions, passions, and weaknesses, the consequences of which become evident after ages have passed away. Frequently these old causes have been but ill observed, and they are, in many instances, enveloped with a veil of obscurity, through which it is impossible to penetrate. But what particularly renders social science confused and uncertain is, that several causes always concur to produce every effect, and that it is frequently necessary to seek in another department of the political sciences for the origin of a phenomenon which presents itself in that branch to which we devote our attention. Thus we admire the tactics of the Romans; but perhaps it was not so much to that, as to the education of their children, that they were indebted for their success in war. We wish to adopt the institution of the English jury; but it would probably be divested of its equity and independence were it not supported by the religious opinions of the country in which it originated. We speak of the fidelity of the Austrians to their government; perhaps it is not the government to which they are attached, but to the economical laws which rule them.

We cannot wonder, therefore, if social science be but little advanced, if its principles be uncertain, and if at present not a single question that has not been a subject of controversy. It is a science of facts, and yet it contains not a single fact which some one is not ready to deny. It is a science of observation, and yet how few sound observations have been collected for it! It is rather a subject of surprise that men should contend with each other respecting matters which they so ill comprehend. There is not, perhaps, a single denomination of a political, philosophic, or religious sect, that has not been exposed to insult. Every contradictory opinion that has been entertained on subjects so difficult and complicated, by men who had no other view than the welfare of their fellow

creatures, has been in its turn anathematized, as though it could only be the offspring of a wicked mind. Poor novices as we are in the theory of social life, how can we presume to allege that the adoption of any particular opinion denotes a corrupt heart, while we cannot even demonstrate that it reveals an error of judgment? Let us study, and, we shall then feel the full extent of our ignorance. Let us study, and, by attaining a knowledge of the difficulties, we shall comprehend how they have given birth to the most opposite systems. History may, perhaps, leave us in doubt as to the mode in which we ought to conduct ourselves, or particicipate in the conduct of the society of which we form a part; but it will remove every uncertainty respecting the indulgence which we should extend towards the opinions of others. Since the science is so complicated, since the truth is so obscure and remote, since, at every step we take, a new difficulty gives rise to new questions not yet resolved-since we cannot trust to ourselves, how can we venture to pronounce judgment on those who differ from us?

That portion of history of which I now propose to treat, not with the view of establishing a system, or of shaking or confirming principles, opinions, or institutions, but to demand of past ages an account of the events that have taken place, and the causes that produced them-that portion of history is even more rich in information than in glorious examples. I intend to take a review of the history of the world, and more particularly of that of Europe, from the coronation of Constantine to the death of Otho, and to consider the revolutions, the spirit, and the institutions of the ages which elapsed from the fourth to the tenth century. This first half of the middle age, the period of barbarism and desolation, is in general but little known, and throughout its whole extent it produced no historian worthy to be placed in the first rank. The confusion of facts-our ignorance of many of the details, and of several of the causes which have produced the greatest revolutions--the want of philosophic spirit, and even of judgment in the historians who have related the events-the numerous crimes with which the period is polluted-and the excessive misery to which the human race was reduced-no doubt essentially tend to diminish the interest which this part of history might excite. These reasons, however, are not sufficient to deter us from endeavouring to become acquainted with it.

The period which we now propose to take into consideration is far less remote than that to which we are accustomed to devote the most assiduous study. It is nearer to us, not only in the order of dates, but also in interests. We are the descendants of the people of whom I am now about to speak, but we are not descended from the Greeks and Romans. With the people of the middle

ages originated the languages we speak, the laws to which we have been subjected, or which we still acknowledge. The people, whose history we are now about to consider, professed, as we do, the Christian religion; but in this respect there is a striking difference between them and ourselves. The ages which intervened between the fourth and the tenth centuries were those in which the church was in the greatest degree exposed to the effects of ignorance, barbarism, and worldly ambition. We in vain look for any traces of the pure religion which we now profess. The direction given to the education of youth, the study of a language which was then dying, and which is now dead, and the literary chefs-d'œuvre it contains, may be dated from the same period; as well as the institution of several schools which have preserved in Europe the spirit of past ages. Finally, from the wrecks of the great Roman empire were formed all the modern states, of which several still subsist; and we shall now enter upon the consideration of the origin of those people with whom our different interests are connected.

[To be continued.]

HIGHLAND ANECDOTES.

The Raid of Cillechrist.

BORDERING clans, like neighbouring nations, were never upon terms of hereditary concord; vicinity produced rivalry, and rivalry produced war for this reason, the Mac Donells and the Mac Kenzies were never long without some act of hostility or feud; firing houses, driving herds, raising rents, and slaughtering each other's clansmen, were feats of recreation which each was equally willing to exercise upon his neighbour; and if either was more deficient than the other, it was more from want of opportunity, than lack of goodwill. Among all the exploits which were thus occasioned between the two clans, none was more celebrated, nor more fearful, than the burning of the Cillechrist (Christ's Church); it gave occasion and name to the pibroch of the Glengarrie family, and was provoked and performed in the following manner. In the course of a long succession of fierce and sanguinary conflicts, the Mac Lelans, a race who were followers of the Mac Kenzies, took occasion to intercept, and assassinate, the eldest son of Donald Mac Angus of Glengarrie. Donald died shortly after, and his second son, who succeeded to the chieftaincy of the clan, was too young to undertake the conduct of any enterprise to revenge the death of his brother: his cousin, however, Angus Mac Raonuill of Lundi, acted as his captain, and gathering the Mac Donells, in two separate raids swept off the rents from the greater part of Lord Seaforth's coun

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