propriety. Many animals have noxious qualities, and are to us without any conceivable use; and a great part of mankind are cut off before they attain an age sufficient to render them useful members of society. At this our reason is confounded, and we ask, For what purpose were they created? In the moral world would man have originally admitted sin, or his own positive, or at least comparative, misery in this life? and yet it pleased God so to constitute human affairs. "What I do thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter." If it were true, that whatsoever is reasonable may be discovered by reason, no bounds could be set to man's knowledge; even the secret things, which belong unto the Lord, and appear reasonable, would, on this principle, be discoverable by human intellect. How presumptuous, then,

5

Dr. Price, in his Dissertations, uses this as an argument in favour of the annihilation of the wicked after this life. He quotes Butler (Analogy, pt. i.ch. 5) respecting the great waste of nature in seeds and bodies: but Butler draws no conclusions favourable to Price's opinions; on the contrary, he tells us that the circumstance is altogether unaccountable. Perhaps the strongest text in the New Testament in favour of the doctrine is Luke xx. 35. "They which shall be accounted worthy to attain that world," seems to imply that all shall not. But, when so little is said on the subject, we should be extremely cautious in giving an opinion.

5 Rousseau and Bolingbroke assert, that reason comes slowly to our assistance. Is not this a strong argument in favour of the necessity of a revelation, especially in the first ages of the world, before men had been instructed by experience and observation? Reason is a sluggard, says the latter; yet it is upon reason he would teach us to depend.

and how great is the inconsistency between man's high pretensions to knowledge, and the ignorance which he is compelled to confess!

14. Admitting the moral attributes of the Deity, and reasoning upon them, we are often led to conclusions contrary to fact: for we do not consider, that it is one thing to see a reason for the Divine conduct, and another to see a reason against it; yet the Deist concludes, in the former case, as he would in the latter. There may be nothing incomprehensible in the reason of our belief, although there may be in the truth which is believed; but these two circumstances are frequently confounded: e.g. nothing is, perhaps, more above the reason of man, than to explain the wisdom of God in creating and placing him in the state which human life is shown to be; but it is so. The mode of God's existence is incomprehensible; but the grounds on which we believe His existence are reasonable and conclusive. It has been said, that if reason be not sufficient to direct us, the original constitution of things must have been defective; but such assumption takes for granted the very truth to be proved-" that it was intended reason should be sufficient."

15. In the moral world we are ignorant wherein perfection consists, because we are ignorant of the whole plan of Divine government, and cannot explain the apparent contradictions of the Divine attributes: how, e. g., mercy and justice can meet together. Take the attribute of forgiveness, and

the utmost we can gather from reason is, that God will not punish. The plan to save mankind was conceived before his fall, but not executed till four thousand years after. God hath never forgotten to be gracious; and, if revelation has promulgated truths which natural religion could never have imparted, surely the very basis of deism is destroyed. Even the law of nature is not understood by the illiterate; nay, it is not even agreed upon by the learned; but the Deist is employed in undermining revelation without substituting anything in its stead.

16. Modern Deists attempt to fathom the wisdom of the Deity, and make our ways His, or, at least, what they ought to be, according to their conceptions. The light of nature, on the contrary, led the wisest, and amongst them, the most moral heathen, to hope for a Divine revelation, which should effect something more than "intimate eternity to man." On the contrary, turn to the creed

"If you reject Christianity, you reject, at all events, what may be the word of God, and trust, till this life is ended, to have the momentous truth made manifest, "What is to become of me hereafter?" If you assent to the doctrines of the Gospel, even if untrue, you lose nothing, and, consequently, act on the safer side; and, although this may not to the Deist be an argument in proof of Christianity, it is an argument which no prudent man would reject, without giving it some consideration. To assert carelessly that revelation may be an imposition, is not argument; but it is a lax way of speaking, which may unsettle many a man's religious opinions, or raise doubts which would not otherwise have occurred.

of the Deist: his religion is circumscribed, alas! within the narrow bounds of social duty. He may be honest, and practise those civilities of life which society absolutely requires; but he offers up nor prayers, nor praises, nor thanksgivings to his Creator; and his religion, if it were not degrading it by such a term, consists solely in the morality of his actions.

17. If neither the Jewish nor the Christian religion be true, then God has permitted the world to be imposed upon in the most essential article of this life, by allowing a fraud to have prevailed for so long a period; and, having to contend with a Deist, we are warranted in tying him down to the first article in our Creed, "I believe in God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." When, therefore, the Deist refers all his duties and obligations to a consideration of the Divine nature, and human experience of it, how can he maintain that such a fraud, on the part of the Deity, could have been permitted, consistent with His attributes of wisdom, and justice, and mercy-consistent with what he calls the eternal fitness of things, and the rule of right?

18. Should it be urged that Mahometism contradicts our argument, it may be answered: that Mahomet admitted the truth of the Mosaic and the Christian dispensations, but promulgated doctrines fundamentally opposite to both. As the founder of a new religion, he consequently stood self-condemned; and, as is well observed by Paley, "If you

admit the whole of Mahomet's history, so far as it was capable of being known or witnessed by others, to be true, still he might be an impostor or enthusiast." It must also be remembered, that the religion of this prophet depended on the success of his arms; and, if you could keep out of the reach of his sword, you need not fear the edge of his arguments.

19. If, from the creation, God had never interfered in human affairs, never shown Himself by miraculous interpositions, Atheism must have been the consequence; which the deist is equally concerned to abjure with the Christian. But it appears that there never was a period in which man was not under the protection of God, which even the heathen writers acknowledge; and, in fact, their religion seems to have been, in some measure, derived from the writings of Moses.

20. On the supposition that revelation is an imposition, why have not like impositions been hazarded, considering how successful they have been in the instances of Moses and Jesus Christ? But, with the exception of Mahometism, which the deist also rejects, there have not existed any pretended revelations, deserving attention, for eighteen hundred years. Men's passion for distinction and love of novelty are the same, if not greater; and, amongst the adventurers for fame, it might be expected that some bold candidates would have arisen, if imposture had held out sufficient encouragement for the undertaking.