said city of Detroit, it shall be the duty of every court, police justice, justice of the peace or other magistrate by whom any person, for any crime or misdemeanor not punishable by imprisonment in the State prison, may be sentenced for any term not less than sixty days, to sentence such person to the Detroit house of correction, there to be received, kept and employed in the manner prescribed by law, and the rules and discipline of the said house of correction." It is the general rule that all consistent statutes which can stand together, though enacted at different dates, relating to the same subject, are treated prospectively, and construed together as though they constituted one. "Statutes which are not inconsistent with one another, and which relate to the same subject-matter, are in pari materia, and should be construed together; and effect should be given to them all, although they contain no reference to one another, and were passed at different times." See 2 Lewis' Sutherland on Statutory Construction (2d Ed.), § 443. See, also, Com. v. Griffin, 105 Mass. 185; State v. Towner, 26 Mont. 339. We think these two statutes should be construed as in pari materia. It is to be noted of section 2163 that no attempt is therein made to define the offenses for which an offender may be committed to the Detroit house of correction, the only requirement being that such crime or misdemeanor shall not be punishable by imprisonment in the State prison, and that the sentence shall not be less than 60 days; nor does this section of the statute relate to all counties in the State. It only relates to such counties as shall have by contract made provision for substituting the Detroit house of correction for its own place of detention, namely, the county jail. It is left to other provisions of the statute to fix the term of imprisonment for the offender in each individual case. The two statutes can be harmonized. Section 2163 makes the Detroit house of correction as to offenses therein defined in effect the common jail of the county with which the city of Detroit has entered into contract relations. The decision of the court below rested upon People v. Gobles, 67 Mich. 475. That case, however, dealt with a section of the statute which provided: "From and after the time when the State house of correction [at Ionia] shall have been opened for the reception of all offenders, all courts having criminal jurisdiction in Michigan may sentence all male persons duly convicted of a felony before them, and who shall be at the time of sentence of the full age of sixteen years, and not more than twenty-five years of age; and also all male persons duly convicted before them of a misdemeanor when the imprisonment shall not be less than ninety days; to the said State house of correction." 2 How. Stat. § 9755. * * The question arose as to whether one convicted of a violation of the liquor law might under this statute be sentenced to the State house of correction. The court discussed the impropriety of incarcerating those who were convicted of mere misdemeanors with confirmed criminals, but proceeded finally upon the ground that, as the statute fixing the penalty for the offense under consideration was later in point of time than that which provided imprisonment in the house of correction at Ionia, the legislature could not have intended to extend the provisions of the earlier statute to that of the later. It is said: "The legislature did not intend that other or more odious punishment should be imposed than that specified in the act. It is a greater and more odious punishment to be imprisoned with convicted felons in a State house of correction than in a county jail. Had the legislature intended that an infraction of the law might be punished by sentence to the State house of correction, they should, and probably would, have said so." The same reasoning, in effect, is employed in Re Silverthorn, 73 Mich. 644. These cases are distinguishable from the present. In these cases the court was dealing with a general provision of statute relating to sentence by all magistrates. The right to sentence did not depend upon contract, and the view of the court appears to have been that by the subsequent fixing of the penalty the legislature should be understood to have intended to exclude the provisions of section 9755. It is to be noted that the reason which influenced the court in reaching this conclusion, viz., that the punishment under section 9755 would be more odious than that provided by the act defining the offense, is not applicable to the present case. But more than this, the fact that section 2163 is prospective in its operation, and in terms relates to all offenses not punishable by imprisonment in the State prison, and could be made operative at any time by contract between the county and the city of Detroit, of necessity imports that such contract shall have relation to the cases in which, at the time the contract is made, a person may be sentenced for any crime or misdemeanor not punishable by imprisonment in the State prison. Since this case was submitted, we have asked briefs of counsel upon the question of whether an order discharging a party under sentence from imprisonment is subject to review by this court. Briefs have been filed, from which it appears to be conceded that, as the term of imprisonment has expired, no effective order for discharge could be now entered, and we, therefore, refrain from discussing the question of the power of the court in a case where such an order might be effective. No order will be now entered in the case. BLAIR, C. J., and GRANT, OSTRANDER, and BROOKE, JJ., concurred. GIBNEY v. ALLEN.1 1. TRUSTS-TESTAMENTARY TRUSTEE-APPOINTMENT. When a trustee is named in a will, his appointment as such by the probate court, under Act No. 253, Pub. Acts 1899, is simply declaratory and affirmatory of said will; and the court, except in case of his failure to qualify or other good cause shown, is not authorized to appoint any other person as such. 2. SAME-FAILURE TO FILE BOND-EFFECT - EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS. The failure of a trustee under a will to file a bond, as required by an order of the probate court, amounts in law to a disclaimer of such appointment. 3. SAME DISPOSITION OF TRUST PROPERTY-BONA FIDES AS DEFENSE WHEN AVAILABLE. --- Good faith is a defense only where a trustee, acting within the limits of his powers with proper prudence and diligence, commits mere mistakes or errors of judgment, but is not a defense where he disregards the limits placed upon his power by law or by the instrument creating the trust; and where, on a bill by the beneficiaries under the trust to set aside a deed and mortgage and for an accounting by the trustee, it appeared that the instruments were executed by the trustee without orders from the probate court, his good faith in the transactions, if established, would not be a defense. 4. SAME-ACTS OF TRUSTEE-REPUDIATION-INFANTS - ESTOPPEL. Where, on such bill, it appeared that complainants were a mother, who was a deaf mute, and two infant children; that the mother, under the evidence, was incompetent to understand and comprehend business transactions; and that she relied implicitly upon the judgment of defendant trustee, held, that under the law he was bound to the strictest accountability to his wards, that the mother was not estopped by her conduct to question the validity of the transactions, and that she, even if a perfectly normal person, 'Rehearing denied July 15, 1909. could not by her conduct deprive complainant infants of their rights, or relieve the trustee of accountability to them. 5. SAME WILLS EFFECT. APPOINTMENT OF EXECUTOR AS TRUSTEE The appointment by a testator, in a separate clause of the will, of the executor therein named to be a trustee of the estate for certain purposes, does not confer upon the trustee the right to do such acts as are conferred upon him as executor; since the duties of the two offices are distinct, the duties of the executor terminating when those of the trustee begin. 6. SAME-PURCHASE FROM TRUSTEE-BONA FIDES. Purchasers of trust property from the trustee are put upon inquiry as to the validity of such transactions and cannot rely upon the claim of bona fides. Appeal from Genesee; Wiest, J., presiding. Submitted October 12, 1908. (Docket No. 41.) Decided April 24, 1909. Bill by Effie A. Gibney, and Alice Gibney and Lyman Gibney, infants, by next friend, against Thomas J. Allen, trustee, the Union Trust & Savings Bank, Robert W. Selleck, and Lena Selleck to set aside a deed and mortgage and for an accounting. From a decree dismissing the bill except as to an accounting by defendant Allen, complainants appeal. Reversed, and decree entered for complainants. Homer J. McBride and John H. Farley, for complainants. Brennan & Cook, for defendant Union Trust & Savings Bank. William V. Smith, for defendants Selleck. MCALVAY, J. The complainant Effie A. Gibney is a deaf mute. The other complainants are her infant children. In 1895, upon the death of her father, Lyman J. Hitchcock, she took, under his will, the use during her |