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"A. Looking all the time, to avoid the worse places, and going on to the places which I knew would hold me up. "Q. You were afraid of the whole walk in front of that vacant lot?

"A. I was of the whole walk from my house to Woodward avenue, and that included 80 feet. * * *

"Q. Did you use care going along there at night?

"A. Extra care, walking slowly, certainly, very seldom in the evening. I didn't go out there in the evening more than four times in the year. I had no occasion to go out in the evening.

"Q. At night you had to use extra care?

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A. I did use extra care, because I thought it was not very safe.

"Q. Because you thought it was dangerous? 'A. I knew it was dangerous.

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I knew it.

I didn't think it was.

"Q. And at night you had to use extra care? "A. Yes, sir; you had.

"Q. You didn't want to trip on any loose boards or fall in any hole?

"A. I didn't; I didn't want to fall in any holes.

"Q. On account of the knowledge you had of the walk, you used this extra care?

"A. Yes, sir."

The cross-examination was very long, and she repeated over and over again that she knew the walk was defective, that she had that fact in mind, and for that reason walked slowly, using great care.

There was testimony of witnesses that at the time of the accident they used the walk, and that the neighbors used it instead of walking on the grass or in the street. There was also testimony to the effect that before the plaintiff was hurt the building of a house was commenced on the lots before which this sidewalk was located, and that earth from the excavation was thrown clear to the walk, and that outside of the walk there were bricks piled, and that the limbs of the trees between the walk and the curb hung very low.

We think an examination of the cases referred to by the learned trial judge will show they are easily dis

tinguishable from the case at bar. The case before us is within the line of cases of which Germaine v. City of Muskegon, 105 Mich. 213, is a type, in which case Justice GRANT, among other statements, speaking for the court, said:

"It was not error to instruct the jury, under the facts of this case, that the plaintiff had a right to travel on the sidewalk, and the mere fact that he did so travel, even with the knowledge that there was a hole in the walk, was of itself no evidence of negligence on his part, unless the place was so dangerous that a prudent man would not have traveled on the walk. Sidewalks are intended for the use of pedestrians, and they are entitled to walk upon them, and are entitled to do so even if they have knowledge of a defect like the one in question."

See, also, Lowell v. Township of Watertown, 58 Mich. 568; Schwingschlegl v. City of Monroe, 113 Mich. 683; Vergin v. City of Saginaw, 125 Mich. 499; Belyea v. City of Port Huron, 136 Mich. 504; Oesterreich v. City of Detroit, 137 Mich. 415; Barnes v. West Bay City, 138 Mich. 93; Vander Velde v. Village of Le Roy, 140 Mich. 359; Lewis v. City of Marshall, 146 Mich. 389.

We do not think it can be said as a matter of law that plaintiff was guilty of such negligence as to preclude her recovery. The case should have been submitted to the Jury under proper instructions.

Judgment should be reversed.

BLAIR, C. J., and MONTGOMERY and BROOKE, JJ., concurred with MOORE, J.

GRANT, J. I cannot concur in the opinion of my Brother MOORE. I think this case falls directly within Hodge v. City of St. Louis, 146 Mich. 173, and Irion v. City of Saginaw, 120 Mich. 295. The facts in this case are so nearly parallel to the facts in those cases that I am unable to distinguish them. The same principle, also, is contained in Grandorf v. Railway Co., 113 Mich. 496;

Black v. City of Manistee, 107 Mich. 60; Howey v. Fisher, 122 Mich. 43. The condition of this sidewalk was well known to the plaintiff. She lived nearby and passed over it frequently. She usually passed in the daytime. She testified that it was dark on the evening in question, the accident happening between 6 and half past 6 on October 15th. Her companion testified that the light was sufficient to see the sidewalk. She testified that she knew the danger in walking, as she did, beside her companion. She knew that stepping on the outer end of the plank was liable to raise the other end. She had the situation fully in mind. Her attention was distracted by nothing. She testified:

"The only safe place was to walk right on the center, so that neither end would fly up. If you went on the other edge there the boards would go down and fly up and be more dangerous. I knew it was dangerous. I didn't think it was. I knew it. The boards would shake and give somewhat, so I always walked right in the middle of the walk if I could. I always took the chance in walking in the middle of the walk, hoping to get over it safely."

With this knowledge it was clearly her duty not to walk in this dangerous manner. She could have and should have walked in the center behind or in front of her companion. Besides, she could have stepped off the walk four or five feet across the space between the walk and the curb onto the paved street and walked around this dangerous place, or she could have crossed the street to the sidewalk on the other side. Her companion, who lived on the same street, testified that he seldom walked on the south side of the street, but usually on the north side. She was 61 years of age, very large, and knew that she should take extraordinary care in avoiding so dangerous a place. While it is true that the existence of such a dangerous sidewalk is discreditable to the city, its notoriously bad condition furnishes all the more reason for pedestrians to avoid it. One who deliberately walks in an unsafe place, when with but little inconvenience he can walk in a safe

place, must abide by the consequences of his own negligent act.

I think the court correctly directed a verdict for the defendant.

OSTRANDER, HOOKER, and MCALVAY, JJ., concurred with GRANT, J.

In re KREINER.

CRIMINAL LAW-INTOXICATING LIQUORS — STATUTES

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CONSTRUC

TION. Section 5385, 2 Comp. Laws, defining the punishment for illegally engaging in the sale of intoxicating liquors, construed in connection with section 2163, 1 Comp. Laws, authorizes a sentence to the Detroit house of correction for such violation; since all consistent statutes which can stand together, though enacted at different dates, relating to the same subject, are treated prospectively, and construed as in pari materia.

Certiorari to Wayne; Donovan, J. Submitted November 17, 1908. (Docket No. 139.) Decided April 24,

1909.

Habeas corpus proceedings by Charles H. Kreiner to obtain his discharge from the Detroit house of correction. There was an order discharging the petitioner, and the people bring certiorari. Reversed, but the time of sentence having elapsed, no order was entered.

Geer, Williams & Halpin, for petitioner.

B. F. Reed, Prosecuting Attorney, for the people.

MONTGOMERY, J. The respondent was duly convicted, in the circuit court for the county of Lapeer, of the of fense of selling liquor without payment of tax, and sentenced to imprisonment in the Detroit house of correction for the period of 65 days, and a further period, if his fine and costs were not paid, until the same should be paid, not exceeding six months from and including the date of his sentence. He sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and was discharged by the circuit judge on the ground that there was no authority to imprison for this offense in the Detroit house of correction, and the decision of the circuit judge is brought here for review on certiorari.

Section 5385, 2 Comp. Laws, being section 7 of the act for taxation and regulation of the liquor traffic, provides, in substance, that if any person shall engage in any business requiring the payment of the tax provided by the act, without having paid such tax, or shall in any manner violate any of the provisions of the act, such person shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof, if there be any specific penalty provided by the act, shall be punished by fine of not more than $200 and costs of prosecution, "or by imprisonment in the county jail not less than ten days nor more than ninety days, or both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court." And provides further:

"And in case such fine and costs shall not have been paid at the time such imprisonment expires, the person serving out such sentence shall be further detained in jail until such fine and costs shall have been fully paid: Provided, That in no case shall the whole term of imprisonment exceed six months."

By section 2163, 1 Comp. Laws, being section 9 of the act providing for the Detroit house of correction, and following upon section 8, which provides for an agreement between the board of supervisors of any county and the city of Detroit for the detention of prisoners at the charge of the county, it is provided:

"In every county having such agreement with the

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