CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See also Jurisdiction, 2.
State statute prohibiting display of state grade of apples-Burden on interstate commerce.-North Carolina statute requiring that all apples sold or shipped into State in closed containers be identified by no grade other than applicable federal grade or a designation that apples are not graded, violates Commerce Clause by burdening and discriminating against interstate sale of Washington apples. Hunt v. Washington Apple Adver- tising Comm'n, p. 333.
1. Admissibility of identification evidence-State criminal trial.-Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment does not compel exclusion, at respondent's state criminal trial on charge of possession and sale of heroin, of identification evidence consisting of police photograph of respondent, testimony of undercover police officer that person shown in photograph was suspect from whom officer had purchased heroin, and officer's posi- tive in-court identification. Reliability is linchpin in determining admis- sibility of identification testimony for confrontations occurring both prior to and after Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, wherein it was held that de- termination depends on "totality of circumstances." Manson v. Braith- waite, p. 98.
2. Murder prosecution-Burden of proving affirmative defense-Retro- activity of Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U. S. 684.-North Carolina Supreme Court, on appeal from petitioner's conviction for second-degree murder, erred in declining, with respect to erroneous jury instruction as to burden on petitioner to prove self-defense, to hold retroactive Mullaney rule, which required State to establish all elements of a criminal offense beyond a reasonable doubt and which invalidated presumptions that shifted bur- den of proving such elements to defendant. While in deciding whether a new constitutional rule is to be applied retroactively it is proper to consider State's reliance on old rule and impact of new rule on adminis- tration of justice if degree to which new rule enhances integrity of fact- finding process is sufficiently small, "where the major purpose of new constitutional doctrine is to overcome an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials, the new rule [is] given complete retroactive effect." Hankerson v. North Carolina, p. 233.
3. Murder prosecution-Fair trial-Jury selection-Pretrial news cov- erage. Absent anything in record, in particular with respect to voir dire examination of jurors, that would require a finding of constitutional unfair- ness as to method of jury selection or as to character of jurors actually
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
selected, petitioner has failed to show that under "totality of circum- stances" extensive pretrial news media coverage of his case denied him a fair trial on a charge, inter alia, of first-degree murder of one of his children. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
4. Murder trial-Burden of proving affirmative defense.-New York law requiring that defendant in a prosecution for second-degree murder prove by a preponderance of evidence affirmative defense of extreme emo- tional disturbance in order to reduce crime to manslaughter does not vio- late Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Patterson v. New York, p. 197.
III. Equal Protection of the Laws.
1. Barring resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher edu- cation-Strict scrutiny.-New York statute that bars certain resident aliens from state financial assistance for higher education violates Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment. Statute discriminates against a class and is subject to strict scrutiny since it is directed at aliens and only aliens are harmed by it even though its bar against them is not absolute in that those who have applied for citizenship or those not qualified to apply who have filed statements of intent may participate in assistance programs. Nyquist v. Mauclet, p. 1.
2. Changes in death penalty statute.-Imposition of death sentence upon petitioner for first-degree murder pursuant to new Florida death penalty statute did not deny him equal protection of laws. Having been neither tried nor sentenced prior to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, he was not similarly situated to those prisoners whose death sentences under old statute were commuted to life imprisonment after Florida Supreme Court had invalidated old statute under Furman, and it was not irra- tional for Florida to relegate petitioner to class of those prisoners whose acts could properly be punished under new statute that was in effect at time of his trial and sentence. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
3. City funding of childbirth but not nontherapeutic abortions.-City of St. Louis, in electing, as a policy choice, to provide publicly financed hospital services for childbirth but not for nontherapeutic abortions, does not violate any constitutional rights. Poelker v. Doe, p. 519.
4. Independent candidate-Access to ballot.-In appellees' action chal- lenging constitutionality of Maryland statute requiring an independent candidate for statewide or federal office, in order to qualify for a position on general election ballot, to file 70 days before date of party primaries, nominating petitions signed by at least 3% of State's registered voters, three-judge District Court was not warranted in holding, on basis of this Court's summary affirmance in Tucker v. Salera, 424 U. S. 959, that
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
Maryland statute's early filing deadline was an unconstitutional burden on an independent candidate's access to ballot. Rather than relying on Salera as controlling precedent, District Court should have conducted an inde- pendent examination of merits under constitutional standards set forth in Storer v. Brown, 415 U. S. 724, 742, for determining extent of burden imposed on independent candidates. Mandel v. Bradley, p. 173.
5. Medicaid program-State funding of childbirth but not nonthera- peutic abortions.-Equal Protection Clause does not require a State par- ticipating in Medicaid program to pay expenses incident to nonthera- peutic abortions for indigent women simply because it has made a policy choice to pay expenses incident to childbirth. Maher v. Roe, p. 464. IV. Ex Post Facto Laws.
1. Changes in death penalty statute.-Changes in Florida's death pen- alty statute between time of first-degree murder for which petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death and time of trial are procedural and on whole ameliorative, and hence there is no ex post facto violation. New statute simply altered methods employed in determining whether death penalty was to be imposed, and there was no change in quantum of pun- ishment attached to crime. New statute provides capital defendants with more, rather than less, judicial protection than old statute. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
2. Changes in death penalty statute-Increased burdens on life sen- tence under new statute.-Petitioner, having been sentenced to death for first-degree murder under new Florida death penalty statute, may not complain of burdens attached to a life sentence under that statute which may not have attached to old statute which was in effect at time murder was committed. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
3. Changes in death penalty statute-Warning of death penalty.— Existence of earlier Florida death penalty statute at time of first-degree murder for which petitioner was convicted and sentenced under changed statute served as an "operative fact" to warn petitioner of penalty which Florida would seek to impose on him if he were convicted of first-degree murder, and this was sufficient compliance with ex post facto provision of Constitution, notwithstanding subsequent invalidation of earlier stat- ute. Dobbert v. Florida, p. 282.
1. Double jeopardy-Conviction of lesser included offense-Bar to sub- sequent prosecution.-Double Jeopardy Clause of Fifth Amendment, ap- plied to States through Fourteenth, bars prosecution and punishment for crime of stealing an automobile following prosecution and punishment
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Continued.
for lesser included offense of operating same vehicle without owner's consent. Brown v. Ohio, p. 161.
2. Double jeopardy-Multiple prosecutions-Accused's opposition to consolidated trial.-Court of Appeals' judgment that although offense under 21 U. S. C. § 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) was a lesser included offense of 21 U. S. C. § 848 (conducting a criminal enterprise to violate drug laws), §§ 846 and 848 were not "same offense" for double jeopardy purposes and therefore petitioner's conviction under § 846 did not bar prosecution under § 848, petitioner having opposed a consolidated trial, is affirmed. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.
3. Double jeopardy-Retrial after dismissal of information.-Petitioner's retrial for theft in violation of Assimilative Crimes Act and applicable Indiana statute after dismissal of defective information at his request did not violate Double Jeopardy Clause. Proceedings against petitioner did not terminate in his favor, dismissal clearly not being predicated on any judgment that he could never be prosecuted for or convicted of theft. Lee v. United States, p. 23.
Medicaid abortion benefits—Limitation to "medically necessary" abor- tions.-Connecticut regulation limiting state Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary," does not impinge upon fundamental right of privacy recognized in Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, that protects a woman from unduly burdensome interfer- ence with her freedom to decide whether or not to terminate her preg- nancy. That right implies no limitation on a State's authority to make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and to implement that judgment by allocation of public funds. An indigent woman desiring an abortion is not disadvantaged by Connecticut's decision to fund child- birth; she continues as before to be dependent on private abortion services. Maher v. Roe, p. 464.
COURTS OF APPEALS. See Investment Company Act of 1940. CRIMINAL ENTERPRISE IN VIOLATION OF DRUG LAWS. See Constitutional Law, V, 2; Criminal Law.
CRIMINAL LAW. See also Constitutional Law, II; III, 2; IV; V.
Cumulative fines.-Court of Appeals' judgment imposing cumulative fines for petitioner's separate convictions for violation of 21 U. S. C. § 846 (conspiracy to distribute drugs) and 21 U. S. C. § 848 (conducting a criminal enterprise to violate drug laws), is vacated, and case is re- manded. Jeffers v. United States, p. 137.
CUMULATIVE PENALTIES OR FINES. See Criminal Law.
DEATH PENALTY. See Constitutional Law, II, 3; III, 2; IV.
DEFENSES TO MURDER. See Constitutional Law, II, 2, 4.
DELAY OF EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION IN BRINGING ENFORCEMENT ACTION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
DENIAL OF STAY. See Jurisdiction, 2; Stays.
DEPENDENT CHILDREN. See Social Security Act, 2.
DETERMINATION OF COVERAGE UNDER VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 1.
DISCLOSURE OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILD'S FATHER. See Social Security Act, 1.
DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Intervention; Vot- ing Rights Act of 1965.
DISMISSAL OF INFORMATION. See Constitutional Law, V, 3. DISMISSAL OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI AS IMPROVIDENTLY GRANTED. See Certiorari.
DISPLAY OF SWASTIKA. See Jurisdiction, 2.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY. See Constitutional Law, V.
DRUG OFFENSES. See Constitutional Law, V, 2; Criminal Law.
DUE PROCESS. See Constitutional Law, II.
EDUCATIONAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS. See Constitutional Law, III, 1.
ELECTIONS. See Constitutional Law, III, 4.
EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEES. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1, 5; Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964; Intervention.
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS BY EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPOR- TUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY ACT OF 1972. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, 2-4.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS. See Constitutional Law, III. EVIDENCE. See Constitutional Law, II, 1, 2, 4.
EX POST FACTO LAWS. See Constitutional Law, IV.
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