court from which said records come; and provided further, that appended to and as a part of such release shall be the certificate of the judge or clerk of the foreign court duly attested that said executor, administrator or guardian is, at the date of such release or instrument still acting as such executor, administrator or guardian under authority of said court; and provided further, That nothing herein contained shall authorize any administrator, executor or guardian of another state or country to release any judgment, mortgage or deed of trust, while any administrator, executor or guardian of the estate to which such judgment, mortgage or deed of trust belongs is authorized to act by virtue of appointment and qualification under the laws of this state.

SEC. 3. All releases and discharges of record of any judgment, mortgage or deed of trust heretofore made by administrators, executors or guardians in the manner and to the extent authorized by this act where the copy of the original records required by this act has been or shall hereafter be recorded as required by this act, are hereby declared to be legal and valid from the date of such release or discharge.

Approved April 8th, 1886.

CHAPTER XXVI.

GUARDIAN AND WARD.

SECTION 2237. Majority.-The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years; and in females to that of eighteen years; but all minors attain their majority by marriage.

In Iowa a marriage between a male person of sixteen and a female of fourteen years of age is valid, so that by marriage they attain their legal majority at sixteen and fourteen respectively. Code, section 2186.

As to the right of a minor to recover for personal injuries to him prior to his majority. See Nelson v. The C. R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 38 Iowa, 564.

If a person who has attained the age of majority, voluntarily attends a public school, creating the relation of teacher and pupil,

the latter thereby waives any privileges which age confers, and subjects himself to like dicipline with those who are within the school age, and he may be punished for refactory conduct, and the teacher will not be liable for inflicting such punishment if it was reasonable under the circumstances. The State v. Migner, 45 Iowa, 248.

SEC. 2238. Contracts and disaffirmance.-A minor is bound, not only by contracts for necessaries, but also by his other contracts, unless he disaffirms them within a reasonable time after he attains his majority, and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of the contract and remaining within his control at any time after attaining his majority.

A deed of real property by a minor is voidable, but not void. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 12 Iowa, 195.

What is a "reasonable time" within which a minor may disaffirm his contract after attaining his majority, under the statute, must be determined upon the circumstances of each case. Id. See also Stout v. Merritt, 35 Iowa, 47; Jones v. Jones, 46 Id., 466.

Where a minor attained his majority on the 5th of January, and filed his petition on the 23d of the same month, to cancel a deed made by him during his minority, it was held that in the absence of equitable circumstances, requiring an earlier disaffirmance, the delay was not unreasonable. Id.

The only property which the party is required to return, upon disaffirming a contract made during minority, is that which was received by him by virtue of the contract and remained in his control at any time after coming of age. Id.

The general rule is that the right of a minor to avoid his contract is absolute and paramount to all equities in favor of third persons, including purchasers without notice. Id.

Under the statute, a contract made by a minor, in order to be avoided, must be disaffirmed by him within a reasonable time after he attains majority. Wright v. Germain, 21 Iowa, 585; Stucker v. Yoder et al., 33 Id., 177.

In order to avoid the contract, the party must not only disaffirm the same, but redeem or tender to the other party what he received under the contract, within a reasonable time after attaining his majority. Stout v. Merrill, 35 Id., 47. But this rule does not apply when the minor has never received anything either from his guardian or otherwise on the contract. Lyon v. Vanatta, 35 Iowa, 522.

Where a minor owns an undivided interest in real property, which has been sold for taxes, he can redeem to the extent of his interest only. Stout v. Merrill, 35 Iowa, 147.

The right of a minor to redeem from tax sale is a transferrable interest, which may be conveyed by deed. Id.

Where a minor entered into a contract with his father respecting his share of the estate, which he failed to disaffirm within six months after attaining his majority, he was held, not entitled to disaffim it after that length of time had elapsed. Jones v. Jones, 46 Iowa, 466.

Where a minor has rendered services in accord with the terms of a contract entered into by himself, and has received payment for the same, such payment is a full satisfaction for the services and the parent cannot recover a second time therefor. Murphy v. Johnson, 45 Iowa, 57.

The father has a right to the care and custody of his minor children, and when he is deprived thereof by another he has a right of action therefor. The statute has not so far modified the common law as to take away these rights, or the right to sue and recover for the minors services. Everett v. Sherfey, 1 Iowa, 357. So held under the code of 1851.

The father may emancipate his minor child, or abandon his right of control, and in the absence of statutory requirements such emancipation need not be evidenced by any formal or recorded act, but may be proved like any other fact. Wolcott v. Rickey et al., 22 Iowa, 171; See also Nixon v. Spencer, 16 Id., 214.

This section which provides that a minor is bound by his contract, unless he disaffirms it, "and restores to the other party all money or property received by him by virtue of his contract, and remaining within his control," only requires a return of the identical money or property, and not the payment of other money or property which he may have at the time of disaffirmance. Hanes v. The C. B. R. & N. Ry. Co., 64 Iowa, 316 following Jenkins v. Jenkins 12 Id., 195.

The effect of these cases operates as a construction of this section that the minor seeking to disaffirm his contract may do so without restoring the money or property received by him by virtue of his contract, if such money or proporty is no longer within his control.

That the property conveyed by the ward without consideration has psased into the hands of an innocent purchaser will not prevent the revocation of the deed. Gates v. Carpenter, 43 Iowa, 152.

A minor may disaffirm a contract made by him, at any time thereafter, during his minority or within a reasonable time thereafter. This section is not intented to prevent a disaffirmance during minority, but only to fix a limit to the time when it may be made. Childs v. Dobbins 55 Iowa 205.

The earnings of a minor child who, with his father's consent, has been doing business for a number of years upon his own means and in good faith, are not liable to the claims of creditors of the father; nor is a homestead purchased for the family by such means thus liable. Wolcott v. Rickey et. al., 22 Iowa, 171.

What is a reasonable time after majority, under this section of the statute within which the infant may disaffirm his contract made during his infancy, will depend upon the circumstances of each case. It

was held in a case where the plaintiff did not act to disaffirm except to bring an action for that purpose, three years and eight months after attaining his majority, and three months after being legally advised his right to disaffirm, that the action was not brought within a reasonable time; and, the fact that she had been duly informed by persons not qualified to give legal advice, that she could not bring an action to disaffirm until her infant brother became of full age, was not in the eye of the law, a sufficient excuse for the delay. Green v. Wilding, 59 Iowa, 679.

SEC. 2239. Misrepresentations of.-No contract can be thus disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own misrepresentations, as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe the minor capable of contracting.

If a minor who is engaged in business for himself possesses property and manages his affairs as an adult, persons dealing with him are justified in concluding that he is capable of making contracts; and this is not limited to the particular business in which the minor is engaged but applies to all contracts he may make. Jacques v. Sax, 39 Iowa, 367.

To render a minor who engages in business, and holds himself out as capable of contracting, liable as an adult under this section, his infancy must have been unknown to the person contracting with him. If known to him the statute creates no shield to the disaffirmance of the contract. Beller v. Marchant, 30 Iowa, 350.

A minor may disaffirm a contract made by him, at any time thereafter during his minority or within a reasonable time thereafter. This section is not intended to prevent a disaffirmance during minority but only to fix a limit to the time when it may be made. Childs v. Dobbins, 55 Iowa, 205.

An order of court authorizing a guardian to revoke the deed of his ward is not necessary where there was no consideration for the deed and no act of revocation is necessary other than application to a court of equity. Gates v. Carpenter, 43 Iowa, 152.

That the property conveyed by the minor without consideration has passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser, will not prevent the revocation of the deed. Id.

SEC. 2240. Payments to.-Where a contract for the personal service of a minor has been made with him alone, and those services are afterwards performed, payment made therefor to such minor in accordance with the terms of the contract, is a full satisfaction for those services, and the parent or guardian cannot recover therefor a second time.

Where the contract for personal service of a minor is made with him alone, with knowledge of the parent, and those ser

vices are afterwards performed, and paid for to the minor, without fraud and in accordance with the terms of the contract, such payment will operate as full satisfaction for the services rendered; and the parent or guardian cannot recover therefor. Nixon v. Spencer, 16 Iowa, 214; Murphy v. Johnson, 45 Id., 57.

This section provides that when a minor has made a contract for services, and rendered the same and received payment therefor, the parent cannot again recover. Everett v. Sherfrey, 1 Iowa, 357.

The parent may emancipate a minor child, or abandon the right of control, and in the absence of statutory requirements such emancipation need not be evidenced by any formal or recorded act, but may be proved as any other fact. Everett v. Sherfrey 1 Iowa, 357. See also Wolcott v. Rickey, 22 Id., 171.

CHAPTER XXVII.

OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS, DRUNKARDS, SPENDTHRIFTS AND LUNATICS.

SECTION, 2241. Natural Guardians.-The parents are the natural guardians of their minor children, and are equally entitled to the care and custody of them.

The mother as the natural guardian of the person of her minor son, the father being dead, is entitled to recover for the personal services of the son. Cain v. Devitt, 8 Iowa, 116.

Under this section, as it now stands, the right of the father to the care and the custody of a minor child is not paramount to that of the mother. In controversies respecting the custody of a minor child, the controlling consideration is the best interests of the child. A child fifteen months old, and unweaned, was held to have been properly awarded to the custody of the mother, she not being shown to be an improper person to have such custody. The State v. Kirkpatrick, 54 Iowa, 373.

Notwithstanding the law of this state so clearly gives to the parents equal right to the guardianship and custody of their minor children, we can still read an occasional philipic in a woman's journal against the partiality of the law on the side of the father in this respect.

SEC. 2242. Death of either parent.-Either parent dying before the other, the survivor becomes the guardian. If there