of the Chief Justice without his knowing it, until he made him see in the auxiliary provision of the Constitution, "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution" the specific powers granted, powers as original as those they are to carry into execution. And the Chief Justice never afterwards freed himself from this persuasive coercion of that master of the forum.

My chief purpose in this Memoir is to show the influence of Mr. Taney on the working of the Federal Government, in the political system of the United States, both while he was a Cabinet officer and while he was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. I shall therefore confine my review to his judicial opinions on constitutional questions. At the moment he took his seat on the bench of the Supreme Court, there were pending three cases of great interest, each of them involving the validity of a State law, and the discussion of the relative powers of the State and the Federal Governments. The cases had been discussed in the time of Chief-Justice Marshall, and it was understood that he was of opinion that the State law involved in each was repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. Those who were familiar with the current of judicial decisions while Marshall presided over the Supreme Court, were curious to see, from the decision of these cases, whether that current was to flow in the same channel of construction, under the influence of the new Chief Justice.

The first of these cases is the City of New York vs. Miln. The Legislature of the State of New York had passed a statute, requiring the master of every vessel arriving in the port of New York, under certain penalties, to report in writing, respecting his passengers, within twenty-four hours after his arrival. The question in the case was, whether the requirement of the statute did not interfere with the right of Congress, under the express grant of the Federal Constitution, to regulate commerce.

It had been decided in 1824, by the Supreme Court, in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, that a statute of the State of New York, granting to certain persons the exclusive privilege to navigate all the waters of the State with vessels moved by steam, was repugnant to the clause of the Constitution giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce among the several States, and was therefore void. And in 1827, it was decided by the Supreme Court, in the case of Brown vs. The State of Maryland, that an Act of the Legislature of Maryland which required every importer of goods, by wholesale, bale, or package, to take out a license, and pay for it, under certain penalties or forfeitures for neglect, was void; because it was virtually laying a duty on imports, which the States were by the Constitution prohibited from doing, and because it interfered with the power of Congress to regulate

foreign commerce. In both cases, Chief-Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court.

It was argued, by those opposed to the validity of the State law, that the case came within the decisions just mentioned. But the majority of the Court, including Chief-Justice Taney, decided that the Act of New York was not a regulation of commerce, like the statutes involved in those cases, but a regulation of police, and was therefore in the exercise of a power belonging to the State. Persons, it was argued, are not the subject of commerce; and not being imported goods, they do not fall within the reasoning founded upon the construction of the power given to Congress to regulate commerce, and a prohibition of the States from imposing a duty on imported goods. The opinion of the Court was pronounced by Justice Barbour.

The second case was Briscoe vs. The Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Act of the Legislature of Kentucky established the bank "in the name and behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky." It was argued, against the validity of the Act, that it was repugnant to the provision in the Federal Constitution which restrains the States from emitting bills of credit. The case had been argued before Chief-Justice Marshall, and he and a majority of the Court were of opinion that the Act was unconstitutional and void. A re-argument was ordered; and the case was argued before Chief-Justice Taney. The Act was declared

constitutional; as the States were only prohibited from emitting such paper as was denominated bills of credit before and at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and there was no limitation in the Constitution on the power of a State to incorporate a bank, a power incident to sovereignty. The judgment of the Court, in which the Chief Justice concurred, was pronounced by Justice McLean.

The last of these cases was the Charles River Bridge vs. Warren Bridge. The Chief Justice now delivered his first judgment regarding the Constitution. The case had been argued before Chief-Justice Marshall, and was ordered to be re-argued. It was a question of law that involved a great principle of public policy, requiring for its solution the forecast of the statesman as well as the learning of the lawyer. It was a question just suited to the statesmanly judicial mind of the Chief Justice.

The question in this case involved the power of the several States relative to the corporations which they have chartered, as it is affected by the provision in the Federal Constitution prohibiting a State from passing any law impairing the obligation of contracts.

The Charles River Bridge held its franchises under Acts passed by both the Colonial and the State Legislatures of Massachusetts. It was claimed that the corporation had, in perpetuity, the exclusive right to erect and maintain a bridge over the Charles River, and

receive tolls; and that the Act of the Legislature of Massachusetts which authorized the erection of the Warren Bridge-which was a free bridge, diverting all the travel-impaired the implied contract contained in the charter of the Charles River Bridge not to authorize another such structure.

The case came by appeal before the Supreme Court, on a bill in equity for an injunction to prevent the erection of the Warren Bridge, filed in the State Court.

The Chief Justice maintained that public grants are to be construed strictly: that nothing passes by implication. And as there was no express grant of an exclusive privilege to the Charles River Bridge, an implied contract to that effect cannot be inferred. And that therefore the Act authorizing the erection of the Warren Bridge does not come in conflict with the provision in the Federal Constitution prohibiting the several States from passing laws impairing the obligation of contracts. "We cannot [he said] deal thus with the rights reserved to the States, and by legal intendments and mere technical reasoning take away from them any portion of that power over their own internal police and improvement which is necessary to their well-being and prosperity."

And having disposed of the case by the well settled rules for construing public grants, the Chief Justice vindicates his decision on grounds of statesmanly policy. "If this Court [he said] should establish